STACK 
ANNEX 


061 
9*4 


Some  Phases  in  the  Development 
of  the  Subjective  Point  of  ^Oie^w 
during  the  Post- Aristotelian  Period 


VAGNY  GUNHILDA  SUNNE 


PHILOSOPHIC  STUDIES 

ISSUED  UNDER  THE  DIRECTION  OF  THE  DEPARTMENT  OF 
PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  CHICAGO 

NUMBER  3 


THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  CHICAGO  PRESS 
CHICAGO,  ILLINOIS 


The  Department  of  Philosophy  of  the  University  of  Chicago  issues 
a  series  of  monographs  in  philosophy,  including  ethics,  logic  and  meta- 
physics, aesthetics,  and  the  history  of  philosophy.  The  successive 
monographs  are  numbered  consecutively  with  a  view  to  their  subsequent 
publication  in  volumes.  These  studies  are  similar  to  the  series  of 
Contributions  to  Philosophy,  but  do  not  contain  psychological  papers  or 
reprints  of  articles  previously  published. 


SOME  PHASES  IN  THE  DEVELOPMENT 

OF  THE  SUBJECTIVE  POINT  OF  VIEW  DURING 

THE  POST-ARISTOTELIAN  PERIOD 


THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  CHICAGO  PRESS 
CHICAGO.  ILLINOIS 


Bgente 
THE  BAKER  &  TAYLOR  COMPANY 

NEW    TOBK 

CAMBRIDGE  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 

LONDON    AND    EDINBURGH 


SOME  PHASES  IN  THE  DEVELOPMENT 
OF  THE  SUBJECTIVE  POINT  OF  VIEW 
DURING  THE  POST-ARISTOTELIAN 
PERIOD 


BY 
DAGNY  GUNHILDA  SUNNE 


B 


THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  CHICAGO  PRESS 
CHICAGO.  ILLINOIS 


COPYRIGHT  1911  BY 
THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  CHICAGO 


Published  March  1911 


Composed  and  Printed  By 

The  University  of  Chicago  Press 

Chicago,  Illinois,  U.S.A. 


Stack 
Annex 

r 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

I.  INTRODUCTION         .         .         . 9 

1 .  The  Difference  in  Philosophic  Standpoint  between  Aristotle  and 
St.  Augustine 

2.  Indications  of  Interest  in  Inner  Experience  during  the  Pre- 
Aristotelian  Period 

3.  Development  of  Biological  Psychology  and  Realistic  Episte- 
mology  by  Aristotle 

4.  Scientific  Method  Based  on  This  Theory  of  Knowledge 

II.  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  SUBJECTIVE  STANDPOINT  IN  STOICISM         .        18 

1.  Introduction:  Social  and  Political  Conditions;  Chief  Phases  of 
the  Development  of  the  Subjective  Attitude 

2.  Attempts  at  a  Theory  of  Knowledge  on  a  Subjective  Basis  by 
the  Older  Stoa 

A.  Doctrine  of  Assent  with  Reference  to  Sense-Perception 

a)  Zeno's  Contribution 

b)  Limitation  of  Assent  through  Skeptical  Criticism 

B.  Objective  Character  of  the  Object  of  Knowledge:  the  Con- 
troversy between  Cleanthes  and  Chrysippus 

C.  Analysis  of  Cognition  on  the  Basis  of  Assent:  Chrysippus 
a)  Assent  Basal  in  Cognitive  Functions 

6)  Analysis  of  the  Object  of  Knowledge 

c)  Preconception  as  a  Criterion 

D.  Development  of   the   Subjective  Attitude   in  Regard  to 
Concepts:  Doctrine  of  the  \cKr6v 

3.  Increased  Subjectivism  in  the  Middle  Stoa 

A.  Social  Conditions 

B.  Growth  of  Introspection 

a)  Increased  Psychological  Analysis 

6)  The  Function  of  Reason 

c)  The  Criterion;  Analysis  of  Attention 

4.  The  Subjective  Attitude  Dominant  in  Later  Stoicism 
A.  Social  and  Political  Conditions  of  Roman  Stoicism 

5 


2067300 


6  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

l 

PAGE 

B.  Subjective  Attitude  in  Ethics 

a)  Cicero,  Transition  from  External  to  Internal  Control 

b)  Seneca 

(1)  Psychological  Analysis 

(2)  Moral  Reformation 

(3)  Spirituality  in  Religion 

(4)  Political  Conflicts 

C.  Ethical  and  Religious  Environment  of  Later  Stoicism 

D.  Increased  Emphasis  on  Self-Consciousness 

a)  From  the  Individual  Standpoint:  Epictetus 

(1)  Reflective  Consciousness 

(2)  Self-Consciousness — the  Daemon 

(3)  Theory  of  Knowledge 

(4)  Autonomy  of  Will 

6)  From  the  Universal  Point  of  View:   M.  Aurelius 

(1)  Cosmic  Interrelationship 

(2)  Social  Relationship 

(3)  Autonomy  of  the  Spiritual  Element  in  the  Soul 

(4)  Self-Consciousness  in  Religion 

III.  EFFECT  OF  THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  SUBJECTIVE  ATTITUDE  ON 

SCIENTIFIC  METHOD         ........        49 

1.  Introspective  Psychology  and  Inductive  Method:  Epicurus 

A.  Thought  and  Sense-Perception  as  Psychological  Processes 

B.  Judgment  and  Inferential  Reasoning 

2.  Changes  in  Method  of  Later  Epicureans  Due  to  Advance  in 
Psychology 

3.  Problem  of  Attention  in  Relation  to  Method 

A.  Practical  Standpoint  of  Pyrrho  and  Arcesilas 

B.  Analysis  of  Attention  and  Scientific  Procedure  by  Carneades 

C.  Analysis  of  Inference  in  Theory  of  Signs  by  Carneades, 
Middle  Stoa,  and  Progressive  Epicureans 

4.  Demolition  of  Deductive  Analysis  and  Formal  Scientific  Con- 
cepts by  Skeptics 

A.  Destructive  Criticism  of  Scientific  Concepts  by  Aenesidemus 
and  Agrippa 

B.  Criticism  of  All  Speculative  Systems  on  the  Basis  of  Real 
and  Phenomenal  and  Outline  of  Method  of  Applied -Science: 
Sextus  Empiricus 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS  7 

PAGE 

5.  Personal  Experience  Made  Basal  in  Scientific  Procedure  by 
Empirical  Physicians 

A.  Early  Stages  of  Empirical  Method;    Influence  of  Psycho- 
logical Analysis 

B.  Value  of  Individual  Experience  Admitted  and  Occult  Causes 
Rejected  by  Celsus 

C.  Experimentation  Based  on  Personal  Observation:   Galen 

D.  Scientific  Development  of  Inductive  Method  by  Menodotus; 
Logical  Formulation  by  Sextus  Empiricus 

6.  Summary — Changes  in  Character  of  Universal;  Importance  of 
Individual  Experience;  the  Nature  of  a  Problem 

IV.  SUBJECTIVE  ATTITUDE  AS  A  BASIS  OF  METAPHYSICS     ...        78 

1.  General  Character  of  the  Imperial  Period 

2.  Neo-Platonism,  Metaphysics  Based  on  Psychology  with  the 
Emphasis  on  Intellect 

A.  The  Rise  of  Neo-Platonism 

B.  The  Soul-Body  Relation  as  a  Problem 

C.  Psychology  of  Mental  Processes  and  Reflective  Conscious- 
ness 

D.  Metaphysical  System  Based  on  Psychology 

3.  Psychology  and  Metaphysics  of  Augustine  Based  on  Analysis 
ofWiU 

V.  SUMMARY 91 


I.    INTRODUCTION 

I.   THE     DIFFERENCE     IN     PHILOSOPHIC     STANDPOINT     BETWEEN 
ARISTOTLE  AND   ST.   AUGUSTINE 

In  St.  Augustine's  philosophy  the  starting-point  is  the  same  as  in 
the  beginning  of  modern  thought,  namely,  the  certainty  of  inner  experi- 
ence. Not  even  the  Skeptic,  says  St.  Augustine,  can  doubt  sensation 
as  such;  moreover,  this  very  experience  reveals  not  only  the  content 
that  had  formed  the  basis  of  relativistic  or  positivistic  interpretations, 
but  also  the  conscious  self,  the  perceiving  subject.  For  Aristotle  and 
his  contemporaries,  perception  was  essentially  a  cognitive  process, 
apprehending  the  forms  of  sensible  objects  without  the  matter.  Such 
apprehension  of  external  objects  was  regarded  as  direct,  the  awareness 
as  awareness  of  the  objectively  real  character  of  things.  A  mind  as 
such  perceiving  was  foreign  to  their  modes  of  thinking;  the  person,  com- 
posite of  body  and  soul,  thinks  and  knows,  was  their  view.  There  is 
ample  evidence  that  self-consciousness  was  recognized  by  Plato  in  his 
theories  of  sensation;  and  that  Aristotle  made  a  psychological  analysis 
of  it  as  a  mental  phenomenon,  though  he  utterly  disregarded  it  in  his 
metaphysics  and  epistemology.  In  the  earlier  period,  therefore,  mind 
was  studied  in  its  manifestations  in  nature  and  society;  with  the  close 
of  ancient  speculation,  the  investigation  was  based  predominantly  on 
introspection  and  the  analysis  of  mental  operations  of  the  individual 
thinker.  It  is  accordingly  an  interesting  inquiry  how  this  change  of 
viewpoint  was  effected  and  what  were  the  consequent  alterations  in 
scientific  method.  Though  such  a  development  cannot  be  treated  in 
isolation  from  the  social  life,  the  scope  of  this  paper  will  allow  only  most 
general  and  cursory  references  to  the  social,  political,  and  religious 
influences  affecting  the  philosophic  thought  of  the  post-Aristotelian 
period. 

2.   INDICATIONS   OF   INTEREST   IN   INNER   EXPERIENCE    DURING   THE 
PRE-ARISTOTELIAN  PERIOD 

The  Ionian  philosophers  viewed  physical  reality  as  a  concrete  whole; 
there  was  no  antagonism  between  human  nature  and  universal  nature 
in  either  theory  or  practice.  Heraclitus  revolted  from  the  conception 
of  the  world  established  by  tradition  and  the  theories  of  teachers,  over 
against  which  he  set  up  the  claims  of  reason.  To  the  "  obscure  philos- 

9 


10       SUBJECTIVE  VIEWPOINT  IN  POST- ARISTOTELIAN  PERIOD 

opher"  scientific  research  was  difficult;  for  he  believed  there  is  an  idea 
expressed  in  things,  a  meaning  which  it  is  the  aim  of  philosophy  to  bring 
to  light.  It  seemed  to  this  ontological  idealism  that  the  strife  and 
discord  discernible  in  nature,  which  had  been  first  mentioned  by  Anaxi- 
mander,  is  an  expression  of  a  deeper  harmony.  Thus  the  notion  of 
illusion  developed,  because  the  hidden  harmony  was  regarded  as  more 
perfect  than  the  apparent.  In  this  early  development  of  philosophy 
also,  progressive  emphasis  was  laid  on  the  impersonal  element  in  nature 
till  in  Democritus  the  gods  were  abolished.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
system  of  Parmenides  which  influenced  to  a  marked  extent  the  thinking  of 
his  successors  made  no  attempt  to  explain  or  even  describe  nature,  but 
endeavored  to  clarify  an  idea  that  should  be  the  permanent  truth  about 
things. 

Athwart  this  philosophic  development  came  the  humanistic  move- 
ment of  Sophism.  The  Sophist  discovered  the  world  to  be  himself 
and  hence  all  inquiry  had  a  personal  aim.  Doubting  any  positive  knowl- 
edge of  the  world  of  nature,  he  turned  to  the  more  comprehensible  life 
in  society.  Now  appeared  the  first  attempt  at  a  study  of  mind,  which 
was  further  developed  by  Socrates.  Thus  the  Sophists  from  an  indi- 
vidualistic, and  Socrates  with  his  followers  from  a  universalistic  stand- 
point investigated  the  human  mind  in  its  social  aspect. 

Though  the  distinction  between  sensation  and  reason  was  early  made 
in  Greek  philosophy,  metaphysical  interests  predominated.  All  mental 
processes  were  conceived  as  material  operations.  In  its  origin  Greek 
psychology  was  a  division  of  physics  or  physiology.  Cognition  was  con- 
sidered a  property  of  the  matter  composing  the  human  organism.  Em- 
pedocles  first  touched  on  the  distinction  between  sensory  and  physical 
facts  in  his  doctrine  of  symmetry  and  similarity  between  object  and 
sense-organ.  He  attempted  to  exhibit  a  common  element  in  the  various 
kinds  of  sense-perceptions  but  denied  any  fundamental  difference  between 
them  and  physical  processes.  Yet  from  his  time  on,  two  opposite  stand- 
points are  apparent  in  philosophy :  the  assertion  or  the  denial  of  a  funda- 
mental distinction  between  physical  interaction  and  sense-perception.1 

In  accordance  with  his  physical  theories,  Democritus  regarded 
thought  and  sensation  as  bodily  changes  because  he  had  observed  that 
both  these  activities  depend  on  the  organism.  The  distinction  between 
Ao'yos  and  ato-flrjo-is  had  already  been  drawn.  Therefore,  there  must  be 
two  regions  of  knowledge:  one  dealing  with  an  intelligible  world — the 
formation  of  things  from  atoms — the  other  with  sense-perceptions.  All 

1  Cf.  Beare  294-95. 


INTRODUCTION  II 

sensations  were  explained  in  terms  of  direct  contact  and  mechanical 
manifestations  of  pressure  and  impact.  Thinking  was  supposed  to 
take  place  when  the  soul-atoms  are  harmoniously  united.  Thus  the 
difference  between  sense  and  thought  processes  was  held  to  be  that  of 
impact  versus  organized  physical  movement.  So  Democritus  tried  to 
formulate  the  principle  to  which  pure  knowledge  must  conform  and  to 
state  it  as  a  relation  of  concepts  to  sense-perception,  not  in  terms  of 
subjective  functions  but  in  those  of  objective  contents.  It  is  typical  of 
the  thoroughness  of  Democritus  that  he  attempted  on  the  basis  of  the 
atoms  to  explain  the  world  as  perceived  and  thought  out.  In  the 
previous  systems,  the  differences  between  the  two  realms  had  been 
pointed  out  and  made  irreconcilable.  Democritus  tried  to  give  a 
thoroughly  scientific  explanation  of  their  connection,  that  is,  of  mind 
and  its  relations,  from  the  physical  side. 

Plato  on  the  other  hand  was  the  first  philosopher  to  demarcate 
sense-perception  from  physical  reaction  by  defining  sensation  as  a 
movement  common  to  soul  and  body.  Here  sensation  signifies  any 
immediate  consciousness,  perception  including  pleasure-pain.  He  con- 
tended that  sensationalism  cannot  account  for  the  synthesizing  activity 
of  thought  and  rejected  psychological  analysis  based  on  physical  analo- 
gies. We  find  in  Plato  an  opposition  not  so  much  between  soul 
and  body  as  between  thought  and  sense — one  faculty  over  against  another. 
Against  the  Protagorean  theory  that  sensible  objects  possess  their  so- 
called  attributes  only  by  acting  and  being  acted  upon  in  the  interplay  of 
object  and  sense-organ,  Plato  insisted  that  the  defects  of  sense  are  not 
in  the  perceiving  subject  but  in  the  object,  for  the  particulars  of  sense 
are  incessantly  changing.  No  scientific  treatment  of  psychological 
problems  is  given,  though  there  are  numerous  examples  of  introspective 
analysis  unequaled  for  keenness  and  subtlety.  For  the  metaphysical 
and  ethical  implications  of  mind  as  objectified  in  society  viewed  from 
a  spiritual  standpoint  formed  the  chief  subject  of  investigation. 

3.   DEVELOPMENT   OF   BIOLOGICAL  PSYCHOLOGY  AND   REALISTIC 
EPISTEMOLOGY   BY  ARISTOTLE 

The  construction  of  a  thoroughly  realistic  epistemology  based  on  a 
correlation  of  physics  with  psychology  was  one  of  the  achievements  of 
Aristotle.  In  accordance  with  his  teleological  standpoint  he  deals  in 
his  psychological  treatise  with  soul  as  belonging  to  all  animate  beings. 
Soul  as  such  he  considers  a  mere  logical  entity.  It  is  possible  to  give  a 
purely  generic  definition  of  soul  as  of  geometrical  figure,  but  there  is 


12       SUBJECTIVE  VIEWPOINT  IN  POST- ARISTOTELIAN  PERIOD 

nothing  corresponding  to  it  apart  from  the  particular  kinds  of  soul.1 
Aristotle  criticizes  severely  the  treatment  of  mental  processes  in  the 
abstract  as  well  as  the  limitation  of  observations  to  the  human  soul. 
It  is  the  embodied  individual  that  is  the  subject  under  consideration. 
The  view  of  the  soul  as  an  entity  is  vigorously  opposed;  the  soul  is 
simply  the  eiSos  of  a  concrete  living  being.  It  is  not  the  soul  that 
learns  and  pities;  man  learns  and  pities  with  his  soul.2  And  yet  Aris- 
totle speaks  of  the  soul  as  the  subject  of  sensations,  feelings,  and  thoughts; 
and  the  very  fact  that  he  so  often  refers  to  a  central  organ  apparently 
signifies  a  tendency  to  locate  some  peculiarly  psychical  part. 

Activity  is  the  basal  principle  of  Aristotle's  psychology  just  as  motion 
is  fundamental  in  his  physics.  His  theory  implies  that  a  process  of 
the  human  organism  is  of  the  same  kind  as  some  motion  in  the  external 
world.  When  a  movement  is  caused  by  the  stimulation  of  the  sense- 
organs,  the  form  of  the  external  object  is  communicated  to  the  organism. 
The  content  of  sensation  or  thought,  whether  in  the  sense-organ  or  in 
the  physical  world,  is  equally  objective.  Aristotle  believed  that  the 
assertion  of  the  relativity  of  perceptions  and  the  denial  of  the  objective 
validity  of  sense-qualities  on  the  part  of  earlier  philosophers  were  due 
to  their  failure  to  distinguish  the  ambiguity  of  the  terms  sensation  and 
sensible  thing.  "When  they  mean  the  actual  sensation  and  the  actual 
sensible  the  statement  [that  without  seeing  there  is  neither  white  nor 
black,  without  tasting  no  flavor,  etc.]  holds  good;  when  they  mean 
potential  sensation  and  potential  sensible  this  is  not  the  case."3 

According  to  Aristotle  the  first  two  stages  of  cognition,  sense-percep- 
tion and  reproductive  imagination,4  furnish  the  content  of  common-sense; 
this  same  content,  regarded  as  potential,  is  the  passive  reason  on  which 
creative  reason  operates.  Aristotle  received  the  groundwork  of  his 
theory  of  sensation  from  Plato.  He  defines  it  as  the  transmission  of 
some  stimulus  or  impression  through  the  body  to  the  soul.5  In  this 
manner  he  connects  physics  and  empirical  psychology.  By  means  of 
his  physical  theories  of  motion,  efficient  cause,  matter  and  form,  potenti- 
ality and  actuality,  he  demarcates  sensation  from  physical  interaction 
and  explains  the  relation  of  sensation  to  sense-organ,  and  of  perceiving 
subject  to  sensible  object.  In  the  reception  of  the  form  of  a  thing  with- 
out the  matter,  object  and  act  are  correlative;  they  can  be  distinguished 
logically,  though  in  the  perceptive,  process  they  coincide.6  The  par- 

1  De  An.  413-15,  013.  *  <pavraffia. 

2  Ibid.  408,  bi2.  s  De  Somno  454,  07. 

3  Ibid.  425,  020.  6  De  An.  425,  ^26. 


INTRODUCTION  13 

ticulars  of  sense  are  restricted  to  some  special  quality.  To  explain  a 
complete  act  of  sense-perception  Aristotle  had  recourse  to  the  sensus 
communis,  the  common  unifying  and  discriminating  function  of  sense,1 
to  which  was  ascribed  the  comparison  of  sense-data,  the  apprehension 
of  the  common  sensibles  and  of  concrete  objects  and  reflective  con- 
sciousness, imagination,  and  memory.  The  objects  of  sense-perception, 
classified  as  specific,  common,  and  incidental,  are  all  treated  as  present 
data  and  as  given  elements  in  sensuous  experience.2 

As  a  fundamental  principle  of  his  account  of  favTaa-ia.,  the  faculty 
of  reproductive  imagination,3  Aristotle  posits  the  frequent  persistence 
of  sense-impressions.  The  stronger  affections  of  the  sense-organs  over- 
come the  weaker  so  that  these  are  only  potentially  present  in  the  sense- 
organs  until  brought  to  consciousness  by  being  conveyed  to  the  organ 
of  central  sense.4  Hence  sensuous  impressions5  and  images6  are  identical 
as  to  content  and  differ  in  function  alone.  "When  the  stimulus  occurs, 
it  imprints  as  it  were  a  mould  of  the  sense-affection,  exactly  as  a  seal 
ring  acts  in  stamping."7  Then  in  regard  to  images: 

As  the  animal  depicted  on  the  panel  is  both  animal  and  representation, 
and,  while  remaining  one  and  the  self-same  thing,  is  both  these,  though  in  aspect 
of  existence  the  two  are  not  the  same,  and  we  can  regard  it  both  as  animal  and 
copy;  so,  too,  the  image  in  us  must  be  considered  as  being  both  an  object  of 
direct  consciousness  in  itself  and  relative  to  something  else  a  copy.8 

By  means  of  the  fact  of  error  Aristotle  discriminated  sense  from 
thought,9  just  as  he  distinguished  t^avraaia  from  both  these  processes 
by  reference  to  belief.10  Thought  both  in  its  discursive  and  in  its 
intuitive  function  is  analogous  to  sense-perception."  In  actual  thinking 
the  universal  and  intelligible  element  implicit  in  the  sensible,  it  was  held, 
becomes  explicit.  Thought  dealing  with  universals  discovers  its  objects 
within  itself,  while  sense-perception  receives  its  stimulus  from  particular 
external  objects.  Though  nothing  exists  self-dependent  but  the  extended 
objects  of  sense-impression,  concepts  in  which  essence  and  existence  are 
identical  are  also  owrfat  in  a  sense."  Such  simple  ultimate  concepts 

1  Ibid.  425,  013-21;  De  Mem.  450,  ai2. 
3  De  An.  418,  07-25,  428-29. 

3  Ibid.  428,  bg.  s  a&flij/iara. 

4  De  Insom.  459-61;  De  Sensu  447,  015.  6  QavrdfffjMTa.. 
?  De  Mem.  450,  031-64. 

8  Ibid.  450,  623-451,  024;  cf.  Spinoza  Eth.  II,  16. 

9  De  An.  427,  61-5.  "  Ibid.  426-27,  a. 

10  Ibid.  427,  65-428,  ai6.  "  Ibid.  429,  612. 


14       SUBJECTIVE  VIEWPOINT  IN  POST-  ARISTOTELIAN  PERIOD 

form  the  starting-point  of  science.  The  mind  can  deal  only  with  forms 
of  sensible  objects  or  concepts  realized  in  them.  Hence  images  must  be 
present  in  the  absence  of  concrete  object,1  and  the  perceptual  form 
becomes  the  matter  of  such  concepts  as  cannot  exist  apart  from  the 
continuity  of  such  context.  The  objective  counterparts2  of  these 
conceptions  have  their  concrete  existence  in  the  sensible  forms  of  objects. 
The  universal  was  thus  regarded  as  potentially  immanent  in  the  con- 
crete particular,  and  hence  reason  discovers  its  content  both  in  itself 
and  in  the  perceptual  world.  Aristotle  held  that  it  is  impossible  to 
know  whether  the  subjective  affections  are  qualitatively  alike  in  two 
individuals  or  species;  but  when  the  objective  content  is  identical,  it 
must  be  assumed  that  the  affection  is  the  same.  The  sensation  as  imme- 
diate experience  varies  with  the  individual,  but  as  quality  is  identical  for 
all.3  Aristotle  states  the  gist  of  his  psychology  and  epistemology  as 
follows: 

Somehow  the  soul  is  all  existent  things.  For  they  are  all  either  objects  of 
sensation  or  objects  of  thought;  and  knowledge  and  sensation  are  in  a  manner 
identical  with  their  respective  objects  .....  Knowledge  and  sensation, 
then,  are  subdivisions  to  correspond  to  the  things.  Potential  knowledge  and 
sensation  answer  to  things  which  are  potential,  actual  knowledge  and  sensation 
to  things  which  are  actual  .....  Since  apart  from  sensible  magnitude  there 
is  nothing  as  it  would  seem  independently  existent,  it  is  in  the  sensible  forms 
that  the  intelligible  forms  exist,  both  the  abstractions  of  mathematics  as  they 
are  called  and  all  the  qualities  and  attributes  of  sensible  things.4 

Aristotle,  therefore,  started  with  the  assumption  that  objects  exist 
and  can  be  known;  his  problem  was  how  an  individual,  a  bodily  organ- 
ism, functions  in  knowing.  His  explanation  was  that  in  the  act  of 
cognition,  the  knowable  character  of  the  object  is  in  the  thinker. 
Sense  is  a  faculty  of  receiving  the  form,5  the  knowable  character  or 
meaning  of  a  thing,  and  thinking  is  defined  in  the  same  terms.6  Hence 
the  elSos  of  the  sensible  object  exists  actually  only  in  the  process  of 
perception  and  is  identified  numerically  and  specifically  with  the 
in  the  soul.7 


1  De  Mem.  450,  012-15. 
3  De  An.  421,  61-20;  De  Sensu 
*  De  An.  429. 

s  Ibid.  424,  ai8.  6  Ibid.  429,  015. 

7  De  An.  426,  015;  Metaph.  1010,  61-30;  (in  De  Mem.  425,  616-17,  it  seems  that 
the  eTSoj  exists  already  realized  in  the  external  object). 


INTRODUCTION  1 5 

It  is  significant  for  the  development  of  thought  in  this  period,  that 
reflective  consciousness  was  clearly  recognized  by  Aristotle  but  other- 
wise disregarded,  though  Plato  had  called  attention  to  this  mental 
phenomenon.  "A  sight  which  sees  itself  will  be  regarded  as  incredible 
by  some,"  he  remarked;  and  then  added  significantly,  "though  not  by 
others."  Aristotle  raised  the  question  how  we  perceive  that  we  see 
and  hear,  and  his  answer  was:  "  There  is  a  common  power  which  accom- 
panies all  the  special  senses  and  by  which  the  mind  perceives  both  that  it 
sees  and  hears,  since  it  is  not  by  sight  it  sees  that  it  sees,"  but  in  virtue 
of  a  common  faculty  accompanying  the  special  sensations.1  Aristotle 
was  also  aware  of  the  importance  of  this  form  of  reflective  consciousness. 

In  one  passage  he  says,  "He  who  sees  perceives  that  he  sees We 

perceive  that  we  perceive,  think  that  we  think,  and  so  on.  For  us  our 
existence  consists  in  this  very  perceiving  that  we  perceive  and  thinking 
that  we  think."2  But  all  the  mental  processes  from  sense-perception  up 
to  scientific  knowledge  deal  with  their  respective  objects,  and  cognizance 
of  their  own  activity  is  a  by-function.3  In  view  of  the  great  stress  put 
on  will  in  the  post- Alexandrian  period,  it  is  of  interest  to  notice  that 
Aristotle  made  a  connection  between  thought  and  desire  by  means  of 
</>avTcurta.4  In  his  treatment  of  recollection,  he  speaks  of  it  as  a  search 
depending  on  will,  thus  recognizing  its  purposive  character.  So  he 
also  asserted  that  the  distinctions  between  truth  and  falsehood  made  by 
theoretical  reason  are  generically  the  same  as  the  objects  of  pursuit  and 
avoidance  of  practical  reason,  good  and  evil.5  But  this  line  of  investiga- 
tion was  not  further  developed.  Such  a  position  toward  will  and  reflect- 
ive consciousness  was  due  to  the  view  held  of  cognition  and  epitomizes 
the  great  contrast  between  the  philosophical  attitude  at  the  beginning 
and  end  of  the  post-Aristotelian  period. 

4.    SCIENTIFIC    METHOD    BASED    ON    THIS    THEORY    OF    KNOWLEDGE 

As  thought  is  concerned  either  with  recognition  and  contemplation 
of  truth  or  with  devising  rules  for  producing  results,  Aristotle  held  that 
science  must  be  either  theoretical  or  practical.  The  first  principle  of 
the  former  disciplines  cannot  be  proved  and  the  end  of  the  latter  can 
form  no  matter  for  deliberation.  Scientific  knowledge  of  universals 


1  De  An.  425,  62;  DeSom.  455,  015. 

2  2V.  Eth.  1170,  029;  Beare  289. 

3  irdpepyov.   Met.  1074,  635. 

4  Z)e  ^4w.  433,  09;  De  Mem.  453,  012. 
s  De  An.  431  ^10;  TV.  Eth.  1139,  026. 


16       SUBJECTIVE  VIEWPOINT  IN  POST- ARISTOTELIAN  PERIOD 

is  based  on  experiential  knowledge  of  particulars.  True  perception 
is  possible  and  its  objects  actual;1  the  doubts  raised  in  regard  to  sense- 
perception  are  due  to  the  application  made  of  it.2  The  object  of  per- 
ception is  implicitly  universal.  "The  concrete  individual  is  perceived 
but  the  perception  is  of  the  universal,  as  for  example,  of  a  man,  not  of 
Kallias,  a  man."3  Ultimate  principles  are  apprehended  by  induction 
in  the  Socratic  sense.  For  sense-perception  gives  rise  to  memory  which 
depends  on  the  experienced  connection  of  facts,  whether  that  of  conti- 
guity, similarity,  or  contrast,  and  "repeated  memories  of  the  same  object 
to  experience;  ....  and  experience  leads  to  the  principles  of  art  and 
science."4  Psychologically,  then,  the  mind  comes  by  the  apprehension 
of  such  principles  by  induction  from  examples  of  their  truth  in  concrete 
cases. 

But  such  induction  merely  makes  possible  the  direct  intuition  of 
the  implied  principles,  but  does  not  prove  them;  for  they  are  not  prov- 
able.5 "Some  first  principles  are  seen  by  induction,  others  by  per- 
ception, others  by  a  sort  of  habituation,  and  some  in  one  way  and  others 
in  another."6  By  perception  or  direct  insight  the  first  principles  of 
mathematics  are  recognized.  In  more  complex  subjects,  especially  the 
physical  sciences,  the  truth  of  a  proposition  can  be  seen  only  as  exempli- 
fied in  a  number  of  instances.  Demonstration  or  scientific  analysis 
as  discussed  in  the  analytics  has  to  do  only  with  middle  terms,  that  is, 
with  causes  in  the  theoretical  sciences  and  means  in  the  practical.  At 
each  end  of  this  process  recourse  must  be  had  to  immediate  insight 
whether  sensuous  or  intellectual.7  The  instrument  for  getting  at 
mediate  propositions  is  the  syllogism  which  is  the  only  form  of  proof 
whether  in  demonstrative  or  deliberative  analysis.8  Hence  there  are 
two  forms  of  reasoning,  the  purely  scientific  and  the  inferential.9 

Empiricism  as  developed  in  Aristotle  was  probably  due  to  his  associ- 
ation with  medical  pursuits,  more  particularly  with  the  method  of 
Hippocrates  who  combined  remarkable  ability  of  diagnosis  with  clear 
insight  into  the  importance  of  experience.  But  Aristotle  develops 
and  proves  his  theories  not  by  observation  but  by  reasoning.  The 
observed  facts  are  instances  of  the  general  proposition,  which  when 
clearly  perceived  becomes  immutable  and  elevated  beyond  the  possi- 
'  Met.  iv.  5-6. 

2  De  An.  428,  618.  6  N.  Eth.  1098,  63. 

3  An.  Post.  100,  ai6;  N.  Eth.  1143,  a35-  7  fbid.  1142,  azj. 

4  De  Mem.  451,  632;  An.  Post.  ii.  100,  a.  8  Ibid.  1139,  a6. 

5  Ibid.  91,  633.  9  tirisTi)iioinicbv  ical  XoyiffTucbv. 


INTRODUCTION  17 

bility  of  proof  or  refutation.  Concepts  were  thus  clearly  stated  and 
then  organized.  No  mere  observation,  however,  had  scientific  value. 
The  importance  of  exactly  defined  investigation  was  recognized;  but 
only  the  completely  generalized  form  was  an  object  of  knowledge. 

In  the  pre-Socratic  period  matter  was  the  knowable  phase  of  nature. 
With  the  Socratic  movement  form  became  dominant,  and  through  the 
categories  of  possibility  and  realization  Aristotle  made  an  important 
advance  on  the  Platonic  ideas  by  way  of  biology.  It  was  in  this  direction 
that  he  developed  his  psychology.  Here  he  deals  not  with  consciousness 
but  only  with  the  objects  of  consciousness.  For  a  thing  has  value  for 
knowledge  only  if  it  has  the  form  of  a  universal.  In  his  scientific 
treatment,  then,  Aristotle  accepted  as  given  in  generalized  perception 
the  physical  phenomena  of  which  the  qualities  were  to  be  determined. 
No  attempt  was  made  to  analyze  the  immediate  object  of  knowledge 
into  the  conditions  out  of  which  it  arises,  or  to  investigate  the  different 
experiences  under  these  varying  conditions.  The  object  of  knowledge 
was  presented  and  then  known  because  of  its  nature.  Therefore  it  could 
only  be  analyzed  into  more  ultimate  forms  of  knowledge,  until,  when  the 
intuition  of  final  objects  of  cognition  was  achieved,  the  goal  of  science 
was  also  attained. 


II.    DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  SUBJECTIVE  STANDPOINT  IN 

STOICISM 

i.  INTRODUCTION:     SOCIAL   AND    POLITICAL    CONDITIONS;    CHIEF 

PHASES  OF  THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  SUBJECTIVE  ATTITUDE 

It  was  in  the  period  following  the  death  of  Alexander,  while  the 
Greek  world  was  in  a  turmoil  of  confusion  consequent  on  the  splitting 
up  of  the  empire  into  separate  states,  that  the  post-Aristotelian  schools 
began  to  formulate  their  position.  The  main  characteristic  of  the  time 
from  323  to  280  B.C.  was  the  predominance  of  the  individual,  as  has  been 
forcibly  brought  out  by  recent  historians.1  The  desires  and  advantages 
of  the  rulers  were  of  paramount  importance;  the  people  were  disregarded 
and  were  rarely  able  to  assert  themselves  with  success.  What  the 
generals  of  Alexander  achieved  they  owed  to  their  own  efforts;  for  the 
mingling  of  the  various  tribes  and  nationalities  under  one  government 
left  the  leaders  without  the  loyal  support  accorded  a  chieftain  from 
his  own  people  and  forced  them  to  depend  on  themselves  as  individuals. 
The  prominent  role  that  women  played  in  political  events  is  another 
indication  of  increasing  significance  of  personal  influence.  Another 
significant  fact  is  that  the  sovereign  claimed  divine  descent  or  at  least 
a  divine  mission  in  order  to  gain  his  ends  more  easily.  While  among 
the  Greeks  who  came  under  the  influence  of  kings  the  oriental  cults  and 
the  deification  of  the  rulers  transformed  the  beliefs  of  the  people,  in 
the  independent  cities,  such  as  Athens,  philosophy  attempted  in  various 
ways  to  solve  the  problems  raised  by  these  changes  in  religious  convic- 
tions as  well  as  by  Skepticism  and  also  in  general  by  the  tendency  to 
make  momentary  benefits  the  aim  of  all  endeavor.  As  philosophy  thus 
attempted  both  to  interpret  and  to  direct  this  great  social  movement, 
the  individualistic  and  subjective  point  of  view  gradually  superseded 
the  objective  standpoint  just  outlined.  It  was  especially  in  the  search 
for  the  criterion  of  truth  that  the  subjective  attitude  began  to  emerge. 

As  a  naturalist,  Aristotle  had  viewed  the  world  as  a  system  of  specific 
forms;  these  complete  organisms  could  be  explained  by  studying  the 
parts  in  reference  to  the  whole,  as  means  to  an  end.  Thus  his  investi- 
gation of  soul  was  a  biological  treatise  in  which  development,  the  transi- 
tion from  potentiality  to  realization,  was  the  keynote.  The  underlying 
motive  was  the  desire  to  exhibit  the  universal  form  in  the  empirical  data 

1  Cf .  Holm  Hist,  of  Greece  IV,  chaps.  1-3. 

18 


THE  SUBJECTIVE  STANDPOINT  IN  STOICISM  19 

of  nature  and  life,  since  the  universal  exists  potentially  in  the  concrete . 
Aristotle's  problem  was  determined  by  his  epistemological  position 
(based  on  the  Socratic  concept  and  the  Platonic  mediation  between  ideas 
and  particulars)  that  universals  are  the  only  objects  of  scientific  knowl- 
edge and  that  the  concrete  particulars,  reality  in  the  strict  sense,  are 
presented  in  sense-perception.  Hence  no  regulating  principle  was  de- 
manded or  furnished;  and  the  search  for  it  became  the  dominant  problem 
of  post-Aristotelian  philosophy. 

Discarding  the  Aristotelian  conception  of  transcendence,  the  Stoics 
developed  the  other  side  of  the  latent  dualism,  the  view  of  the  world  as 
an  organism,  by  adopting  the  Heraclitean  notion  of  primordial  fire, 
eternal,  divine,  possessed  of  thought  and  will.1  All  existing  things 
partake  of  this  divine  substance  which  appears  as  hold  or  bond  of  union 
in  inorganic  matter,  as  vital  principle  in  plants,  irrational  soul  in  animals, 
and  rational  soul  in  man.2  Together  with  significant  contrasts  in  ethics 
the  ideal  of  Aristotle  was  carried  to  its  logical  conclusion;  but  a  new 
spirit  was  introduced  with  the  doctrine  of  universal  law  and  still  more 
by  the  ever-increasing  emphasis  on  will,  self-determination,  which 
involved  a  practical  instead  of  a  theoretical  standard  of  life.  The 
concrete  was  the  object  of  study;  but  not  the  individual  in  general  so 
much  as  the  particular  person.  The  introduction  of  assent  or  acknowl- 
edgment into  the  cognitive  process  by  Zeno  was  the  entering  wedge  of 
the  subjective  standpoint.  As  the  volitional  attitude  gradually  became 
basal  in  psychology  and  epistemology,  the  need  of  a  standard  became 
imperative.  It  is  possible  to  trace  in  the  older  Stoicism  the  growing 
emphasis  on  assent  as  fundamental  in  knowledge,  the  increasing  skill 
in  psychological  analysis,  while  the  criterion  of  truth  remained  dis- 
tinctly objective.  The  problems  thus  raised  were  bequeathed  to  the 
Middle  Stoa;  then  the  stress  fell  on  attention  and  the  need  of  reason 
in  all  forms  of  knowing  was  recognized.  In  later  Stoicism  the  judgment, 
the  interpretation,  the  "  view  "  became  of  sole  importance.  The  relation 
between  universal  and  particular,  abstract  and  concrete,  remained  a 
vexing  problem  while  the  tendency  was  ever  toward  a  subjective  inter- 
pretation of  the  universal.  Thus  when  the  individual  as  such  asserted 
himself,  the  will  began  to  be  treated  as  a  specific  function,  just  as  Aristotle 
in  contrast  to  Plato  had  discriminated  activity  from  the  other  functions 
of  the  soul ;  the  more  analytic  point  of  view  tended  toward  a  transforma- 
tion of  the  philosophical  attitude. 

1  Arnim  I,  37-44. 

3  Pearson  Z.  43;  Aurel.  Med.  vi.  14;  Sext.  ix.  81. 


20       SUBJECTIVE  VIEWPOINT  IN  POST-ARISTOTELIAN  PERIOD 


2.   ATTEMPTS  AT  A  THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE  ON  A  SUBJECTIVE  BASIS 
BY   THE   OLDER   STOA 

A.  Doctrine  of  Assent  with  Reference  to  Sense-Perception 
To  the  founder  of  Stoicism  ethics  was  the  climax  of  philosophy; 
so  the  study  of  human  nature,  individual  and  social,  was  basal.  More- 
over, both  his  physics  and  his  epistemology  were  psychological  in  char- 
acter. His  followers  also  made  valuable  contributions  to  psychology  in 
their  treatment  of  assent,  motive,  and  emotion.  Of  the  eight  parts  or 
rather  functions  of  the  soul  enumerated  by  Zeno,1  the  five  senses  and 
reason  were  cognitive  functions.  The  cognitive  soul  in  its  different 
activities  was  conceived  through  analogy  of  substance  and  its  qualities 
by  Chrysippus;2  but  this  logical  formulation  was  undoubtedly  founded 
on  Zeno's  view  of  the  soul  as  unified  activity.  The  term  ^ye/aovtKoV  was 
used  by  Zeno3  and  was  sometimes  identical  with  tyvxt  in  the  narrower 
sense;  as  the  controlling  soul-function  it  was  active  reason.  With  Zeno's 
insistence  on  will,  all  mental  processes  became  species  of  judgment4 
and  hence  the  ^y^ovLKov  was  for  him  the  soul  not  only  as  thinking 
but  as  willing.  The  difference  between  such  a  definition  and  Aristotle's 
tentative  characterization  of  soul  is  evident;  a  step  had  been  taken  to 
shift  the  emphasis  from  insight  to  assent. 

Zeno's  particular  contribution  to  the  theory  of  knowledge5  was,  in 
the  first  place,  the  voluntary  assent  in  sense-perception,  and  in  the 
second,  the  division  of  <£avrao-icu  into  two  classes,  those  which  are  per- 
spicuous and  those  which  are  not,6  and  the  formulation  of  his  theory  of 
knowledge  on  the  basis  of  the  former.  Sense-perception  Zeno  defined7 
as  a  union  of  a  certain  blow  or  impress  from  without  and  the  free  assent 
of  the  mind.  There  can  be  no  assent  unless  the  mind  is  excited  by  a 
<£avTacna  which  was  regarded  by  Zeno  as  an  imprint  or  impression  in 
the  soul.  An  external  object  may  affect  the  senses,  but  no  perception 
takes  place  until  the  mind  gives  the  fiat,  admits  it  as  a  true  perception. 
It  may  well  be  that  Zeno,  like  certain  other  Stoics,8  dominated  by  his 
feeling  of  the  power  and  independence  of  reason  and  the  clear  evidence 
of  presentations  under  normal  conditions,  at  first  deemed  it  unnecessary 
to  define  further  what  sense-perception  is,  and  believed  that  those  act 
unwisely  who  wish  to  convince  a  man  that  there  is  anything  which  can 
be  perceived  and  grasped  by  the  mind,  because  nothing  is  more  evident 


1  Arnim  I,  39. 

2  Stob.  Eel.  i.  49;  Arnim  II,  286. 

3  Pearson  Z.  93;  Diels  471. 
«  Arnim  II,  456. 


s  Cic.  Ac.  i.  40. 

6  Cic.  Fato  42. 

i  Sext.  vii.  228;  D.  L.  vii.  45. 

8  Cic.  Ac.  ii.  17. 


THE  SUBJECTIVE  STANDPOINT  IN  STOICISM  21 

than  this  perspicuity.1  For  "perspicuity  has  such  force  that  it  through 
itself  shows  us  things  just  as  they  are."  A  presentation  that  possessed 
this  clear  evidence  peculiar  to  itself  concerning  objects  given  in  experi- 
ence was  termed  ^avrao-t'a  Ka.TaX-rprrt.Kri*  Each  brought  its  own  testi- 
mony of  truth  and  was  naturally  accepted  by  a  healthy  mind.  A  matter- 
of-fact  man  that  he  was,  Zeno  might  challenge  his  disciples  to  deny  the 
existence  and  their  own  knowledge  of  external  objects,  maintaining  that  he 
did  not  need  to  describe  their  self-evident  character,  since  normal  men 
know  and  experience  them  alike.  The  universe  is  rational  and  we  are 
a  part  of  it.  Hence  what  is  presented  by  nature  as  true  must  be  accepted 
of  its  own  free  assent  by  the  human  mind  which  is  a  portion  of  that 
nature.  "Our  perceptions  of  external  objects,  we  believe,"  said  the 
Stoic,3  "deserve  to  be  embraced  for  their  own  inherent  worth,  because 
they  comprise  something  which,  so  to  speak,  encircles  and  holds  within 
it  the  truth." 

More  analytic  procedure  was  introduced  by  the  Skeptical  criticism 
and  the  objective  characteristics  of  the  criterion  were  made  more  promi- 
nent without  recognition  of  the  difficulties  involved  in  the  relation  of 
voluntary  assent  and  object  of  knowledge.  For  no  sooner  had  Zeno 
formulated  his  doctrine  of  <£avTao-i'a  KaraXifn-TLK^  than  Arcesilas  began 
to  criticize  it.  Zeno  accordingly  had  to  define  the  expression  more 
minutely:5  that  the  presentation  must  be  from  a  real  object  to  exclude 
the  phantasies  of  the  insane ;  it  must  correspond  to  that  object  so  as  not 
to  produce  on  the  mind  the  impression  that  it  comes  from  some  other 
object;  and  finally,  it  must  be  properly  imprinted  and  stamped  to  insure 
a  presentation  of  all  the  details.  When  the  mind  assents  to,  and  ap- 
proves of,  such  presentations  as  bear  clear  evidence  of  the  objects  from 
which  the  impressions  come,6  infallible  sense-perception  occurs.  Zeno  is 
represented  as  comparing  the  favTavia  to  the  open  hand,  assent  to  the 
slight  drawing  together  of  the  fingers,  and  certain  perception  to  the 
closed  fist;  when  the  other  hand  closely  and  firmly  grasps  the  fist,  we 
have  an  illustration  of  knowledge  of  which  only  the  wise  man  is  capable.7 
The  exact  formulation  of  the  definitions  was  a  matter  of  gradual  growth, 
but  the  main  position  was  outlined  by  Zeno.  Perception,  he  urged, 
is  common  both  to  the  wise  man  and  to  the  fool,  as  it  is  not  per  se  abso- 

1  Cic.  Ac.  ii.  45.  3  Cic.  Fin.  iii.  17. 

3  Ibid.  i.  40-42.  4  Euseb.  P.E.  xiv.  6. 

s  Cic.  Ac.  ii.  77,  18;   Sext.  P.E.  ii.  4;  vii.  248-49,  255,  402,  410;  xi.  183;  D.  L. 
vii.  46-50. 

6  Cic.  Ac.  i.  41;  N.D.  i.  70.  *  Ibid.  ii.  145. 


22       SUBJECTIVE  VIEWPOINT  IN  POST-ARISTOTELIAN  PERIOD 

lutely  certain  knowledge,  but  becomes  such  through  philosophical  train- 
ing. Therefore,  only  the  wise  possess  knowledge  in  the  strict  sense, 
which  cannot  be  overthrown  by  reason.1  Those  who  are  not  wise  cannot 
have  knowledge;  although  they  may  cognize,  their  cognition  is  not 
welded  into  a  system  by  dialectic.  Hence  Arcesilas  maintained  that 
Zeno's  KaroX^ts  was  a  mere  abstraction,  for  with  the  wise  it  is  perfect 
knowledge,  with  the  not- wise  So£a  or  ayi/oia.2  Thus  Zeno  was  the 
first  distinctly  to  formulate  and  defend  the  possibility  of  certain  knowledge 
on  the  part  of  the  wise  man.3  It  is  an  interesting  question  how  far  the 
view  that  perfect  knowledge  is  attainable  only  by  the  ideal  philosopher 
was  with  Zeno  developed  through  the  exigencies  of  the  controversy 
with  Arcesilas.  For  the  ultimate  result  of  Zeno's  tenets  was  that  as 
there  is  no  mean  between  virtue  and  vice,  so  there  is  none  between 
ignorance  and  knowledge.  Such  was  Zeno's  solution,  maintaining  both 
the  criterion  as  defined  and  the  necessity  of  voluntary  assent. 

B.  Objective  Character  of  the  Object  of  Knowledge:    Cleanthes 
and  Chrysippus 

The  objective  character  of  the  criterion  was  still  more  accentuated 
by  Cleanthes  and  consequently  stress  was  laid  on  the  universal  aspect 
arid  on  the  interrelation  of  all  parts  of  the  universe.  The  parallelism 
between  the  macrocosm  and  microcosm  was  emphasized  by  means  of  the 
theory  of  tension.  As  the  human  soul  is  braced  by  the  ever-varying 
tension,  so  the  cause  of  motion  in  the  universe  is  the  changing  tension 
of  fiery  breath  which  was  identified  with  the  universe  or  God  in  the 
pantheistic  system  to  which  Cleanthes  reduced  the  dualism  that  was 
merely  formal  in  Zeno's  philosophy.  In  harmony  with  the  consistently 
materialistic  and  experiential  character  of  his  teaching,  Cleanthes  gave 
a  psycho-physical  treatment  of  Zeno's  theory  of  knowledge.  He  inter- 
preted Zeno's  definition  of  favravia.  as  analogous  to  the  impression  made 
by  a  seal  on  wax.4  The  insistence  upon  the  clearness  of  true  perception, 
compared  to  the  raised  and  depressed  portions  of  the  imprint  of  a  seal, 
together  with  the  general  spirit  pervading  the  fragments,  shows  what 
an  objectively  real  thing  a  sense-impression  was  to  him.  Cleanthes, 
iJien,  likened  the  KaraXrjirTiK^  ^avrao-t'a  to  the  clear,  sharply  indented 
impression  of  the  seal  upon  wax,  and  the  aKaraXr^Tof  he  regarded  as 
not  clear  cut.  The  analogy  was  made  still  more  striking  by  comparing 

1  Cic.  Ac.  ii.  145.  3  Cic.  Ac.  ii.  77,  113. 

a  Sext.  vii.  153.  4  D.  L.  vii.  46. 


THE  SUBJECTIVE  STANDPOINT  IN  STOICISM  23 

the  clearness  of  the  impression  to  the  raised  and  depressed  parts  of  the 
stamp  of  a  seal. 

In  opposition  to  Cleanthes,  Chrysippus  contended  that  by  his 
definition  of  ^avrao-ta  as  Twroxns  ev  i/^xfl  Zeno  did  not  mean  to  liken 
the  impression  to  the  stamp  of  a  seal,  but  simply  intended  the  expression 
to  signify  alteration  or  qualitative  change.1  It  is  at  least  interesting 
that  as  in  explaining  the  process  of  remembering  Aristotle  gave  a  differ- 
ent version  of  the  existence  of  e'Sos,  so  Chrysippus  based  his  criticism 
of  Cleanthes  on  Zeno's  definition  of  memory  as  a  storing-up  of  <£avrao-uu. 
The  objections  brought  by  Chrysippus  against  the  interpretation  of 
Cleanthes  are  illuminating.  In  the  first  place,  he  said,  when  a  triangle 
and  a  square  are  imaged  simultaneously,  then  the  same  body  must 
have  different  shapes  in  it  at  the  same  time — a  senseless  supposition. 
Furthermore,  when  many  presentations  occur,  the  soul  will  assume 
numerous  forms,  and  this  is  worse  than  the  first  statement.  But  it  is 
possible  that  some  alteration  takes  place,  as  for  instance,  the  air  under- 
goes various  changes  when  many  persons  are  speaking  at  the  same  time. 
Then  comes  the  clinching  argument:  Cleanthes'  view  makes  memory 
impossible  since  the  last  excitation  will  blot  out  the  preceding  impression.2 
With  memory,  all  learning  and  art  are  also  abolished.  With  his  veiled 
sarcasm  Sextus  suggests  his  own  doubt  as  to  the  advance  made  by 
Chrysippus  upon  his  predecessor.  Chrysippus  had  in  fact  substituted 
a  less  definite  term  and  in  this  fashion  covered  up  rather  than  cleared 
away  the  difficulty. 

In  this  development  of  the  primary  meaning  of  ^avraaia,  Zeno 
emphasized  the  shock  of  sense  (to  borrow  the  expression  of  a  recent 
writer)  without  distinguishing  between  the  percept  and  the  act  of  per- 
ceiving; Cleanthes  confined  himself  to  a  psycho-physical  interpretation 
of  the  term.  Chrysippus  made  a  definite  distinction  between  the  pro- 
cess and  the  object,  by  defining  <£avTao-i'a  as  "  a  modification  of  the  soul 
pointing  out  also  in  this  very  act  its  cause."3  That  such  analysis  indi- 
cated no  change  in  the  view  of  the  nature  of  ^avrao-ta  in  this  sense  but 
resulted  from  the  pressure  brought  to  bear  by  the  New  Academy  is 
obvious  from  the  account  of  Sextus  who  also  makes  it  evident  that  the 
distinction  between  TVTTUMTIS  and  erepoiWts  was  not  considered  essential 
as  a  matter  of  terminology.4  It  signalized,  however,  a  change  of  view- 
1  D.  L.  vii.  46;  Sext.  vii.  227,  372. 
1  Sext.  vii.  232-33. 

3  D.  L.  vii.  48;  Plac.  iv.  12;  Sext.  vii.  162. 

4  Sext.  vii.  227-41;  cf.  Ti/irw<m  used  by  Epictetus  and  M.  Aurelius. 


24       SUBJECTIVE  VIEWPOINT  IN  POST-ARISTOTELIAN  PERIOD 

point  from  the  psycho-physical  to   the    more    strictly    psychological 
problems. 

C.  Analysis  of  Cognition  on  the  Basis  of  Assent:   Chrysippus 

a)  Assent  basal  in  cognitive  functions. — While  Chrysippus  insisted  on 
the  objective  character  of  the  criterion  he  also  made  a  more  compre- 
hensive analysis  of  cognition  on  the  basis  of  assent.1  The  assent  involved 
in  all  human  activity  was  one  of  the  most  characteristic  features  of 
Stoic  thought.  Sense-perception  and  understanding,  the  double  source 
of  knowledge,2  were  therefore  regarded  as  fundamentally  the  same 
mental  power.  "  The  mind  itself  which  is  the  source  of  sense-perception 
and  is  itself  sense-perception  has  a  natural  force  which  it  extends  to 
the  objects  by  which  it  is  stimulated."3  So  according  to  Plutarch:4 
"The  receptive  and  irrational  element  is  not  by  nature  separable  from 
the  rational,  but  it  is  the  same  power  of  the  soul  which  they  call  the  under- 
standing or  -fiyepoviKov"  It  is  in  the  spirit  of  Chrysippus  that  Sextus 
says:5  "Sense  and  reason  are  identical,  not  in  the  same  respect;  in  one 
aspect  it  is  understanding,  in  another  sense-perception.  Just  as  the 
same  drinking-cup  is  both  convex  and  concave,  thus  the  same  under- 
standing is  in  one  aspect  sense,  in  another  reason."  But  the  basis  of  this 
mental  unity  was  voluntary  assent  which  was  considered  the  essence 
of  reason  as  such  and  which  the  Stoics  made  every  effort  to  prove  a 
requisite  in  sense-perception.  No  sense-perception  without  assent,  was 
a  statement  reiterated  under  various  forms6  and  upheld  with  intense 
persistency  by  Chrysippus  against  his  critics.  Sense-perception  is  not 
merely  a  presentation,  it  was  urged,  but  depended  for  its  very  existence 
on  assent.7  Chrysippus  in  particular  contended  against  the  Academy 
that  no  act  or  impulse  occurs  without  assent,8  and  it  was  folly  to  assert 
that  when  presentations  in  accord  with  nature  take  place  the  subject 
feels  an  impulse  without  being  willing  or  assenting  to  it. 

Such  analysis  necessitated  a  closer  inspection  of  the  term  aio^o-is 
which  had  become  an  "omnibus  term."  Of  the  six  meanings  enumer- 
ated,9 the  important  differentiation  is  that  between  the  process  of  appre- 
hension and  free  assent.  This  discrimination  again  shows  the  weight 

1  Cic.  Ac.  ii.  108,  30. 

2  D.  L.  vii.  51-52;  Sen.  Ep.  66,  35;  Epict.  i.  26,  15. 

3  Cic.  Ac.  ii.  30. 

4  Plut.  De  Vir.  Mor.  c.  3.  ^  Stob.  Phys.  834. 
s  Sext.  vii.  307,  359.  8  Arnim  II,  246. 

6  Cic.  Ac.  ii.  37,  108.  »  Plac.  iv.  8;  Diels  635;  D.  L.  vii.  72. 


THE  SUBJECTIVE  STANDPOINT  IN  STOICISM  25 

placed  by  Chrysippus  on  volition.  As  a  separate  function  besides 
<f>avTao-ia  and  crvyKara^eo-is,  the  term  ato-Orjcris  meant  immediate  appre- 
hension.1 In  its  wider  connotation  it  comprehended  the  whole  process 
of  sense-perception;  the  first  impression  of  the  object  in  the  sense-organ 
is  unconscious  and  mechanical  and  becomes  perception  in  the  ^y«- 
POVLKOV  to  which  the  stimulation  is  conveyed;  by  assent,  absolutely 
certain  perception  is  obtained.  Such  technical  psychological  discrimi- 
nation, which  in  its  precise  formulation  began  with  Chrysippus,  had  a 
tendency  to  substitute  for  the  actual  experience  distinctions  made  for 
the  sake  of  exact  definition.  The  Stoics,  however,  were  emphatic 
in  their  insistence  on  the  importance  of  assent,  for  upon  it,  they 
believed,  depended  knowledge,  science,  and  all  forms  of  activity.  This 
emphasis  became  more  pronounced  in  the  controversy  with  the  Academy. 
For,  in  the  opinion  of  the  Stoics,  moral  freedom  was  involved  in  this 
question.  Moreover,  they  made  a  tacit  assumption  that  assent  to  an 
impression  implied  its  correctness.  Accordingly,  if  their  opponents 
acknowledged  such  assent  they  also  admitted  the  possibility  of  certain 
knowledge.  Thus  these  older  Stoics  had  not  only  admitted  volition  as  a 
factor  in  cognition,  but  had  gradually  rendered  it  basal  for  all  knowledge 
and  hence  made  a  definite  approach  toward  a  subjective  standpoint. 

(b)  Analysis  of  the  object  of  knowledge. — On  the  other  hand  the  older 
Stoa,  and  Chrysippus  in  particular  against  the  Skeptics,  gave  much 
attention  to  the  characterization  of  the  object  of  knowledge.  For  they 
grounded  their  doctrine  of  absolute  certainty  on  the  freedom  of  assent 
and  the  objective  character  of  the  criterion,  using  this  term  in  its  most 
usual  connotation  of  that  in  accordance  with  which  a  thing  is  judged, 

as    a    <f>avTa(Tia.    KaTaXrjTrTiKr).2       Since   the    Stoics    used    Ka.Taha.fj.(3dveiv  in 

the  technical  sense,  to  apprehend,  comprehend,  a  <f>avTao-ta  KaToX^im.^ 
signified  an  apprehending,  knowing  impression,  one  fitted  to  give  knowl- 
edge and  apprehending  the  object  of  knowledge.  That  this  was  the 
meaning  intended  seems  clear  from  the  explanation  given  by  Sextus.3 
"The  Stoics  consider  this  particular  presentation  as  one  apprehending 
completely  the  external  objects  and  as  absorbing  thoroughly  the  dis- 
tinctive marks  of  these  objects."4  Some  true  fyavraaiai  are  KaTa\rjTrTiKai, 
others  are  not.  For  they  may  be  true,  exact  impressions,  and  yet  not 
be  means  of  certain  knowledge.  To  insure  certainty,  the  impression 

1  Plut.  De  Vir.  Mor.  c.  3;  Plac.  vii.  9;  Cic.  Ac.  i.  40. 

2  Sext.  P.H.  ii.  15-16,  22-78;  vii.  35,  261. 

3  Sext.  vii.  248. 

4  Cf.  ibid.  411  and  247. 


26       SUBJECTIVE  VIEWPOINT  IN  POST-ARISTOTELIAN  PERIOD 

must  in  the  first  place  be  from  an  existing  object;  and  in  the  second 
correspond  to  it,  so  as  to  exclude  visions  of  madmen  and  all  forms  of 
illusion;  finally  it  must  give  accurately  all  the  characteristics  of  the 
real  object.1  Hence  some  peculiar  sign  is  essential,  a  distinctness  which 
brings  conviction  of  its  truth.  That  the  KaraA^-nxou  <£avTao-«u 
have  such  characteristics  can  be  seen  from  our  behavior  when  we  desire 
to  know  an  object  exactly:  in  trying  to  see  an  object,  we  go  nearer, 
strain  our  eyes  to  get  a  clear  impression,  and  are  not  satisfied  till  we 
attain  it.2 

This  importance  assigned  to  the  objective  character  of  a  mental 
impression  conduced  to  a  closer  examination  of  the  meaning  of  the  term 
favTacria.  Some  <t>avra<Tiai  are  perceived  by  the  senses,  said  Chrysippus 
and  his  followers,  others  are  apprehended  through  the  understanding, 
as  in  the  case  of  the  incorporeal  and  other  rational  matters.3  When  it 
is  said  that  ethical  and  aesthetic  qualities  are  perceived  with  the  senses, 
the  meaning  seems  to  be  that  such  abstract  qualities  are  found  in  relation 
to  the  sensuous  and  are  perceived  by  means  of,  but  not  through,  the 
senses.4  The  perception  of  ethical  and  aesthetic  values  was  referred 
to  the  understanding  or  to  sense  trained  and  directed  by  reason.5  In  the 
words  of  Sextus:  "Some  presentations  have  such  a  nature  that  reason 
forms  images  on  their  basis,  but  not  directly  through  their  agency."6 
In  regard  to  content,  therefore,  ^avrao-tot  are  of  sense-qualities  when 
given  through  immediate  sensation.7  When  produced  by  the  under- 
standing, they  may  be  of  actual  realities,  as  of  ethical  and  aesthetic 
qualities  or  of  matters  reached  by  inference;8  of  things  whose  reality 
is  possible  but  not  certain  of  which  the  stock  example  was  VO^TOI  iropoi ; 
of  concepts  and  the  incorporeal.9  The  stress  naturally  fell  on  impressions 
of  sense.  Since  the  two  faculties  of  sense  and  reason  are  essentially  a 
unity,  no  intrinsic  change  was  believed  to  occur  in  the  transformation 
of  sense-elements  into  percepts  and  concepts,  as  the  sensations  are  worked 
over  into  new  knowledge  in  the  formation  of  the  KaraA^-riKa/  ^avracrc'at. 
Thus  Zeno  is  reported  to  have  said:  "A  sense-perception  is  true  and 
trustworthy,  not  because  it  includes  everything  there  is  in  the  object, 

1  Sext.  vii.  249-51. 

3  Ibid.  257-58,  252;  cf.  Cic.  Ac.  ii.  77. 

3  D.  L.  vii.  51-52;  Sext.  vii.  240;  viii.  176,  402-9;  Epict.  i.  i,  5;  ii.  23,  7. 

4  Plut.  St.  Rep.  19;  Cic.  N.D.  ii.  145. 

s  Epict.  ii.  23,  7;  iii.  8,  i;  Cic.  Ac.  ii.  20. 

6  Sext.  viii.  409.  *  D.  L.  vii.  52;  Stob.  Eel.  ii.  86. 

7  Ibid.  176;  Galen  329.  »  Sext.  ii.  99;  viii.  145,  306. 


THE  SUBJECTIVE  STANDPOINT  IN  STOICISM  27 

but  because  it  does  not  leave  out  any  of  the  qualities  that  are  present, 
and  because  nature  has  given,  as  it  were,  a  rule  and  standard  of  itself 
whence  afterward  notions  of  things  are  imprinted  on  the  mind  from  which 
not  only  first  principles  but  also  further  means  for  formulating  concepts 
are  discovered."1  Of  the  same  nature  as  the  things  directly  given  by 
sense  are  also  the  things  inferred  from  them.2  "Just  as  silver  and  gold 
coins  are  in  themselves  merely  coins,  but  if  they  are  used  for  hiring  a 
boat,  under  those  circumstances  in  addition  to  being  coins  they  are  also 
passage-money,"3  thus  sensations  in  passing  over  into  thought  suffer 
no  more  alteration  than  the  coins  used  as  passage-money ;  they  function 
as  contents  of  another  kind  of  cognitive  process.  Hence  percepts  are 
the  first  form  of  thought-material;  then  memory  images  are  formed 
because  the  understanding  has  the  capacity  of  retaining  impressions.4 
"Mind  itself  which  is  the  source  of  sense-perception  and  also  itself  is 
sense-perception  has  a  natural  power  which  it  turns  and  applies  to  things 
by  which  it  is  moved.  Accordingly,  some  impressions  it  receives  in 
such  a  manner  as  to  use  them  immediately,  others  it  stores  up ;  from  the 
latter  memory  arises.  Thus  through  memory  by  means  of  resemblance, 
combination,  comparison  and  contrast,  the  mind  arrives  at  new  knowl- 
edge."5 In  whatever  form,  then,  the  object  of  knowledge  was  regarded 
as  directly  and  completely  given. 

c)  Preconception  as  a  criterion. — While  the  immediate  and  objective 
character  of  the  Kara\r]TrTiKrj  <f>a.vra<Tia  was  reinforced  by  Chrysippus, 
a  decided  step  toward  a  subjective  attitude  was  taken  in  regard  to  the 
criterion  in  its  other  signification,  as  the  faculty  by  which  a  judgment  is 
passed.  The  older  Stoics,  we  are  informed,6  held  right  reason  to  be  the 
criterion;  Chrysippus,  in  opposition  to  Boethus,  posited  ato-ffyo-is  and 
Trp6\r)\j/i<;  as  criteria.  The  preconceptions  as  concepts  formed  on  the 
basis  of  sense-perception  in  the  same  way  in  all  men  represent  the  laws 
of  thought,  since  what  is  in  accord  with  nature  is  true.  The  opObs  Aoyos 
is  the  power  of  rational  thinking  through  which  preconceptions  are 
developed  and  formed  into  clear  concepts  that  can  grasp  reality  and 
become  criteria.  As  the  preconceptions  are  universal,  hence  never 
contradictory  and  therefore  normative,  they  are  the  primitive  logos7 
out  of  which  reason  is  perfected  and  completed.  Here  again,  then,  is 

1  Cic.  Ac.  i.  42. 

2  Ibid.  ii.  21 ;  Sext.  vii.  345-46. 

3  Plac.  iv.  ii ;   Arnim  II,  28. 

4  D.  L.  vii.  52-53;  Sext.  ix.  393.  6D.  L.  vii.  54. 

s  Cic.  Ac.  ii.  30.  ^  Cf.  Epict.  i.  28,  28;  17,  i;  iv.  8, 12. 


28       SUBJECTIVE  VIEWPOINT  IN  POST-ARISTOTELIAN  PERIOD 

an  evidence  of  a  change  produced  by  the  psychological  analysis  of  Chry- 
sippus;  for  as  a  result  of  introspection  he  put  the  emphasis  on  the  actual 
rather  than  on  the  ideal  criterion. 

D.  Development  of  the  Subjective  Attitude  in  Regard  to  Concepts: 
Doctrine  of  the  XCKTOV 

Concepts,1  as  incorporeal,  were  first  given  a  subjective  tinge  by  the 
Stoics  of  this  period.  They  called  them  "our  thoughts"  and  regarded 
them  as  non-existent  and  unreal.  Some  are  gained  by  consciously 
applied  efforts  of  reason;  others,  the  preconceptions,  all  men  necessarily 
and  without  elaborate  reasoning  build  on  their  experience.  Universal- 
ity was  held  to  be  conferred  only  by  reason,  and  is  possessed  also  by 
verbal  expressions.  In  his  dialectic  Chrysippus  elaborated  a  theory  of 
signs  and  things  signified,  distinguishing  between  the  thing,  the  word, 
and  the  signification  which  exists  only  in  the  mind  of  an  intelligent 
being.2  The  thing  and  the  sound  are  corporeal;  the  signification 
TO  XCKTOV  is  incorporeal,  and  in  contrast  to  the  concrete  particular 
thing,  general.  As  universal  TO  XCKTO'V  must  be  immaterial.  Since 
the  concrete  object  and  its  sign  are  individual,  these  cannot  be  signified 
by  the  verbal  expression  referring  to  them.  Such  expressions  are  signs 
of  something  we  represent  to  ourselves  on  hearing  the  word,  namely  TO 
AcKToV.3  Truth  and  falsehood  have  reference  only  to  this  signification. 
In  obvious  contradiction  to  the  most  fundamental  Stoic  tenet,  therefore, 
the  universal,  as  concept  and  signification,  was  considered  immaterial. 
Such  a  position,  together  with  the  virtual  identification  of  words  and 
thoughts,  is  another  indication  of  the  tendency  toward  a  subjective 
point  of  view. 

In  the  whole  treatment  of  Chrysippus  there  is  noticeable  an  increas- 
ing skill  in  psychological  analysis  and  consequent  emphasis  upon  con- 
ditions and  environment  in  general.  The  infallibility  and  sufficiency 
of  the  wise  man  are  lofty  ideals,  but  the  stress  is  placed  on  the  reliability 
of  the  normal  individual  and  on  the  need  of  training  and  circumspection. 
As  introspective  analysis  became  more  accurate, progressive  attention  was 
paid  to  the  individual  and  his  needs.  Agreement  with  nature  was  the 
basis  of  Zeno's  system,  but  the  question,  What  nature  ?  he  did  not  raise. 
For  Cleanthes  with  his  emphasis  on  the  unification  of  macrocosm  and 
microcosm,  "according  to  nature"  meant  agreement  with  the  universal 

i  fvvoiai. 

*  D.  L.  vii.  62;  Sext.  viii.  n;  Plac.  iv.  20,  2. 

3  Cf.  Sen.  Ep.  117,  7;  Sext.  viii.  70. 


THE  SUBJECTIVE  STANDPOINT  IN  STOICISM  29 

law.  But  for  Chrysippus  the  main  interest  centered  on  human  nature, 
harmony  in  thought  and  act.  It  was  the  mystery  that  TO  i/ye/AoviKov, 
ideally  and  potentially  self-consistent,  could  decide  and  act  both  in 
agreement  and  disagreement  with  reason  that  presented  the  chief  prob- 
lem to  him  in  his  treatment  of  the  criterion  in  relation  to  free  assent. 
Another  effect  of  this  emphasis  on  the  individual  was  the  prominence  of 
the  utilitarian  principle  in  his  ethics.  In  Cleanthes  we  have  an  inter- 
pretation of  rational  life  from  the  standpoint  of  the  universal,  in  Chrysip- 
pus as  viewed  from  the  level  of  human  nature;  the  one  theory  is  onto- 
logical  and  theological,  the  other  psychological  and  concerned  with  the 
doctrine  of  virtue  and  happiness.  For  the  Stoic  the  two  views  were 
complementary,  but  as  Chrysippus  gave  explicit  and  distinct  expression 
to  the  various  distinctions  implied  in  the  tenets  of  his  predecessors  and 
worked  out  a  more  thorough  psychological  account  he  also  prepared 
the  way  for  a  gradual  substitution  of  logical  distinctions  for  the  actual 
experience  and  helped  to  develop  a  tendency  to  assign  undue  importance 
to  one  side  of  the  dualism  that  was  becoming  more  apparent  in  philosophy. 

3.   INCREASED   SUBJECTIVISM  IN   THE   MIDDLE   STOA 

A .  Social  Conditions 

The  first  century  after  the  death  of  Alexander  was  an  era  of  increas- 
ing importance  of  Greek  thought  and  ideals  from  the  intellectual  side; 
politically,  the  monarchial  principle  predominated  during  the  first 
fifty  years;  then  followed  a  movement  toward  liberty  on  the  part  of 
the  leagues  in  European  Greece  simultaneously  with  a  similar  tendency 
in  Asia  facilitated  by  the  invasions  of  the  Gauls.  In  these  affairs  the 
struggles  and  ambitions  of  single  individuals  for  mastery  had  become 
more  decisive  though  there  were  also  undertakings  in  which  Greeks  as 
a  united  people  acted  in  behalf  of  freedom.  In  the  leagues  there  was  an 
attempt  made  at  representative  constitutions,  but  it  was  always  the 
personality  of  the  leader  that  prevailed.1  By  the  middle  of  the  second 
century,  "politically  the  Greek  element  was  everywhere  on  the  decline; 
intellectually,  however,  almost  everywhere  in  the  ascendant."2  It  is 
interesting  to  observe  how  this  political  situation  affected  the  chiefs  of  the 
older  Stoa,  who  were  vitally  interested  and  very  influential  in  the  affairs 
of  the  Greek  states.  Starting  with  the  category  of  universality  adopted 
from  the  Socratic  concept,  they  sought  to  give  room  to  personal  initiative 
no  less  in  their  ethics  than  in  their  theory  of  knowledge.  As  the  prospects 

1  Holm  Hist,  of  Greece  IV,  412. 
'Ibid.   423. 


30       SUBJECTIVE  VIEWPOINT  IN  POST-ARISTOTELIAN  PERIOD 

for  expansion  of  political  authority,  which  during  Alexander's  brief 
supremacy  seemed  to  give  practical  confirmation  of  their  theory,  became 
less  favorable,  the  more  did  the  Stoics  dwell  on  the  all-pervading  law 
that  united  all  men  in  a  city  of  Zeus.  When  they  grew  more  conscious 
of  the  ultimate  reference  of  decisions  to  the  individual  as  such,  the  stress 
began  to  be  put  on  the  rational  control  exerted  by  each  person  rather 
than  on  the  universal  logos,  and  thus  the  perfect  unity  exemplified  in 
the  wise  man  became  more  an  ideal  than  an  actuality. 

B.  Growth  of  Introspection 

a)  Increased  psychological  analysis. — In  the  Middle  Stoa  the  intro- 
spective attitude  came  to  be  distinctly  recognized  and  employed.  The 
consequent  difficulties  with  the  objective  criterion  and  the  still  more 
emphasized  assent  brought  these  philosophers  to  find  some  solution  in 
a  subjective  standpoint  as  is  evinced  by  the  changes  in  the  definition  of 
the  criterion,  the  new  interpretation  of  the  function  of  reason,  and  the 
importance  assigned  to  attention. 

The  older  Stoic  view  based  on  the  absolute  demarcation  of  virtue 
and  vice,  wisdom  and  ignorance,  attributed  the  non-existence  of  their 
ideal  state  to  the  folly  of  the  men  who  had  established  governments. 
The  nature  of  the  soul  and  its  relation  to  deity  with  the  consequent  inter- 
relation of  all  human  beings  implied  that  there  is  only  one  law  and  one 
state  of  God  and  men.  The  critical  acumen  of  Carneades  developed 
by  observation  and  introspection  showed  forth  in  a  strong  light  the 
contrast  between  the  ideal  and  the  actual  and  led  to  divergence  of  opin- 
ion within  the  Stoic  school  between  the  conservative  and  the  more  pro- 
gressive.1 Of  these  latter,  Panaetius  was  forced  to  recede  from  the 
Stoic  ethical  ideal  and  consider  ordinary  men  and  their  standards; 
and  at  the  same  time  to  make  the  law  of  universal  sympathy  applicable 
not  only  to  the  wise  but  to  ordinary  mortals.  The  beginnings  of  such 
concessions  in  political  and  ethical  theories,  however,  had  already  been 
evident  in  Chrysippus  and  was  due  to  the  reciprocal  interaction  of  the 
Skeptical  criticism  and  social-political  conditions  on  the  one  hand  with 
the  emphasis  on  psychological  analysis  and  insight  on  the  other. 

The  influence  of  Plato  and  Aristotle  as  well  as  other  Academic  and 
Peripatetic  philosophers  on  these  Stoics  is  well  known,  but  this  readiness 
to  receive  help  from  other  schools  and  acknowledge  the  truth  in  their 
criticisms  is  another  evidence  of  the  development  in  analytic  introspec- 
tion. Panaetius  held  that  knowledge  and  morality  must  be  based  on  the 

1  Cf.  Cic.  Ac.  ii.  17. 


THE  SUBJECTIVE  STANDPOINT  IN  STOICISM  31 

logos  common  to  all  men,  and  that  differences  in  opinion  are  due  to  the 
specific  character  of  the  individual  reason.  The  assertion  of  Posidonius 
that  all  philosophers  agree  in  their  fundamental  tenets  may  be  ascribed 
to  a  similar  belief.  This  insistence  on  the  universality  implied  in  rational 
thought  in  opposition  to  the  individualistic  point  of  view  of  the  Skeptics 
combined  with  due  recognition  of  individual  differences  signalized  the 
adoption  of  a  subjective  standpoint.  This  attitude  is  also  manifest  in 
the  Platonic  conception  of  soul  held  by  Posidonius.  For  the  difference 
in  point  of  view  is  significant:  no  explanation  is  required,  said  the  Stoic, 
introspection  is  the  only  verification  needed.  The  transition  from  social 
to  introspective  psychology  had  been  definitely  accomplished. 

b)  The  function  of  reason. — Panaetius,  adhering  to  the  tenets  of  his 
school,  made  reason  the  summum  bonum.    Reason  is  intrinsically  the  same 
in  all  men,  but  it  is  present  in  varying  degrees  in  different  individuals. 
Consequently,  there  is  a  double  goal:  for  the  wise  the  absolute  perfec- 
tion of  reason,  and  for  all  men  the  perfection  of  natural  capacities  accord- 
ing to  reason.1    Though  thought  and  feeling  vary  for  different  individuals 
this  variability  does  not  affect  the  end  since  that  is  founded  on  absolute 
reason.     The  ground  of  certain  knowledge  Panaetius  found  in  the  ability 
to  perceive  and  think  that  is  common  to  all;  differences  of  opinion  and 
error  are  due  to  the  divergence  of  individual  natures  which  is  accentuated 
by  the  varied  effects  of  environment.     As  the  senses  per  se  do  not  deceive, 
the  cause  of  error  and  illusion  must  be  found  in  this  variability.2     Posi- 
donius held  that  reason  alone  can  recognize  the  truth  of  presentations 
and  preconceptions  and  can  pass  judgment  on  them  because  the  soul 
perceives  through  the  senses  and  in  virtue  of  its  participation  in  universal 
reason  is  capable  of  understanding  its  nature.    On  account  of  the  relation 
of  soul  and  body,  reason  is  influenced  by  the  nature  of  the  body  as  is 
evident  from  the  wide  difference  in  beliefs.    As  affected  by  the  body 
reason  is  not  an  impartial  judge  of  the  true  and  false;  but  independent 
of  the  body  it  is  intrinsically  identical  with  universal  reason.     Hence 
human  reason  sees  the  truth  more  clearly  the  less  it  is  influenced  by  the 
body.    Thus  the  dualism  was  becoming  acute. 

c)  The  criterion;    analysis  of  attention. — This  view  of  reason  had 
important  bearing  on  their  doctrine  of  the  criterion.     Carneades  had 
argued  that  over  against  every  presentation  another  equally  trustworthy 
may  be  placed  and  consequently  the  KQTOATP-TIKI/  <£avracna  does  not  neces- 
sarily appear  true.     Admitting  that  it  may  seem  false,  the   Middle 

1  Cic.  De.  Of.  i.  107-10. 

2  Sext.  ix.  61-74;  Cic.  Tusc.  i.  46. 


32       SUBJECTIVE  VIEWPOINT  IN  POST-ARISTOTELIAN  PERIOD 

Stoa1  made  another  addition  to  the  definition  of  the  criterion,  that 
nothing  must  interfere  with  the  perception.  The  certainty  that  no 
objection  can  be  raised  against  a  presentation  cannot  be  afforded  by 
the  presentation  itself,  as  there  is  need  of  an  investigation  to  prove  that 
there  is  nothing  hindering  correct  perception.  Five  conditions  must  be 
fulfilled  in  order  to  have  sense-impressions  that  give  certain  knowledge: 
the  sense-organs  must  be  normal,  the  object  must  be  in  such  place  and 
such  condition  that  it  can  be  perceived,  the  observation  must  conform 
to  the  purpose  in  view,  and  the  understanding  must  be  sound.2  Reason 
must  of  necessity  be  the  only  faculty  that  can  decide  whether  all  circum- 
stances warrant  the  giving  of  assent.  The  Stoics  accordingly  acknowl- 
edged that  all  obstacles  must  be  removed  before  the  presentation  can  be 
regarded  as  a  criterion,  but  did  not  ask  for  proof  that  there  is  no  contrary 
condition.  Such  a  position  virtually  abolished  the  doctrine  of  the  Ko.ro.- 
\riTTTiKr}  (fravraaia  as  a  criterion  and  also  ato-^o-is  as  a  faculty  of  judging. 
Thus  in  regard  to  the  criterion  in  both  senses  important  changes  had 
been  made.  The  older  Stoa  had  in  varying  degrees  tried  to  reconcile 
free  assent  with  such  distinctness  and  aggressiveness  of  impressions  as 
compelled  acknowledgment.  The  Middle  Stoa,  taught  by  their  own 
introspection  and  by  Skeptical  criticism,  conceded  the  possibility  of  error 
on  such  grounds  and  fell  back  on  the  characteristic  of  clearness  freed  from 
all  interfering  circumstances,  on  which  reason  alone  could  pronounce.  So 
the  problem  had  in  fact  shifted  from  a  study  of  the  object  of  knowledge 
to  the  analysis  of  attention.  Here  centered  the  reason  for  the  modifica- 
tions made  in  the  interpretation  of  the  criterion  and  also  the  very  essence 
of  the  subjective  attitude. 

4.   THE    SUBJECTIVE    ATTITUDE    DOMINANT    IN    LATER    STOICISM 

A .  Social  and  Political  Conditions  of  Roman  Stoicism 
When  Stoicism  first  arose,  a  civic  basis  of  morality  was  being  aban- 
doned for  an  individualistic  or  universal,  as  the  ethical  ideal  became 
internal  and  attributed  to  man  as  an  individual.  The  effect  of  Stoicism 
was  therefore  less  obvious,  especially  as  no  great  personalities  appeared 
who  based  their  social  and  political  practices  on  Stoic  principles;  for 
it  was  developed  theoretically  as  an  academic  discipline  before  it  became 
practical.  The  conditions  of  Rome  in  the  age  when  Panaetius  acted 
as  an  apostle  of  Stoicism  form  a  striking  parallel  to  those  of  Greece 
at  the  time  of  Zeno.  As  its  origin  was  coincident  with  the  world-empire 

1  Cf.  Schmekel  356;    Sext.  vii.  253. 

2  Sext.  vii.  424;  Cic.  Ac.  ii.  19,  46. 


;  THE  SUBJECTIVE  STANDPOINT  IN  STOICISM  33 

of  Alexander,  so  Roman  Stoicism  arose  simultaneously  with  Imperial 
Rome.  Stoic  doctrines  were  introduced  among  the  members  of  the 
Scipionic  circle  when  religious  and  ethical  problems  resulting  from  the 
social  and  political  development  were  forcibly  pressing  upon  the  men  who 
stood  at  the  head  of  affairs.  The  conceptual  religion  of  Rome  when 
brought  into  contact  with  the  personal  elements  that  characterized 
Greek  religious  beliefs  became  full  of  contradictions,  the  more  serious 
since  it  was  part  of  the  law  of  the  state.  Added  to  religious  and  ethical 
perplexities  were  political  and  economic  problems.  Under  such  cir- 
cumstances the  more  thoughtful  minds  would  be  searching  for  some  valid 
moral  standard  and  many  found  in  Stoicism  a  system  that  harmonized 
moral  purity  with  world-wide  power.  At  this  time  ethics  was  chiefly 
of  importance  in  the  sphere  of  jurisprudence.  So  it  was  in  the  evolution 
of  imperial  law  and  administration  that  Stoicism  first  found  a  task  and 
became  a  significant  factor  as  its  conceptions  of  social  obligation,  world- 
citizenship,  and  brotherhood  of  man  contained  the  germs  of  a  great 
political  order.  Historically  its  influence  can  be  traced  in  the  enact- 
ment of  law,  in  literature,  in  the  family  as  well  as  in  the  state.  Philo- 
sophically it  became  a  creed  and  a  system  of  morals.  While  in  the 
Middle  Stoa  the  introspective  analysis  was  concerned  predominantly 
with  the  problem  of  knowledge,  in  Roman  Stoicism  as  inaugurated  by 
Cicero  and  continued  by  Seneca  it  was  in  ethics  that  the  subjective 
attitude  developed.  For  Cicero  the  question  of  what  and  how  we  know 
was  of  great  interest  and  not  subsidiary  to  the  problem  how  to  act;  in 
Seneca  the  latter  is  alone  worthy  of  serious  consideration. 

B.  The  Subjective  Aliilude  In  Ethics 

a)  Cicero. — In  the  transition  from  the  teleological  to  the  jural  view 
of  morality  and  from  an  external  to  an  internal  standard  in  which 
Stoicism  played  the  chief  role,  Cicero  is  of  great  importance  in  the  history 
of  ethics.  His  belief  in  the  importance  of  the  state  and  the  duty  of 
citizenship  is  clearly  set  forth;1  but  in  his  strictly  ethical  works  the  indi- 
vidualistic standpoint  is  prominent. 

Cicero  maintains  that  man  has  a  twofold  character:  that  which  is 
common  to  all  men  as  rational  beings  and  that  which  is  distinctly  his 
own  individual  personality;  he  should  follow  the  bent  of  his  nature  in 
agreement  with  the  universal  law  (a  view  that  can  be  clearly  traced  to  the 
Middle  Stoa).  Such  a  conception  becomes  especially  significant  in 
the  emphasis  on  the  internality  of  moral  consciousness.  The  essence 

1  De  Rep.,  Leg.,  and  De  Of.  ii. 


34       SUBJECTIVE  VIEWPOINT  IN  POST-ARISTOTELIAN  PERIOD 

of  Cicero's  teaching  is  the  appeal  from  the  disputes  of  philosophers  to 
the  notions  implanted  in  every  human  being.  Nature  has  endowed  man 
with  the  fundamental  concepts  of  morality  and  unless  they  were  obscured 
by  evil  habits  and  false  opinions  they  would  of  themselves  develop  into 
perfection ;  and  however  depraved  the  moral  consciousness  may  become 
it  still  exists.  The  consciousness  of  God  is  immediately  given  with  self- 
consciousness,  and  belief  in  immortality  depends  on  these  natural  prin- 
ciples.1 Cicero  speaks  of  dominans  ille  in  nobis  deus  and  asserts,  Nullum 
theatrum  virtuti  conscientia  majus  est.2  No  one  has  discoursed  with 
greater  eloquence  than  he  on  the  intrinsic  value  of  virtue.  The  true 
criterion  is  an  internal  one,  consequences  are  morally  irrelevant;  the 
will  is  the  only  good.  Another  evidence  of  the  subjective  standpoint  is 
the  prominence  given  to  the  gentler  and  more  sympathetic  side  of 
character;  although  his  writings  bear  the  impress  of  the  sterner  and  more 
virile  traits,  Cicero  was  an  influential  factor  in  the  progress  toward 
the  gentler  virtues.  Another  conception  that  is  conspicuous  in  Cicero's 
ethics  is  that  of  humanism,  a  feeling  of  universal  sympathy  ingrafted 
by  nature  for  man  simply  as  a  human  being.  Most  prominent  is  the 
tendency  toward  the  subjective  attitude  in  the  transition  from  the  con- 
ception of  supreme  good  to  that  of  supreme  law.  Cicero's  legal  mind  had 
a  tendency  to  give  a  jural  aspect  to  the  rational  law  and  he  was  probably 
the  first  to  identify  explicitly  the  law  of  nature  with  the  jus  gentium. 
Discussing  the  universal  law  he  says,3  the  divine  reason  has  the  authority 
of  commanding  in  regard  to  right  and  wrong,  attaching  a  penalty  in 
case  of  disobedience.  For  Cicero,  then,  the  law  of  nature,  from  the  objec- 
tive standpoint,  is  a  supreme  code;  and  from  the  subjective,  a  natural 
principle  distinctly  commanding  what  to  do  and  not  to  do.  Thus  in 
ethics  Cicero  allied  himself  in  general  to  the  Middle  Stoa,  but  made 
further  advance  toward  a  subjective  standpoint  by  giving  wider  scope 
both  in  religious  beliefs  and  in  ethical  doctrines  to  the  personal  element 
and  the  inner  control. 

b)  Seneca. — The  more  morality,  political  and  individual,  became 
self-conscious  and  the  need  of  some  reasoned  theory  grew  urgent,  all 
the  serious  minds  of  Rome  gravitated  toward  Stoicism.  For  Cicero, 
philosophy  satisfied  a  purely  personal  need.4  How  the  outlook  had 
broadened  and  the  problems  multiplied  during  the  early  part  of  the 
Imperial  period  is  illustrated  in  Seneca's  writings.  In  these  we  have 

1  Cic.  Leg.  i.  24;  Tusc.  i.  12;  Fato  25. 

2  Tusc.  i.  74;  ii.  63.  J  Leg.  ii.  8-10;  cf.  Rep.  iii.  3. 
4  Cf.  Tusc.  v.  3,  18-31,  47,  84-120;  Fin.  v.  95. 


THE  SUBJECTIVE  STANDPOINT  IN  STOICISM  35 

adherence  to  the  older  forms  of  Stoicism  combined  with  a  transformation 
of  its  spirit.  The  resulting  contradictions  in  psychology  and  ethics 
made  Seneca  take  recourse  to  a  subjective  attitude  in  these  difficulties. 

(i)  Psychological  analysis. — Thoroughly  Stoic  is  the  experiential 
character  of  his  philosophy.  Ethics  is  based  on  psychology  and  both 
are  grounded  on  and  tested  by  experience.  The  practical  side  of  ethics 
had  gradually  received  more  attention,  especially  on  the  part  of  the 
Middle  Stoa,  and  Seneca  followed  their  lead,  though  he  did  not  on  that 
account  disparage  the  formal  aspect.1  He  attached  great  importance 
to  psychology,  for  he  held  it  necessary  to  discover  the  psychological 
principles  prior  to  determining  moral  relations,  since  human  nature  must 
be  investigated  to  know  the  limits  of  the  powers  and  capacities  of  man.3 
In  the  spirit  of  the  old  Stoa,  Jie  asserted  that  the  soul  as  a  spark  of  uni- 
versal reason  is  of  divine  origin  and  holds  a  place  in  the  human 
organism  similar  to  that  of  God  in  the  universe.3  Hence  there  was 
no  formal  break  with  the  material  monism  of  the  Stoa  in  Seneca's  dis- 
paraging remarks  about  the  body.4  It  was  rather  that  the  opposition 
between  the  rational  and  irrational  had  been  inevitably  widened  and 
this  important  modification  of  older  theories  (an  advance  even  on  the 
innovations  of  Posidonius)  had  been  occasioned  by  close  study  of 
daily  human  life  both  through  observation  and  introspection.  As  the 
shadows  of  the  reign  of  terror  closed  in  upon  him,  as  individual  conscious- 
ness became  a  more  vivid  experience  to  him,  and  the  tendency  to  cor- 
ruption observed  in  men  revealed  itself  more,  the  body  appeared  a 
prison,  a  burden,  a  punishment,  and  death  the  portal  to  glorious  freedom.5 
So  the  break  with  psychological  monism  which  appears  in  his  letters  was 
due  to  a  complete  transformation  of  his  own  attitude  and  a  deeper  sense 
of  the  moral  problems.  Though  he  divided  the  soul  into  a  rational  and 
two  non-rational  parts,6  he  expressed  his  uncertainty  whether  anything 
can  be  determined  about  the  substance  of  the  soul.  "There  are  many 
things  the  existence  of  which  we  do  not  question  without  being  able 
to  state  their  composition  accurately."7  Consequently  the  growing 
dualism  in  Seneca's  metaphysics  was  caused  by  an  increasing  dualism  in 
his  psychology.  In  strict  theory  he  never  dissented  from  the  Stoic 
ontology,  but  infused  a  new  spirit  into  it. 

1  Sen.  Ep.  95. 

2  Ibid.  121,3;  89,8. 

3  Dial.  12,6,7;  Ep.  66,  12;  92,  27;  65,  24. 

*Ep.  120,  17;   92,  13;   65,  2.  6  Ibid.  92,  8. 

s  Ibid.  24,  18.  7  JVo/.  Qu,  vii.  25,  2. 


36       SUBJECTIVE  VIEWPOINT  IN  POST-ARISTOTELIAN  PERIOD 

(2)  Moral  reformation. — There  are  found  in  Seneca's  writings 
suggestions  of  the  old  philosophic  attitude  that  true  happiness  is  found 
in  a  clear  vision  of  the  realm  of  eternal  truth.  But  Seneca  was  approach- 
ing the  ideal  by  another  path  and  his  goal  was  not  so  much  "a  passion- 
less eternity  of  intellectual  intuition"  as  holiness.  It  was  in  this  spirit 
that  he  entered  upon  his  mission  as  an  apostle  of  a  great  moral  revival 
and  became  a  spiritual  director  to  many  members  of  the  higher  society 
in  Rome.  His  ethical  creed  aimed  at  a  radical  reconstruction  of  human 
nature,  at  the  triumph  of  moralized  reason  and  social  sympathy  over 
brute  materialism  and  selfishness.  As  a  physician  of  souls  his  aim  was 
to  save  men  by  imparting  precepts  that  appealed  to  conscience.  The  first 
step  in  moral  progress  he  held  to  be  self-knowledge  and  confession  of 
faults;  the  next,  daily  self-examination  and  steadfast  disregard  of  deceit- 
ful allurements.1  This  ideal  could  be  attained  only  by  struggle;  the 
example  of  the  athlete  and  gladiator  was  brought  forward,  though  the 
reward  of  the  Stoic  disciple  was  not  crown  or  palm,  but  self-knowledge, 
renunciation,  and  resignation.2 

This  intense  feeling  of  man's  capacities  and  his  actual  degradation 
and  this  yearning  to  save  souls  arose  not  so  much  from  the  observation 
of  a  corrupt  society  as  from  thorough  self-examination  and  his  own  sad 
experience:  he  was  himself  so  far  from  the  goal.3  The  combination  of 
idealism  and  pessimism  presented  by  the  earlier  Stoicism  was  fatal  to 
moral  reform.  The  flawless  perfection  of  the  wise  man  was  found  an 
impossible  model  and  had  already  been  essentially  modified.  For 
Seneca  the  distinction  between  the  wise  man  and  the  fool  ceased  to  be 
an  absolute  demarcation,  though  still  ideally  valid,  and  degrees  in  virtue 
and  vice  were  fully  acknowledged  in  order  to  encourage  those  who  are 
traveling  the  road  of  moral  progress.4  Again,  the  ideal  contempt  for  all 
external  things  gave  way  to  the  Aristotelian  recognition  of  the  compara- 
tive value  of  some.  The  reforming  force  is  reason  dwelling  in  every 
human  soul.5  A  man  gets  a  vision  of  true  happiness  as  centered  in 
virtue,  then  forms  habits  of  thought  in  accordance  with  the  rational 
law;  from  the  settled  purpose  arises  the  virtuous  act.6  Therefore  he 
must  trust  the  strength  of  reason  in  a  moral  struggle.  Seneca  had, 
however,  had  ample  experience  of  human  frailty  and  fickleness.  So  he 
also  urges  dependence  on  the  help  of  God.7  "  To  those  who  are  climbing 

*  Ep.  6,  i,  28;  56,  4, 15. 

2  Ibid.  96,  5;   78,  16.  s  Ibid.  66,  12. 

3  Ibid.  72,  8;  57,  3;  89,  2.  6  Ibid.  95,  57;  116,  7. 

4  Ibid.  72;   75,  8.  7  Ibid.  73,  15. 


THE  SUBJECTIVE  STANDPOINT  IN  STOICISM  37 

upwards,  God  holds  out  a  hand."1  Moreover,  nothing  is  hidden  from 
God  and  his  voice,  "that  witness  in  the  heart"  must  not  be  disre- 
garded. Peace  and  tranquillity  are  attained  by  living  in  obedience 
to  the  law  of  reason,  and  the  mind  if  unperverted  will  follow  right  con- 
duct infallibly.  Everything  of  worth  is  within.  Mind  creates  its  own 
world  or  rediscovers  the  lost  Eden.2  The  period  of  innocence,  the 
vanished  Golden  Age,  to  which  Seneca  often  looked  back  with  longing, 
was  not  truly  moral,  for  there  was  ignorance  of  evil,  rather  than  prefer- 
ence of  the  good.  True  morality  can  result  only  from  voluntary  choice 
of  the  better.  Seneca  emphasized  the  Stoic  view  of  assent:  "no  impulse 
without  assent " ;3  and  defended  the  foremost  Stoic  thesis:  the  necessity 
of  judgment  in  thought  and  act  at  all  stages.  Thus  throughout  Seneca's 
writings  there  is  abundant  evidence  of  the  advance  in  introspective 
analysis. 

(3)  Spirituality  in  religion. — Seneca  never  in  form  severed  himself 
from  Stoic  materialism;  but  as  the  moral  life  became  more  vital  to  him, 
deity  appeared  a  spiritual  power.    The  Stoic  conception  of  God  was 
so  comprehensive  that  as  the  need  developed,  it  became  elastic.     To 
Seneca  deity  is  a  moral  and  spiritual  being,  "a  secret  power  within 
us  making  for  righteousness."    When  he  became  intensely  conscious 
of  the  conflict  in  himself  and  others,  he  found  succor  in  a  vision  of  God 
as  Creator,4  a  pitiful  loving  Guardian,  Giver  of  all  good,  a  Power  that 
draws  to  himself,  who  receives  us   at  death,  in  whom  is  our  eternal 
beatitude.    A  harsh  repellent  moral  idealism  had  become  a  religion. 
From  the  time  of  Cleanthes  continued,  though  not  endless,  existence 
after  death  was  a  Stoic  doctrine.     If  virtue  is  the  sole  source  of  human 
happiness,  length  of  life  is  a  matter  of  indifference,  as  Seneca  clearly 
recognized.5    Yet  the  demand  for  immortality  was  felt;  and  it  was  not 
merely  a  logical  consequence  of  Stoic  physics,  it  was  corroborated  by  the 
general  belief  in  it.     But  it  had  a  deeper  foundation  in  his  own  spiritual 
craving.    In  his  highest  flights  of  imagination,  personal  immortality 
seemed  a  fact,  a  definite  future  life  of  bliss. 

(4)  Political  conflicts. — The  two  competing  tendencies  in  Seneca's 
exposition  of  Stoicism  are  also  illustrated  in  the  conflict  between  his 
admiration  for  the  sheerly  isolated  perfection  of  the  philosophic  monk  and 
his  active  sympathy  with  the  movement  of  humanity  and  man  as  a 
member  of  the  universal  commonwealth  which  was  aroused  by  his 

*Ibid.  83,  i;  43,5. 

1  Ibid.  74,  6-14;  31,  10;  96;  98.  4  Ep.  73,  15;  79,  12;  102,  22. 

3  De  Ira  ii.  3,  4.  s  Ibid,  93,  74. 


38       SUBJECTIVE  VIEWPOINT  IN  POST- ARISTOTELIAN  PERIOD 

relation  to  the  imperial  government.  There  are  two  states  in  which  a 
man  may  be  enrolled — in  the  city  of  gods  and  men  and  in  the  particular 
city  to  which  he  is  assigned  by  the  accident  of  birth.1  There  is  a  prac- 
tical difficulty  for  the  wise  man:  what  earthly  commonwealth  can  he 
serve  consistently? 

It  is  evident,  then,  that  for  Seneca  epistemology  does  not  present 
problems.  It  is  the  moral  struggle  evident  both  in  his  own  life  and  in 
the  need  of  the  many  stretching  out  their  hands  for  aid  that  appeals  to 
him.  The  contest,  he  feels,  must  be  fought  out  in  each  individual.  So 
there  result  a  dualism  and  a  subjective  attitude  in  all  phases  of  experience 
in  which  he  felt  most  keenly  the  antagonism  between  the  is  and  the 
ought — psychologically,  a  dualism  between  the  rational  and  irrational; 
ethically,  the  struggle  between  the  ideally  perfect  in  man  and  society 
and  the  actual  depravity;  politically,  between  the  isolated  self-sufficiency 
of  the  rational  being  and  the  dependence  upon  and  the  sympathy 
with  all  members  of  the  community,  between  the  ideal  state  and  the 
Roman  Empire  during  the  Julio-Claudian  tragedy. 

C.  Ethical  and  Religious  Environment  of  Later  Stoicism 

Cicero's  letters  present  a  vivid  picture  of  the  discontent  with  actual 
conditions  and  the  uncertainty  of  the  future  which  characterized  his 
age.  But  this  was  only  the  introduction  to  the  perplexities  of  the  Early 
Empire,  when  statesmen  ''moved  at  random  in  the  midst  of  uncertain- 
ties,"2 when  servility  and  independence  were  equally  perilous.  Along- 
side of  the  decline  and  degradation  of  the  senatorial  order,  of  which  we 
catch  shadowy  glimpses  in  Seneca  and  get  a  minute  picture  in  Tacitus, 
other  great  social  changes  were  taking  place;3  the  invasion  of  Greek  and 
Oriental  influences,  the  emancipation  of  woman  from  the  old  Roman 
conventionality,  the  growing  power  of  a  new  moneyed  class,  the  rise  of 
freedmen  who  thus  created  a  free  industrial  order  and  helped  to  break 
down  "the  cramped  social  ideal  of  the  slave  owner  and  the  soldier." 
In  Juvenal's  satires  we  behold  both  the  old  Roman  prejudice  and  con- 
ventionality that  was  passing  away  and  the  growing  sense  of  equality 
and  sympathy.  In  these  social  and  political  changes  Stoicism  played 
an  important  part.  In  general  the  Stoic  opposition  in  political  affairs 
was  only  the  opposition  of  a  moral  ideal,  still  with  others  it  was  the 
"deliberate  propaganda  of  a  political  creed."4  Socially  its  doctrine  of 
brotherhood  awoke  a  deeper  sympathy  for  the  miserable  and  helpless, 

i  De  Olio  iv;  Ep.  68,  2.  3  Ibid.  69,  105. 

*  Dill  R.  Soc.  41-42.  «  Ibid.  48. 


THE  SUBJECTIVE  STANDPOINT  IN  STOICISM  39 

and  aided  the  recognition  of  equality  of  the  sexes  and  the  various  classes 
in  regard  to  moral  and  mental  capacity.  For  the  Roman,  moral  author- 
ity both  political  and  personal  was  embodied  in  the  government.  Hence 
those  who  understood  the  uncertainty  of  the  foundations  of  these  insti- 
tutions, who  were  most  keenly  alive  to  the  social,  political,  and  religious 
changes,  felt  also  most  acutely  the  need  of  a  stable  basis  and  a  law 
unaffected  by  the  varying  fortunes  of  the  state.  In  return  for  the  loss 
of  civic  freedom  and  patriotic  energy  the  great  mass  of  the  people  had 
been  given  peace,  order,  and  material  well-being;  but  the  indications 
are  that  the  moral  tone  was  not  elevated,  chiefly  for  the  reason  that 
stimulus  to  action  was  lacking.  Ideals  to  correspond  with  the  altered 
conditions  were  wanting  also.  Now  philosophy  abandoned  the  quest 
for  an  ideal  of  knowledge  and  took  up  the  problem  of  conduct  and  happi- 
ness. Religion  and  morality  were  both  part  of  the  law  of  the  Roman  state 
and  therefore  had  but  indirect  connection  with  each  other.  When  the 
cultured  Romans  first  sought  in  philosophy  explanations  for  their  per- 
plexities, they  found  a  solution  in  a  threefold  theology  of  the  poets, 
statesmen,  and  philosophers;  the  latter  alone  could  be  true,  but  the 
popular  religion  was  necessary  for  the  common  people.  When  the  true 
law  was  identified  with  right  reason  and  accordingly  with  the  individual, 
it  was  still  rather  the  law  of  the  state  than  personal  morality  that  ema- 
nated from  universal  reason.  Hence  it  was  the  problem  of  civic  and  per- 
sonal morality,  external  and  inner  control,  as  well  as  the  relation  between 
state  religion  or  deity  as  rational  law,  on  the  one  hand,  and  individual 
consciousness  on  the  other,  that  occupied  Stoic  philosophy  during  the 
Imperial  period.  In  this  development  of  self -consciousness,  the  indi- 
vidual standpoint  was  emphasized  by  Epictetus,  the  universal  by  M. 
Aurelius. 

D.  Increased  Emphasis  on  Self-Consciousness 

a)  From  the  individual  standpoint:  Epictetus. — (i)  Reflective  con- 
sciousness.— Reflective  consciousness  (TrapaKoAovtf^o-is)  according  to 
Epictetus  is  the  distinguishing  peculiarity  of  man.  The  human  soul 
is  a  unity  and  rational;  hence  mental  functions  apparently  similar  in 
man  and  the  lower  animals  are  really  different.  A  man  that  lives  irra- 
tionally, though  in  form  human,  is  in  essence  a  brute.1  By  reflective 
consciousness  man  is  able  to  understand  and  discriminate  between  im- 
pressions. Man  is  not  only  a  spectator;  he  is  also  an  interpreter.  The 
irrational  animals  are  not  conscious  of  understanding  what  is  happen- 

1  ii.  4,  u;  22,  27;  iv.  5,  19. 


40       SUBJECTIVE  VIEWPOINT  IN  POST- ARISTOTELIAN  PERIOD 


ing.r  Use  is  one  thing;  conscious  appreciation  another.  Man  is  a 
citizen  of  the  world  and  one  of  the  ruling,  not  of  the  subservient 
parts,  for  he  is  capable  of  comprehending  the  divine  administration  and 
inferring  the  connections  of  things  in  a  logical  manner. 

The  psychological  dualism  characteristic  of  the  Middle  Stoa  which 
Seneca  followed  in  his  later  thought  was  not  adopted  by  Epictetus; 
he  adhered  consistently  to  the  monistic  form.  The  ^ye/xoviKo'v  is  the 
center  of  mental  life,  but  in  harmony  with  the  practical  tendency  of 
his  philosophy,  is  not  so  much  identified  with  apprehending  and  knowing 
as  with  feeling  and  willing;  though  Stavoia  is  used  as  a  synonym,  of 
much  more  frequent  occurrence  is  Trpoatpeo-ts,  the  whole  mental  nature 
from  the  aspect  of  will.2 

(2)  Self-consciousness — the  daemon. — The  emphasis  which  Epictetus 
put  on  reflective  consciousness  finds  its  climax  in  the  self-consciousness 
involved  in  his  doctrine  of  the  daemon,3  the  divine  element  in  man, 
reason  as  the  better  self,  conscience.     In  general  the  term  seems  to 
signify  the  perfect  reason  in  harmony  with  the  divine,  the  ideal  rather 
than  the  empirical  personality.4    The  fact  that  it  is  the  same  self  that 
has  these  two  aspects  gives  the  word  also  the  meaning  of  the  character 
that  is  to  be  idealized,  that  may  be  degraded  or  elevated.5     Thus  the 
daemon  becomes  something  variable  which  in  spite  of  its  divine  nature 
develops  into  what  each  person  makes  of  it.    Thus  it  expresses  a  mys- 
terious interaction  of  human  independence  and  divine  aid.     For  Posi- 
donius  the  daemon  had  been  the  objective,6  unchangeable,  divine  nature 
in  man;  for  these  later  Stoics  the  daemon  was  subject  to  modification 
for  better  and  worse  as  an  explanation  of  the  reality  of  sin.     In  Epictetus, 
the  feeling  of  the  high  destiny  and  worth  of  man  is  intense,  the  close 
connection  with  God  is  vital.     The  inner  consciousness  of  the  divine  is 
the  clearest  and  most  certain  fact  of  experience.7     The  likeness  to 
God  is  moral  rather  than  intellectual;  in  respect  to  will  the  resemblance 
is  perfect. 

(3)  Theory   of   knowledge. — Reflective-  and  self-consciousness  is 
fundamental  in  the  theory  of  knowledge  taught  by  Epictetus.     By 
the  term  <£avrao-ta  he,  in  the  first  place,  implies  the  presentation  of  external 
objects  communicated  by  the  senses.     Man  in  distinction  from  the  lower 
animals  has  the  ability  to  distinguish  presentations  and  thus  to  deter- 


*  i.  6,  13-21;  ii.  8,  6-8. 
3  iv.  i,  147;  ii.  15,  2-20. 
siii.  22,  53;  i.  14,  12. 
4ii.  8,  21;  iv.  12,  2;  9,  13. 


s  ii.  8,  13-21. 

6  Galen  469. 

ii.  12,  26;  5;  17,  27;  ii.  8,  12. 


THE  SUBJECTIVE  STANDPOINT  IN  STOICISM  41 

mine  himself  freely  and  rationally.1  But  this  ability  to  make  use  of 
presentations  must  be  trained  and  cultivated.  In  this  way  ^avrao-ia 
passes  over  into  its  second  signification,  the  meaning  or  value  of  presen- 
tations. In  its  primary  sense,  <£avrao-ia  is  often  substituted  for  Tr/oay/xa, 
vTTOKtifJww,  it  is  not  identical  with  the  external  object  per  se,  but  it 
is  the  external  object  as  perceived.  As  merely  presented,  things  express 
nothing  as  to  their  value,  but  put  questions  to  the  mind.2  "It  is  the 
constitution  of  our  understanding  that  when  we  meet  with  sense-objects, 
we  do  not  simply  receive  impressions  from  them;  but  we  also  select 
something  from  them,  and  subtract  and  add  something,  and  compound 
by  means  of  them  these  things  or  those,  and  in  fact  pass  from  some  to 
other  things  which  in  a  manner  resemble  them."3  Because  things  put 
questions,  Epictetus  urges4  that  presentations  must  not  be  accepted 
without  examination,  and  training  in  such  evaluation  is  indispensable.5 
There  is  a  force,  power,  aggressiveness  in  things  that  assails,  seizes,  con- 
fuses, charms  the  mind.6  Hence  the  importance  and  dominance  of  assent 
in  the  lectures  of  Epictetus.  Again  and  again  he  emphatically  insists: 
We  cannot  be  compelled  to  assent;  therefore,  there  is  something  in  us 
naturally  free.  A  man  cannot  be  forced  to  acknowledge  what  is  false 
or  to  desire  what  he  does  not  choose,  or,  in  short,  be  constrained  to  make 
use  of  presentations.7 

The  <£ai/Tacruu  are,  then,  in  the  terminology  of  Epictetus,  presenta- 
tions of  sense,  percepts;  in  the  second  place,  mental  percepts,  images, 
having  as  contents  aesthetical  and  ethical  qualities,  real  things  not 
apprehended  by  sense,  or  abstractions.8  It  is  with  reference  to  favrao-ia 
in  the  latter  signification  that  training  is  peculiarly  necessary.9  The 
mental  state  is  a  compound  of  which  the  external  object  is  the  least 
important  ingredient.  It  is  the  value  that  is  put  upon  external  objects 
to  which  they  are  devoted,  the  spirit  in  which  they  are  used,  that  counts. 
No  external  thing  can  affect  the  mind  until  it  has  become  a  part  of  the 
mental  life  and  has  been  stamped  with  the  approval  of  the  will.  External 
things  do  not  constitute  rational  life;  for  the  mind  makes  the  significant 
contribution  in  determining  the  worth  of  each  object  and  event.  Out 
of  the  indifferent  external  matter  thinking  makes  the  world  as  it  is. 
If  the  mind  is  trained  to  see  that  only  the  things  within  the  power  of  the 

'  i.  6,  13;  ii.  8,  4;  14,  15;  iv.  7,  32. 

*  iii.  8,  i.  6  ii.  22,  25;  iii.  25,  6,  etc. 
3  i.  6,  10.  ?  iii.  22,  25;  iv.  i. 

*  iii.  12.  8i.  27,  i. 

5  iii.  8.  » iii.  8,  i;  ii.  18,  23-27. 


42       SUBJECTIVE  VIEWPOINT  IN  POST- ARISTOTELIAN  PERIOD 

will  are  good  or  evil,  then  progress  will  be  made,  for  assent  will  never 
be  given  to  anything  but  a  ^avracrun  KaraA.^™*^,  which  accurately  esti- 
mates all  that  befalls  us  at  its  true  worth.1  Philosophers  utter  words 
contrary  to  accepted  opinion  but  not  contrary  to  reason,  for  it  will  be 
found  by  experience  that  their  words  are  true.2  Hence  the  philosophy  of 
Epictetus,  though  it  insists  on  the  subjective  aspect  of  value,  is  grounded 
on  experience  that  may  be  tested  by  all. 

(4)  Autonomy  of  will. — From  the  preceding  position  it  logically 
follows  that  the  good  of  man  is  the  will,  and  that  progress  consists  in  the 
exercise  and  improvement  of  the  will.  Only  will  compels  will,  for  it  is  in 
our  power  and  all  action  depends  on  it.  Nothing  else  can  conquer  will 
than  will  itself,  for  it  is  a  law  of  nature  and  of  God  that  the  superior 
shall  always  overcome  the  inferior.3  It  is  not  the  faculty  of  vision  that 
opens  and  closes  the  eyes  and  turns  them  away  from  objects  which  it  ought 
not  to  use,  but  the  faculty  of  will.  It  uses  the  senses  as  tools  and  tests 
and  judges  the  faculty  of  sense.4  Man  is  not  flesh  or  blood  or  sinews, 
but  that  which  uses  these  bodily  parts  and  that  which,  conscious  of 
itself  and  of  them,  controls  impressions.5  Correct  judgment  is,  accord- 
ingly, a  matter  of  will.6 

As  the  good  of  man  is  a  certain  kind  of  will  and  the  proper  use  of 
impressions  depends  on  the  will,7  it  is  indifferent  whether  things  are 
composed  of  atoms  or  of  similar  parts  or  of  earth  and  fire ;  it  suffices  to 
know  the  nature  of  good  and  evil.  Man  ought  to  live  according  to 
nature  and  therefore  it  is  his  duty  to  contemplate  the  order  of  things; 
but  the  purpose  of  the  observation  is  that  he  may  live  life  as  it  ought  to 
be  lived.8  As  treated  by  Epictetus,  therefore,  philosophy  became 
ethics  that  reached  its  crowning-point  in  theology.  For  his  own  reflect- 
ive experience  gave  rise  to  a  strong  persuasion  that  it  is  the  privilege 
of  a  rational  being  to  live  in  conscious  union  with  the  divine,  and  from 
his  own  experience  of  such  a  relationship  man  ought  to  be  conscious  of 
God's  presence  and  greatness.  From  this  same  consciousness  arose 
the  profound  realization  of  the  brotherhood  of  man.9  The  common 
opinion  that  only  free  persons  ought  to  be  educated  is  wrong;  "rather 
believe  the  philosophers  who  say  that  only  the  educated  are  free."10 

It  was  this  need  of  moral  training  that  lay  at  the  basis  of  the  teachings 

*  iii.  8,  4;  Ench.  45.  6  i.  8,  16. 

*  iv.  i.  ?  i.  20,  15;  29,  i;  iv.  5,  32;  ii.  i,  4. 
3  i.  25,  4;  17,  22;  29,  28.                     8  Cf.  Ench.  49. 

4ii.  23.  »i.  19;  ii.  4,  5;  ii.  i. 

s  iv.  7,  8-12.  Mii.  i,  22. 


THE  SUBJECTIVE  STANDPOINT  IN  STOICISM  43 

of  Epictetus.  Like  Seneca  and  Musonius  he  considered  himself  a  physi- 
cian engaged  in  the  cure  of  souls.  "The  philosophers'  school,  ye  men, 
is  a  surgery;  you  ought  not  to  go  out  of  it  with  pleasure,  but  with  pain; 
for  you  are  not  in  sound  health  when  you  enter."  Here  in  this  self- 
consciousness  we  find  the  origin  of  the  subjective  standpoint  as  illustrated 
in  Epictetus:  the  reference  of  the  problem  of  control  to  the  individual 
will  as  has  been  noted  in  the  theory  of  knowledge,  especially  with  respect 
to  evaluation  of  the  elements  of  cognition,  the  autonomy  of  will  in 
psychology  and  ethics,  the  personal  union  with  God,  in  which  commun- 
ion was  found  the  ground  of  the  course  of  the  world  as  well  as  of  the 
interrelation  of  men. 

b)  From  the  universal  point  of  view:  M.  Aurelius. — (i)  Cosmic 
interrelationship. — With  still  greater  emphasis  on  self-consciousness, 
M.  Aurelius,  in  comparison  with  Epictetus,  made  a  more  complete  appli- 
cation of  the  conception  of  the  cosmos.  No  one  has  more  thoroughly 
identified  himself  with  the  doctrine  that  the  universe  is  a  living  organ- 
ism with  rational  interconnections.1  All  things  by  law  is  the  whole  sum. 
A  vivid  realization  of  the  universe  as  a  system  of  dynamically  inter- 
related parts  is  expressed  in  his  words:  " Subsequents  follow  antecedents 
by  a  bond  of  inner  consequence;  it  is  no  mere  numerical  sequence  of 
arbitrary  and  isolated  units,  but  a  rational  interconnection.  And  just 
as  things  existent  exhibit  harmonious  co-ordination,  so  twro  things  coming 
into  being  display  not  bare  succession  but  a  marvelous  interrelation- 
ship."2 The  universal  law  is  from  one  point  of  view  Deity  itself.  "In 
the  god's  work  there  is  providence  everywhere.  For  the  action  of  chance 
is  the  course  of  nature  or  the  web  and  woof  of  the  dispositions  of  provi- 
dence. From  providence  all  things  flow.  "3  "  No  human  act  can  be  right 
without  co-reference  to  the  divine  and  conversely."  The  mind  of  the 
universe  is  social.  One  and  all  work  toward  one  consummation,  some 
knowingly  and  intelligently,  others  unconsciously.4 

(2)  Social  relationship. — Man's  brotherhood  with  all  mankind  is 
not  by  blood  or  physical  descent  but  by  community  in  mind ;  and  each 
man's  mind  is  God,  an  efflux  of  deity.5  In  social  relations  it  is  toward 
men's  inner  self  that  all  consideration  must  be  directed.  It  is  this 
inner  self  that  is  the  object  of  all  analysis  in  the  Meditations.  In  this 
self  the  immanence  of  the  indwelling  God  comes  to  light.  Though 
Deity  on  the  one  hand  is  more  impersonal,  it  is  on  the  other  more  imperi- 

'  iv.  40,  45;  vi.  3,  38;  v.  8;  vii.  9;  ix.  9. 

2  iv.  45.  4  j.  30;  vi.  42;  ».  18;  v.  i. 

3  ii.  3-13.  s  xii.  26. 


44       SUBJECTIVE  VIEWPOINT  IN  POST-ARISTOTELIAN  PERIOD 

ous  and  distinct  in  operation.  The  god  within  has  control  of  what  man 
is.1  Loyalty  to  his  own  indwelling  reason  and  god  is  the  supreme  obli- 
gation2 and  the  aim  should  be  to  keep  the  spirit  within  pure.3  Thus 
pantheism  became  less  physical;  the  language  used  is  almost  theistic. 
Life  is  the  presence  of  God  and  the  course  of  the  world  is  the  evolution 
of  providence  which  is  operative  everywhere,  especially  in  man's  self. 
This  intense  conviction  of  a  god  within  makes  cosmic  duty  become  per- 
sonal.4 Therefore  "earthly  life  has  but  one  fruit:  inward  holiness  and 
social  acts."5 

(3)  Autonomy  of  the  spiritual  element  in  the  soul. — In  his  view  of  the 
soul,  M.  Aurelius  makes  the  spiritual  more  prominent  by  using  ^ye^ovixov, 
voepdv  /u-e/jos,  and  vovs  (as  distinguished  from  t/^X7?)  for  the  inner  self, 
the  heart,  the  rational  content  of  the  soul.6  It  is  interesting  to  notice 
that  he  follows  the  doctrines  of  the  schools  of  medicine  according  to 
which  Trveu/xa  meant  the  life-principle  or  nerve-fluid7  used  to  explain 
physiological  processes.  So  he  made  a  triple  division  of  <ro>//,a,  IJ/VXTJ, 
and  vovs  to  which  he  attributed  respectively  euo-^o-is,  opjum,  Soy/Mara. 
M.  Aurelius  used  favrao-ia  to  mean  impressions  of  sense  and  adhered 
to  Zeno's  theory  of  ruTrwo-ts.8  Predominantly  favTaa-ia  signifies  a 
thought  product  with  a  sense  of  valuation  and  appreciation.9  The 
tests  to  be  applied  to  such  an  impression  are  "objective  character,  sub- 
jective affection,  and  logical  relation."10  This  valuation  made  by  a  self- 
conscious  subject  is  also  characteristic  of  wcA^is.  "The  view  taken 
is  everything."  "The  world  is  a  process  of  variation,  life  is  a  view,  an 
opinion."11  Significant  is  the  frequent  occurrence  of  Soy/xa,  conviction  or 
principle,  the  general  conception  of  the  value  of  things  as  distinguished 
from  <£avracrta,  the  evaluation  of  concrete  objects.12  The  importance  of 
certitude  is  emphasized;  although  assent  is  fallible,  it  is  in  man's  power 
to  prevent  the  intrusion  of  the  uncertified,  since  it  is  the  nature  of  reason 
to  assent  to  nothing  false  or  obscure.13  Impressions  play  on  the  organs 
of  sense  but  that  is  the  limit  of  their  influence.  Though  they  try  inces- 
santly to  force  an  entrance  to  the  inner  citadel,  to  take  reason  by  storm, 
reason  retains  absolute  power  of  self-determination  and  the  impressions 

1  iii.  5.  7  iv.  3. 

2  ii.  13;  iii.  7.  8  ii.  7;  iii.  6-16;  vi.  16;  vii.  29. 

3  iii.  7.  » iii.  6;  viii.  26;  vii.  47;  viii.  36-1     17. 

4  viii.  51.  I0  viii.  13. 

s  vi.  30.  "  xii.  18,  22,  26;  iv. 

6  xi.  20;  iv.  4;  ii.  2;  ii.  16;  xii.  3.         "  vii.  2. 
*J  iv.  22;  v.  10;  vi.  30;  vii.  54;  viii.  7;  ix.  6. 


THE  SUBJECTIVE  STANDPOINT  IN  STOICISM  45 

must  await  its  decision.1  No  matter  what  affects  the  human  being 
from  without,  as  long  as  it  is  not  viewed  as  an  injury,  he  remains  uninjured. 
Hence  the  requirement  laid  by  M.  Aurelius  on  himself:  "Efface 
impression,  stay  impulse,  quench  inclination,  be  master  of  yourself."2 

The  <£vVis  XoyiK-ij  pursues  the  even  tenor  of  its  way,  when  in  impres- 
sions it  yields  assent  to  nothing  false  or  insecure,  when  it  directs  impulses 
to  social  acts  only,  when  it  confines  inclination  and  avoidance  to  things 
within  our  power,  and  welcomes  every  apportionment  of  universal 
nature.  Over  against  this  active  dominant  self  stand  the  external 
objects,3  which  are  contrasted  with  moral  natures,  have  no  sense  or 
mutual  relations,  must  be  analyzed  into  cause  and  matter,4  and  are 
worthless  and  transitory.  "Facts,  things,  events,  stand  outside  us, 
just  as  they  are,  knowing  nothing  and  stating  nothing  about  themselves. 
What  states  the  case  for  them?  TO  ^-ye/AoviKoY"?  The  understanding 
modifies  and  converts  every  hindrance  to  act  into  furtherance  of  its 
principal  aim.6  The  soul  is  self -swayed  and  self-moved  and  modifies 
the  objects  upon  which  it  exerts  influence  into  accord  with  the  judgments 
that  it  approves.7  The  inner  self  has  only  self-enacted  needs,  is  self- 
complete.8  "  Be  we  ever  so  much  made  for  one  another,  our  inner  selves 
have  each  its  own  sovereign  rights."9  "Press  straight  to  the  inner 
self — your  own,  the  world's  and  this  man's."10  In  dealing  with  others 
we  must  look  at  their  inner  selves;  the  touch-stone,  however,  is  the  indi- 
vidual self.  "Do  not  look  at  other  men's  selves;  but  be  guided  by  the 
nature  of  the  whole  and  your  own  nature."11  The  soul  becomes  a  self- 
rounded  sphere  when  it  "shines  with  the  light  by  which  it  sees  the  truth 
of  all  things  and  the  truth  within  itself."12 

(4)  Self-consciousness  in  religion. — Religion  is  the  atmosphere  of  the 
Meditations.  Man  and  God  are  spiritual  confederates.  Character, 
called  man's  destiny  by  Heraclitus,  has  become  the  indwelling  genius  of 
the  Romans.  A  conscience  responsible  for  act  and  word  to  the  self  and 
to  deity  is  the  vital  reality — his  ruler,  guide,  pilot,  lawgiver,  monarch, 
and  lord.  Truly  devout,  M.  Aurelius  thus  bases  public  and  personal 
religion  on  the  tenet  of  cosmic  order.  All  obligation  is  cosmic  in  its 
sanction.  The  law  of  reason  is  coincident  with  the  law  of  justice  and 

1  iii.  6;  v.  36;  vi.  52;  vii.  16;  v.  19;  vi.  8.  ?xi.  n. 

2  ix.  7.  *  vii.  16. 

3  ix.  3;  xii.  30.  »  viii.  56. 
4v.  10;  vi.  4;  x.  18;  vii.  29.                                             10ix.  22. 

5  ix.  15-  "  vii.  55. 

6  viii.  35.  "  xi.  12. 


46       SUBJECTIVE  VIEWPOINT  IN  POST-ARISTOTELIAN  PERIOD 

injustice  is  a  sin  against  God.1  Deity  is  cosmic.  Therefore,  in  so  far  as 
man  identifies  himself  with  the  cosmos,  no  effort  is  wasted.2  Man  is  an 
insignificant  part — a  grain  upon  the  earth;  and  this  quantitative  insig- 
nificance has  its  counterpart  in  the  qualitative:  everything  can  be  ana- 
lyzed into  cause  and  substance  and  nothing  else.3  This  submission  and 
effacement  is  a  striking  contrast  to  the  proud  self-sufficiency  sounded 
by  the  founders  of  Stoicism,  on  the  intellectual  side  a  counterpart  to  the 
emotional  fervor  of  the  hymn  of  Cleanthes. 

Civil  obligation  was  thus  superseded  by  the  cosmic;  citizenship 
became  world-citizenship  in  the  Dear  City  of  God.4  This  conception 
came  to  include  the  whole  range  of  social  duties  and  endeavor,  and 
because  of  the  position  of  the  emperor  was  invested  with  new  conviction 
and  reality.  In  the  hands  of  the  great  jurists  the  lex  naturae  was  being 
formulated  as  jus  naturale,  which  Stoic  influences  helped  to  secure  as  the 
moral  basis  of  the  imperial  code  of  laws.  Cosmopolitanism  thus  became 
self-consciousness  of  Rome's  mission.  Too  exclusive  emphasis  on  reason 
and  the  intolerance  that  results  from  purely  individualistic  morality 
were  ameliorated  by  recognition  of  the  social  bond.  Although  Stoicism 
from  the  first  had  insisted  on  inwardness  of  morality  and  hence  on  dis- 
position and  motive,  at  the  beginning  mere  self-consistency  satisfied 
the  demand  of  conformity  to  nature.  Such  self-centered  egoism  proved  a 
failure  in  the  relation  of  the  individual  to  society.  Hence  gradually, 
while  the  emphasis  on  the  motive  and  on  self-consciousness  was  increased, 
the  social  outlook  was  broadened  so  that  the  individual  was  in  peril  of 
being  absorbed  in  the  cosmic  world.  It  was  in  the  stress  of  this  conflict 
that  the  subjective  point  of  view  developed.  For  this  conception  of  a 
cosmic  order,  of  a  cosmic  standard,  cosmic  interrelationship  and  cosmic 
duty  were  based  on  self-consciousness.  It  was  "within  the  little  field 
of  self"  that  M.  Aurelius  found  the  ground  of  all  reality.  "Either  an 
ordered  universe  or  else  a  welter  of  confusion.  Assuredly,  then,  a 
world-order.  Or  think  you  that  order  subsisting  within  yourself  is 
compatible  with  this  order  in  the  all  ?  And  that,  too,  when  all  things, 
however  distributed  and  diffused,  are  affected  sympathetically  ?"s 

From  its  inception  and  throughout  its  history  Stoicism  insisted  on 
this  interrelation  of  the  human  and  the  divine,  the  individual  and  the 
whole.  All  speculation  must  start  from  things  human  and  advance 
continuously  to  the  divine,  all-comprehending  principle  of  existence.  The 

1  xi.  i. 

2  iv.  23;  Hi.  12.  4  iv.  23. 

3  iv.  4;  viii.  18;  ix.  37.  s  iv.  3. 


THE  SUBJECTIVE  STANDPOINT  IN  STOICISM  47 

theoretical  cannot  be  severed  from  the  practical,  was  a  Stoic  maxim. 
The  material  monism  of  Zeno  had  included  everything — inorganic  and 
organic,  thought,  feeling,  will,  man  and  God — under  the  category  of 
matter;  hence  metaphysical  materialism.  For  conduct  an  equally 
comprehensive  rule  was  laid  down.  When  philosophy  was  looking 
for  a  canon  of  right  living,  a  formula  to  serve  as  a  standard,  "nature," 
which  had  been  the  subject  of  investigations  for  centuries,  met  with 
universal  favor.  To  the  Cynic,  individual  experience  and  will  had  un- 
conditional authority;  sense  and  instinct  were  the  sure  utterance  of 
nature,  and  happiness  was  to  be  found  only  by  obeying  its  primary 
mandates;  all  social  obligations  and  sanctions,  as  extraneous  to  man's 
nature,  were  a  matter  of  indifference  to  the  philosopher.  Zeno  adopted 
the  formula:  Life  in  agreement,  or  self-consistency  and  conformity. 
Hitherto  the  emphasis  on  nature  had  been  on  the  physical  and  sentient 
side  of  nature ;  the  inclusion  of  reason  and  the  consequent  social  relation- 
ship changed  the  conception  of  the  wise  man  and  things  indifferent. 
In  the  gradual  clarification  of  the  implications  in  pantheistic  immanence 
and  social  fellowship,  return  to  nature  involved  separation  from  the  brutes 
and  inert  matter,  and  a  recall  from  individual  isolation  to  conscious 
brotherhood  with  human  kind  and  harmony  of  will  with  God.  As  long 
as  sense  and  impulse  pronounced  the  verdict  there  could  be  only  absolute 
rejection  or  acceptance.  When  reason  became  dominant,  directing 
sense  and  impulse,  a  graduated  scale  of  things  indifferent  as  they  aided 
or  retarded  life  in  agreement  with  reason  resulted.  The  consequent 
suppression,  or  rather  attempted  annihilation,  of  the  emotions  made  the 
nature  from  which  reason  had  been  excluded  subservient.  From  the 
sovereignty  of  reason,  personality  as  the  ultimate  unity  of  individual 
will  and  consciousness,  distinct  from  the  physical  organism  and  environ- 
ment was  gradually  revealed — with  the  final  antithesis  not  between 
thought  and  sense,  but  between  spirit  and  flesh,  in  later  Stoicism.  It  is 
this  conflict  between  a  metaphysical  materialism  and  an  idealistic  ethics 
that  makes  the  problem,  aroused  by  social  and  political  conditions,  so 
acute  for  Seneca,  Epictetus,  and  M.  Aurelius.  Here  originate  the 
antitheses  between  the  personal  and  impersonal  deity  and  between  the 
material  and  spiritual;  here  is  also  the  ground  of  the  problem  of  immor- 
tality which  disturbed  Seneca  and  made  even  M.  Aurelius  vacillate. 
Holding  on  to  the  fundamental  tenet  of  the  rationality  of  the  universe 
as  their  introspection  revealed  the  reality  of  inner  consciousness,  of  the 
personal  and  spiritual,  the  later  Stoics  still  maintained  the  identity  of  the 
nature  of  man  with  that  of  the  universe  at  large.  But  this  universal 


48       SUBJECTIVE  VIEWPOINT  IN  POST-ARISTOTELIAN  PERIOD 

nature  had  been  reinterpreted  by  ascribing  to  it  the  ideal  characteristics 
that  the  moral  struggle  presupposed.  So  also  in  the  theory  of  knowledge 
a  transformation  had  taken  place.  "For  as  in  the  balance  the  scale 
must  needs  fall  down  if  weights  are  placed  in  it,  so  the  mind  must  yield 
to  things  perspicuous ;  for  just  as  no  animal  can  resist  seeking  for  what 
appears  suited  to  its  nature,  so  it  is  not  possible  to  refuse  assent  to  an 
object  that  is  perspicuous, "  Zeno  had  said.  "  Will  only  can  conquer  will. 
Thinking  makes  our  world  what  it  is;  if  it  is  not  a  good  world,  the  fault 
lies  in  our  erroneous  cognition,"  said  Epictetus.  The  view  we  take,  the 
estimate  we  put  on  things,  is  everything,  declared  M.  Aurelius.  Thus 
the  autonomy  which  had  been  formerly  ascribed  to  nature  or  the  state 
has  been  transferred  to  will  and  thought. 


III.    EFFECT  OF  THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  SUBJECTIVE 
ATTITUDE  ON  SCIENTIFIC  METHOD 

As  regards  scientific  method  a  decided  change  in  standpoint  can  also 
be  traced  in  post-Aristotelian  thought.  With  the  more  analytic  point 
of  view,  the  investigation  of  the  principles  underlying  verification  grew 
imperative.  Epicurus  began  with  the  doctrine  of  the  real  character  of 
the  object  of  knowledge  as  given  in  sense-perception,  while  inferential 
reasoning  was  limited  to  a  very  restricted  field,  though  its  voluntary 
nature  was  emphasized.  Later  Epicureans  found  it  necessary  to  widen 
the  sphere  of  inference  and  in  opposition  to  the  Stoics  admitted  proba- 
bility instead  of  absolute  certainty.  Thus  the  individual's  method  of 
reaching  truth  was  the  subject  of  study.  Then  the  Skeptic  and  Empiric, 
closely  allied  in  scientific  procedure,  worked  against  the  purely  deductive 
analysis  favored  by  the  Dogmatists,  the  one  basing  all  art  and  science 
on  the  practices  of  daily  routine,  the  other  building  up  his  system  of 
medicine  on  an  inductive  basis.  At  the  same  time  the  character  of  the 
object  of  knowledge  was  modified;  not  reality  isolated  and  independent, 
but  as  it  appears  to  the  knower,  became  the  problem.  Hence  progres- 
sive value  had  been  assigned  to  the  individual  judgment,  until  finally 
sole  dependence  was  placed  upon  it  and  the  solution  of  problems  was 
sought  from  a  subjective  point  of  view. 

I.   INTROSPECTIVE  PSYCHOLOGY  AND   INDUCTIVE   METHOD:     EPICURUS 

A .  Thought  and  Sense-Perception  as  Psychological  Processes 
Though  Epicureanism  was  distinctly  and  predominantly  an  ethical 
system,  it  was  based  on  physics  and  therefore  implicated  a  theory  of 
knowledge  and  of  scientific  method.  Though  Epicurus  valiantly  de- 
fended the  reality  and  accuracy  of  the  object  of  sense-perception  to 
which  he  attributed  all  forms  of  direct  cognition,  the  psychological 
analysis  which  he  helped  to  introduce  forced  the  more  progressive  and 
acute  of  his  followers  to  supplement  the  omissions  and  to  remove  some 
of  the  contradictions  of  their  master  by  adopting  a  subjective  standpoint 
for  which  he  had  himself  paved  the  way.  His  division  of  the  soul  into 
parts  each  with  a  specific  function  and  the  physiological  and  psychologi- 
cal distinction  between  the  rational  and  irrational  elements  are  typical 
of  the  new  analytic  spirit.  Benefiting  by  the  psychological  analysis 
of  Plato  and  Aristotle  he  deviated  from  the  doctrines  of  Democritus 

49 


50       SUBJECTIVE  VIEWPOINT  IN  POST-ARISTOTELIAN  PERIOD 

that  there  is  no  difference  between  sensation  and  physical  interaction, 
nor  any  fundamental  distinction  between  sensation  and  thought  as 
psychical  processes.  He  held  that  sensation  is  produced  by  the  joint 
acting  and  common  movement  of  body  and  soul.1  He  also  made  further 
modifications  in  line  with  Aristotle's  psychology.  When  Epicurus 
wrote  the  canon,  he  included  under  aio^o-is  all  percepts  and  imagery. 
In  his  mature  thought  he  maintained  that  the  sense-organs  are  excited 
by  the  emanations  from  objects,  but  that  awareness  of  such  affection 
is  due  to  the  understanding.2  Furthermore,  he  drew  a  distinction 
between  percepts  and  images.  Having  discriminated  seeing  and  the 
consciousness  of  the  perception,  he  said:  "If  we  receive  a  ^avrao-ia  by 
an  impression,  whether  through  the  sense-organs  or  through  the  under- 
standing, of  the  form  or  qualities  of  an  object,  the  form  of  the  object  is 
the  same,  having  been  caused  by  the  continuous  emanations  of  films 
from  the  object  or  by  some  that  have  been  retained."3  In  the  follow- 
ing sentence  17  ^avraa-TiKr)  etrifioXrj  is  used  instead  of  <f>avTao-ia,  and 

then  favTaviai  are  described  as  formed  by  impressions  of  the  under- 
standing or  of  the  other  criteria.4  It  is  therefore  evident  that  in  the 
final  formulation  of  his  theory  Epicurus  understood  by  <£avTao-i<u 
presentations  either  to  sense  or  thought,  caused  by  eiSwAa,  and  considered 
them  in  general  as  <u  r^s  Siavotas  <£avTao-iai.  The  question  arises 
here  how  far  such  a  definition  of  <£avTao-ia  had  become  common  property 
by  the  time  of  Chrysippus,  and  to  what  extent  Stoics  and  Epicureans 
mutually  influenced  each  other  or  were  affected  by  Aristotle's  treatment. 
This  admission  of  the  understanding  to  participation  in  the  process 
of  sense-perception  had  important  bearing  on  the  Epicurean  system 
and  its  significance  becomes  more  apparent  when  the  nature  of  thought 
as  defined  by  Epicurus  is  considered.  As  the  atomistic  system  offered 
an  escape  from  fear  of  the  gods  and  of  death,  thus  giving  an  oppor- 
tunity for  reaching  the  goal  of  philosophy,  a  life  of  undisturbed  calm, 
so  the  attainment  of  such  an  attitude  was  rendered  possible  by  free-will.5 
Hence  to  make  his  theory  consistent,  Epicurus  assumed  innate  spon- 
taneity in  the  atoms.  But  it  was  through  subjective  analysis  that  he 
got  his  clue  to  the  swerving  of  the  atoms  that  made  a  cosmos  possible. 
This  principle  of  inward  mental  freedom  was  proved  by  man's  conscious- 
ness of  effort  in  deliberation  and  of  self-activity  in  volition.6  The  proof 

1  D.  L.  x.  63,  4.  2  Cf.  Arist.  (Century  Dictionary,  s.v.  "Sense"). 

3  D.  L.  x.  49;  Us.  317;  cf.  D.  L.  x.  48;  Cic.  Fin.  i.  21. 

4D.  L.  x.  51. 

*Vol.  Here.  viii.  2,  33.  6Lucr.  iv.  251-93. 


THE  SUBJECTIVE  ATTITUDE  AND  SCIENTIFIC  METHOD        51 

was  found  in  such  facts  of  experience  as  the  effort  felt  and  discerned 
in  the  movements  of  living  things,  the  straining  of  the  eye  to  see 
minute  particles,  the  exertion  of  the  mind  to  examine  the  subtle  images 
of  the  understanding  and  select  those  which  it  prefers.  The  same  prin- 
ciple was  applied  in  his  theory  of  knowledge.  Images  of  all  sorts  sur- 
round and  enter  the  organism  in  a  ceaseless  procession,  while  thought  is 
a  voluntary  activity  that  uses  the  material  which  is  presented  in  this 
inevitable  fashion.1  Without  presentations,  sensuous  or  mental,  think- 
ing would  be  impossible;  yet  whenever  any  concept  is  made  the  object 
of  thought,  the  corresponding  image  is  presented  because  the  attention 
is  directed  to  that  particular  etSwXov  of  all  the  countless  images  that 
surround  the  individual.2  Over  against  the  sensuous  material,  thinking 
is  a  "motion  in  us  that  joins  itself  to  the  presentations  of  sense  and  of  the 
understanding,  grasping,  discriminating,  and  judging  them."3  It  is 
therefore  functionally  different  from  sense-perception.  Such  also  seems 
to  be  the  meaning  of  Epicurus'  statement:4  "It  must  be  understood 
that  human  nature5  is  taught  and  constrained  by  things  and  events 
themselves  in  various  ways ;  but  thought  afterwards  investigates  exactly 
and  makes  additional  discoveries  in  what  is  intrusted  to  it."  In  this 
manner  the  free  activity  of  reasoning  on  the  part  of  the  individual  was 
admitted  and  an  approach  to  the  recognition  of  a  subjective  attitude  was 
made,  as  not  only  objects  of  cognition,  but  the  mental  processes  as  such 
were  studied. 

On  the  other  hand  the  sheer  receptivity  of  sense-perception  was 
emphatically  asserted.  Sense-perception,  Epicurus  maintained,  is  non- 
rational,  and  hence  can  be  neither  shaken  or  confirmed  by  reason.  It 
does  not  add  or  subtract  anything.6  It  cannot  be  invalidated  either  by 
perceptions  of  the  same  kind  or  by  those  of  other  sense-organs,  or  by 
reason,  since  all  thought  is  based  on  perception.7  "  Sense-perception, 
apprehending  what  falls  in  its  way,  neither  removes,  nor  adds,  nor 
changes  anything  and  altogether  in  every  way  gives  truth  and  grasps 
reality  as  it  truly  is."8  Epicurus  even  made  the  bold  challenge:  "If  one 
sense-perception  deceives,  none  is  to  be  believed."9 

1  Lucr.  iv.  777-871,  480;  D.  L.  x.  32.     . 

2  Lucr.  iv.  799;  Cic.  ad  Fam.  xv.  16. 

3  D.  L.  x.  31-32,  38-39,  50,  147. 

4  Ibid.  x.  75. 

s  Including  atff6r)<ns. 

6  Us.  247;  Lucr.  iv.  486.  8  Ibid.  x.  42,  53;  Sext.  vii.  203-4;  viii.  9. 

7  D.  L.  x.  31,  39.  »  Cic.  Ac.  ii.  79,  83. 


52       SUBJECTIVE  VIEWPOINT  IN  POST- ARISTOTELIAN  PERIOD 

On  the  basis  of  his  fundamental  tenet  that  all  percepts  are  true  and 
real,  Epicurus  dissented  from  Democritus'  view  of  secondary  qualities 
and  agreed  with  Aristotle  and  Theophrastus  that  all  sense-qualities  are 
objectively  real.1  Absolute  certainty  was  ascribed  to  all  sense-per- 
ceptions inasmuch  as  they  give  us  the  perceived  object  as  it  really  is, 
and  not  merely  as  it  appears.  All  sensibles  are  true  and  real;  for  there 
is  no  difference,  according  to  Epicurus,  between  saying  a  thing  is  true 
and  that  it  exists.2  Only  matter  and  void  are  substances,  he  held; 
all  else  that  can  be  perceived  or  conceived  he  classified  as  variable 
qualities  or  permanent  attributes.3  The  films  that  continually  pass  off 
from  objects  are  exactly  like  them  in  form  and  all  qualities,  and  the 
ctSwAa  are  apprehended  just  as  they  are  in  respect  to  form,  size,  and 
properties.4  Epicurus,  then,  denied  the  subjectivity  of  sensible  qualities, 
and  in  harmony  with  his  experience-doctrine  acknowledged  not  only  the 
reality  but  also  the  relativity  of  percepts.  The  films  that  surround  the 
human  organism  contain  innumerable  atoms  of  which  each  sense-organ 
apprehends  those  alone  that  are  peculiar  and  adapted  to  itself.  More- 
over, no  individual  grasps  the  whole  object,  but  only  the  components  that 
conform  to  the  constitution  of  his  sense-organs.  A  continuous  trans- 
mission of  similar  emanations  from  objects  into  pre-adapted  pores 
produces  impressions  of  single  objects,  was  the  opinion  of  Epicurus;3 
while  mental  imagery  is  caused  by  still  finer  emanations  which  would 
therefore  be  so  subtle  as  to  enter  the  organism  unnoticed  by  the  sense- 
organs.  Thus  percepts  and  images  stand  on  the  same  level  as  material 
of  thought.  What  is  perceived  is  actually  present,  whether  it  be  the 
object  to  which  the  judgment  refers  the  impression,  or  the  films  ema- 
nating from  it.  On  this  presupposition  of  the  external  existence  of  the 
perceived  object,  Epicurus  explained  the  reality  and  relativity  of 
sensibles.  All  perceptions  are  true  for  their  object.  Contradictory  asser- 
tions about  the  so-called  same  thing  refer  not  actually  but  only  nominally 
to  the  same  thing.  All  persons  must  pass  the  same  judgments  when 
they  have  similar  impressions  under  like  physical  conditions ;  when  two 
individuals  appear  to  judge  differently  about  the  same  thing,  they  are 
in  fact  judging  different  things. 

1  Us.  247,  250,  288;  Lucr.  iv.  478;  Sext.  vii.  210,  369. 

»  D.  L.  x.  42,  53. 

3  Ibid.  x.  39-41;  Us.  6:  ffvuirrufMTo.,  ffiv^/Se/JijK&ra. 

4D.  L.  54,  49-51;  Lucr.  ii.  730,  749,  786;  Us.  fr.  29,  pp.  11-13. 

s  D.  L.  x.  46-50;  Sext.  vii.  209;  Lucr.  iv.  87,  104,  252,  714. 


THE  SUBJECTIVE  ATTITUDE  AND  SCIENTIFIC  METHOD        53 

B.  Judgment  and  Inferential  Reasoning 

On  the  basis  of  the  psychological  propositions  that  all  percepts  and 
forms  of  imagery  are  etSwAa  of  which  the  understanding  is  conscious,  and 
that  sense-perception  is  a  receptive  process  while  thinking  is  a  voluntary 
activity,  the  cause  of  error  can  be  found  only  in  thought  as  it  works  on 
the  sensuous  material  and  adds  something  of  its  own  accord.1  Even 
in  optical  illusions  the  senses  do  not  mislead,  but  the  mind  draws  false 
inferences.  "Nothing  is  harder,"  says  Lucretius,  "than  to  draw  the 
line  between  manifest  facts  and  the  uncertainties  which  the  mind  all  of 
itself  straightway  adds  on."2  "Error  and  false  judgment  always  consist 
in  forming  beforehand  some  opinion  about  the  future  or  the  unknown. 
....  There  would  be  no  false  judgments  unless  we  felt  some  other 
activity  originating  in  ourselves,  that  joins  itself  to  the  various  impres- 
sions and  is  capable  of  making  distinctions.  If  the  discriminations 
thus  made  are  not  proved  or  are  disproved,  the  judgment  is  false;  if 
proved  or  not  disproved,  it  is  true."3  Judgments  are  grounded  on  im- 
mediate sensation,  and  may  therefore  be  either  true  or  false  whenever 
they  pass  beyond  or  reject  the  immediate  experience.4  If  a  supposition 
formed  before  the  actual  experience  is  maintained  through  direct  per- 
ception, the  judgment  was  correct.  Even  judgments  about  what  cannot 
be  directly  experienced  receive  their  warrant  indirectly  from  sensation, 
and  a  statement  about  the  unobservable  which  is  consistent  with 
immediate  experience  is  true.  Consequently,  sense-perception  is  the 
final  and  only  ground  of  validity  of  judgments,  in  regard  both  to  things 
not  at  present  observed  and  those  which  never  come  under  direct  obser- 
vation. The  principle  of  verification  must  be  applied  to  future  events; 
the  method  of  non-refutation,  in  explaining  theories  about  the  un- 
observable. 

Sense-perception  was  the  beginning  and  the  unknown  was  the  goal  of 
the  cognitive  theory  laid  down  in  the  Canon.  This  work  dealing  with 
"matters  manifest  and  matters  obscure"5  formed  a  part  of  physics 
and  was  probably  originally  intended  to  show  how  the  principles  upon 
which  Democritus  based  the  atomic  doctrine  were  derived  from  what 
is  self-evident.  As  according  to  Epicurus  all  percepts  are  true  because 
they  depend  on  the  properties  of  the  atoms  and  their  complexes  and 
on  the  sense-organs,6  all  differences  in  sense-perceptions  are  due  to 

1  D.  L.  x.  50,  147.  *  Ibid.  x.  50. 

2  Lucr.  ii.  464-68.  s  Sext.  vii.  22. 

3  D.  L.  x.  51.  6  Cf.  Lucr.  iv.  498. 


54       SUBJECTIVE  VIEWPOINT  IN  POST- ARISTOTELIAN  PERIOD 

necessary  and  uniform  causes.  Physics,  accordingly,  was  necessary 
for  the  understanding  of  the  nature  of  things  in  order  to  vindicate  the 
validity  of  perceptions,  as  well  as  ultimately  to  establish  moral  prin- 
ciples.1 From  similar  passages  in  Lucretius  it  is  clear  that  Epicurus 
recognized  that  it  was  impossible  for  him  to  prove  that  all  perceptions 
follow  from  definite  conditions.  It  was  therefore  necessary  to  insist 
on  the  trustworthiness  of  the  senses  and  to  base  the  validity  of  sense- 
experience  upon  the  evidence  of  things  perceived.2  The  causal  law  ex 
nihilo  nihil  is  basal,  not  only  for  his  physics,  but  for  his  theory  of 
knowledge. 

Truth  and  falsehood  were  attributed  to  belief,  and  "it  was  the  part 
of  a  wise  man  to  distinguish  belief  from  self -evidence,"3  in  other  words 
to  distinguish  the  data  of  sense  from  the  contributions  of  thought. 
Appeal  must  be  made  to  self -evidence  in  judging  percepts;  things  that 
await  future  experience  to  be  proved  or  disproved  must  in  turn  be 
tested  by  the  same  criterion.  The  unobservable  must  be  so  related  to 
what  is  observed  that  if  the  former  be  refuted  so  also  the  latter.  But 
how  is  inference  to  the  future  and  the  unknown  to  be  made  from  im- 
mediate experience  ?  The  reply  of  Epicurus  was  that  such  judgments 
are  made  through  inferential  reasoning  which  was  sharply  demarcated 
from  immediate  apprehension  by  the  senses.  To  sense-perception  he 
referred  all  the  most  general  and  basal  notions.  For  he  held  that  such 
facts  as  fire  is  warm,  snow  is  white,  honey  is  sweet,  pain  is  shunned,  need 
not  be  supported  by  elaborate  arguments;  "for  there  is  a  difference 
between  proof  and  formal  arguments  on  the  one  hand,  and  a  slight  hint 
or  direction  of  attention  on  the  other:  the  one  process  reveals  to  us 
mysteries  and  things  veiled,  so  to  speak;  the  other  enables  us  to  pro- 
nounce upon  patent  and  evident  facts."4  All  general  notions  depend 
on  the  preconceptions  which  form  the  basis  of  inference  from  what  is 
observed  to  what  is  unknown.  Such  inference  is  a  process  of  reasoning 
by  means  of  concepts  which  "are  formed  from  percepts  through  imme- 
diate experience,  synthesis,  analogy  and  resemblance,  reason  also  adding 
something."5  This  process  of  reasoning  Epicurus  applied  only  to 
acquiring  knowledge  of  the  unknown.6  Thus  Epicurus  utilized  the 
free  activity  of  thought  to  explain  error  and  acknowledged  its  function 

1  Cic.  Fin.  ii.  63. 

2  D.  L.  x.  32. 

3  Cic.  Ac.  ii.  45. 

4  Cic.  Fin.  i.  30. 

s  D.  L.  x.  40,  45,  32,  59.  6  Ibid.  x.  36,  39,  73;  Cic.  Fin.  i.  30. 


THE  SUBJECTIVE  ATTITUDE  AND  SCIENTIFIC  METHOD        55 

in  some  form  in  inference;  but  reason  performed  its  function  properly 
only  when  it  accepted  and  worked  over  the  data  of  sense  truly  and 
completely  given,  "adding  something,"  but  nothing  of  its  own  accord, 
apparently.  For  these  new  additions  of  this  irresponsible  activity 
seemed  to  Epicurus  baffling  uncertainties.  Thus  the  subjective  atti- 
tude was  admitted,  but  it  presented  itself  as  an  indispensable  back- 
ground to  the  ethical  doctrines  and  as  a  dubious  factor  in  the  theory 
of  knowledge.  Still  the  acknowledgment  of  a  subjective  standpoint 
proved  a  leaven  in  later  Epicureanism  when  it  was  united  with  the 
psychological  analysis  of  the  Academy. 

2.  CHANGES  IN  METHOD  OF  LATER  EPICUREANS  DUE  TO  ADVANCE  IN 

PSYCHOLOGY 

That  Epicurus  employed  the  primary  principles  of  inductive  logic 
is  obvious  and  the  method  is  clearly  stated,  though  the  term  used  is 
eTraywyr;  and  not  ^  KaO'5fj.oLov  /x,eTa/?acrts  so  common  in  later  discussions.1 
The  advance  made  by  his  followers  was  methodological  and  analytical, 
consisting  in  the  formulation  and  verification  of  definite  rules  of  pro- 
cedure. But  the  aim  of  Epicurean  philosophy  detracted  greatly  from 
the  value  of  the  method  and  prevented  a  natural  development  of  the 
system  of  Democritus  who  would  rather  find  the  cause  of  a  phenomenon 
than  be  king  of  the  Persians.  Elimination  of  fear  of  the  gods  could  be 
effected  by  showing  various  natural  causes.  Hence,  although  only  one 
cause  can  be  rightly  assigned  to  a  single  phenomenon,  according  to 
Epicurus,  the  discovery  of  such  a  cause  had  no  value  for  the  peace  of 
mind  that  was  the  philosopher's  goal,  and  it  belonged  to  the  province 
of  a  soothsayer  rather  than  of  a  wise  man.2  Epicurus,  therefore,  insisted 
that  various  causes  may  be  ascribed  to  every  phenomenon  and  he  made 
no  attempt  to  decrease  the  number  of  hypotheses;  not  because  such  an 
effort  exceeded  the  power  of  human  intellect,  but  because  it  would  be  of 
no  advantage  in  securing  tranquillity  of  mind.  Yet  this  very  reluctance 
to  determine  some  fixed  cause  contributed  to  the  development  of  an 
inductive  method  and  to  the  investigation  of  the  place  of  individual 
judgment  in  scientific  procedure.  For  there  are  several  indications  that 
like  other  systems  the  Epicurean  underwent  important  changes  in 
doctrine  and  method. 

Diogenes  Laertius  points  out3  that  there  were  two  classes  of  Epi- 
cureans, the  orthodox  and  the  sophists.  As  Cicero  praises  some  of  the 

1  D.  L.  x.  59,  80,  87,  92, 104. 

2  Ibid.  114.  3  Ibid.  x.  35. 


56       SUBJECTIVE  VIEWPOINT  IN  POST-ARISTOTELIAN  PERIOD 

later  Epicureans  for  their  learning  and  excellent  literary  style,  the  term 
sophist  seems  here  to  imply  greater  attention  to  erudition  and  culture 
on  the  part  of  these  philosophers.  It  appears  most  probable1  that 
Apollodorus  was  the  head  of  this  new  movement  and  that  the  doctrines 
of  Carneades  influenced  him  and  his  followers  as  well  as  the  Middle 
Stoa.  That  there  was  a  decided  divergence  from  some  of  the  tenets  of 
Epicurus  is  evident  from  a  passage  in  Cicero.2  Epicurus  had  urged 
that  sense-perception  sufficed  in  all  matters  except  in  the  case  of  inference 
to  the  at  present  unobserved  or  the  completely  unobservable.  The 
later  adherents  of  the  school  asserted  the  need  of  preconceptions  where 
Epicurus  had  deemed  sense-perception  a  satisfactory  criterion,  since 
repeated  observations  are  necessary  to  show  that  fire  burns,  honey  is 
sweet,  and  pleasure  is  the  good,  and  since  preconception  is  "the  memory 
of  what  has  often  appeared."  Another  class  of  Epicureans  went  still 
farther  and  asserted  the  necessity  of  reasoning  and  inference  in  all  forms 
of  cognition,  and  maintained  that  in  philosophy  arguments  must  be 
carefully  investigated  and  proofs  presented  which  have  been  logically 
deduced.  Similar  conclusions  on  different  grounds  had  been  reached 
by  the  Middle  Stoa.  To  understand  this  growth  and  the  further  develop- 
ment of  scientific  methods  in  reference  to  the  subjective  standpoint  it 
will  be  necessary  to  consider  the  contributions  of  the  followers  of  Pyrrho 
and  the  Academy. 

3.  PROBLEM  OF  ATTENTION  IN  RELATION  TO  METHOD 

A.  Practical  Standpoint  of  Pyrrho  and  Arcesilas 

As  the  object  of  knowledge  to  early  Greek  thought  was  given  com- 
pletely and  absolutely  to  all  who  had  the  strength  and  clearness  of  mental 
vision  to  see  it,  the  term  cTrio-n^?/  from  its  earliest  appearance  implied 
permanence  and  stability;  hence,  since  clear  insight  was  the  only 
essential,  there  could  be  no  degrees  of  knowledge.  The  distinction  be- 
tween sense  and  reason  and  the  attacks  leveled  against  the  trust- 
worthiness of  sense  by  the  early  physicists,  Eleatics,  and  by  Plato  did  not 
imply  any  doubt  about  the  powers  of  reason,  but  meant  that  scientific 
knowledge  could  not  be  based  uncritically  on  the  information  given  by 
the  senses.  In  the  Sophistic  period,  the  uncertainty  was  emphasized  in 
the  problem  of  conduct.  Plato  and  Aristotle  held  that  a  systematic 
explanation  of  the  world  was  attainable  because  a  rational  world  exists 
and  is  knowable;  yet  the  one  gave  only  probable  theories  of  the  origin 

1  Hirzel  Unters.  I,  185.  a  Cic.  Fin.  i.  30-32. 


THE  SUBJECTIVE  ATTITUDE  AND  SCIENTIFIC  METHOD        57 

and  nature  of  the  world,  the  other  admitted  chance  among  the  principles 
of  things.  The  tendency  of  the  Sophists,  Megarians,  and  Cyrenaics 
was  to  show  that  reason  could  supply  no  more  certain  knowledge  than 
the  senses.  Then  Pyrrho  combined  all  these  criticisms  in  one  sweeping 
statement:  CTTIO-TT//!?/  is  unattainable;  all  is  unknown  and  unknowable. 
Every  statement  can  be  opposed  by  its  contradictory  equally  valid  and 
reasonable. 

The  aim  of  Pyrrho's  philosophy  was  practical  for  it  was  a  theory  of 
life.  For  him  doubt  was  a  means,  not  an  end.  By  later  Skeptics  the 
balance  of  evidence  was  employed  as  a  method;  by  Pyrrho  its  result 
was  considered  of  main  importance.1  In  fact,  the  distinction  between 
the  manner  of  life  and  the  system  of  teaching  had  not  yet  been  made.2 
Pyrrho  was  pre-eminently  an  ascetic  and  a  moralist  rather  than  the 
founder  of  a  philosophic  sect.  He  found  a  solution  of  the  demand  for 
personal  independence,  which  was  becoming  insistent,  and  the  end  of 
life  and  conduct  in  complete  withdrawal  within  himself.  Thus  the  prac- 
tical aspect  of  philosophy  became  all  important  and  a  subjective  point 
of  view  was  deliberately  adopted  with  reference  to  the  objects  of  volition 
and  cognition.  But  this  subjective  standpoint  was  the  goal  and  sum- 
mation of  all  endeavor.  The  view  of  it  as  a  problem  to  be  investigated 
and  as  of  value  for  method  was  first  adopted  by  the  Skeptical  Academy. 

With  the  acceptance  of  Pyrrhonism  by  Arcesilas,  a  new  spirit  was 
infused  into  the  Academy.  Though  in  the  controversy  with  the  Stoics, 
Arcesilas  attacked  the  fundamental  Stoic  doctrine  of  infallible  percep- 
tion and  <t>a.vTa<Tia  KaTaArprTucrj  on  the  ground  of  formal  consistency, 
yet  his  very  denial  of  an  absolute  criterion  of  truth  compelled  him  to 
meet  the  weightiest  argument  of  his  opponents  by  admitting  a  practical 
standard,  the  reasonable  or  probable.  Employing  this  test,  Arcesilas 
asserted,  a  man  will  do  his  duty — an  act  which  can  be  reasonably 
explained — and  will  attain  happiness.3  So  the  clearly  defined,  infallible 
criterion,  whether  of  epistemology  or  of  ethics,  propounded  with  such 
unanimity  by  all  the  post- Aristotelian  schools  at  the  outset,  was  rejected; 
then  too,  the  bare  acceptance  of  the  deliverances  of  sense  and  of  habits, 
customs,  and  laws,  advocated  by  Pyrrho,  was  found  wanting.  The 
decision  rested,  after  due  deliberation  and  earnest  scrutiny,  with  the 
personal  judgment  of  each  individual.  Thus  a  first  attempt  was  made 
to  employ  the  subjective  attitude  as  a  method. 

1  Euseb.  Pr.  Ev.  xiv.  18;  Sext.  i.  19-20. 

2  D.  L.  ix.  69. 

3  Sext.  vii.  158. 


58       SUBJECTIVE  VIEWPOINT  IN  POST- ARISTOTELIAN  PERIOD 

B.  Analysis  of  Attention  and  Scientific  Procedure  by  Carneades 

The  critical  examination  of  this  deliberative  moment  was  however 
postponed  till  psychological  analysis  had  made  considerable  advance. 
Then  Carneades  took  his  stand  firmly  on  the  basis  of  experience  and 
made  the  attitude  of  the  judging  subject  the  ground  of  his  fundamental 
arguments.  Thus  the  psychology  of  attention  was  inaugurated. 

In  the  first  place,  the  absolute  criterion  of  truth  was  assailed,  not  on 
the  ground  of  formal  consistency  as  previously,  but  from  concrete 
experience.  A  criterion,  according  to  Carneades,1  can  be  nothing  but 
a  mental  affection  produced  by  what  is  evident,  that  is  a  presentation 
that  reveals  itself  and  the  perceived  object,  just  as  the  light  reveals  itself 
and  the  object  which  it  illumines.  In  opposition  to  the  dogmatists 
who  held  that  the  presentation  of  a  real  object  is  known  with  absolute 
certainty  because  it  bears  a  special  mark2  which  insures  that  the  object 
is  such  as  presented,  Carneades  maintained  that  the  sign  is  KOLVOV, 
manifested  by  both  the  true  and  the  false,3  as  can  be  shown  from  cases 
of  illusion,  hallucination  and  undistinguished  resemblances.4  Therefore 
there  is  no  infallible  criterion  and  no  knowledge  of  things  per  se.s  As 
the  effect  produced  by  things  depend  on  their  real  nature,  it  follows 
that  the  causal  relation  and  the  course  of  future  events  cannot  be 
infallibly  determined.6  On  such  grounds  Carneades  held  that  dialectic 
does  not  lead  to  certainty  and  does  not  distinguish  between  the  false 
and  the  true.  In  speculative  matters,  consequently,  suspension  of 
judgment  is  the  only  consistent  attitude.7 

In  practical  matters,  however,  the  probable  was  set  up  as  the  general 
criterion.  As  every  presentation  is  from  some  object  and  experienced 
by  some  subject,  Carneades  contended,  it  is,  on  the  one  hand,  true  if  it 
corresponds  to  the  object,  and  on  the  other,  if  it  appears  true  to  the 
percipient.  Such  correspondence  can  never  be  known  with  certainty, 
for  there  is  no  criterion  as  has  just  been  shown;  even  if  there  were  such  a 
criterion,  "it  could  not  exist  apart  from  the  affection  produced  by  what 
is  manifested  to  the  percipient."8  Therefore  there  remains  only  the 
determination  of  the  criterion  in  relation  to  the  subject. 

1  Sext.  vii.  159  ff.  4  Cic.  Ac.  ii.  54-58,  83,  90. 

2  tdiov  ff-rjfjieiov.  s  Ibid.  40,  83,  98;  Sext.  vii.  159-65. 

3  Sext.  vii.  403.  6  Cic.  De  F.  32;  Sext.  i.  182. 

7  For  Carneades'  position  in  this  matter  and  as  regards  the  controversy  between 
Metrodorus  and  Philo,  see  Hirzel  III,  163  ff.;   Brochard  135. 

8  Sext.  vii.  1 60. 


THE  SUBJECTIVE  ATTITUDE  AND  SCIENTIFIC  METHOD        59 

A  presentation  that  appears  true  is  probable,  one  that  seems  false 
improbable.1  Of  the  probable  presentations  some  are  distinct  and  others 
indistinct,  and  only  the  former  can  be  used  as  criterion  of  the  truth  of 
appearances,  that  is,  for  the  majority  of  acts  and  judgments,  as  there  is 
always  possibility  of  error.2  For  presentations  are  never  isolated  but 
form  a  sort  of  chain.  Thus  the  presentation  of  a  man  includes  not 
only  figure,  size,  color,  movements,  dress,  but  also  his  surroundings, 
the  air,  light,  sky,  earth,  friends.  Just  as  in  making  a  diagnosis  physi- 
cians take  into  account  not  one,  but  all  the  symptoms,  so  in  passing 
judgment  about  a  presentation,  the  percipient  must  make  thorough 
examination  of  all  the  accompanying  details,  in  order  that  these  may  not 
divert  his  attention.  When  the  investigation  has  shown  all  the  ele- 
ments of  the  presented  complex  to  be  in  harmony,  then  the  presentation 
may  be  pronounced  congruous  and  consistent.3  The  third  and  highest 
degree  of  probability  is  furnished  by  the  thoroughly  explored  presenta- 
tion. Here  the  apparent  agreement  of  concomitant  sensations  is  not 
considered  sufficient.  Every  circumstance  must  be  examined  in  detail, 
just  as  in  an  election  the  people  make  a  searching  examination  of  the 
candidate  for  office.  A  thorough  inspection  must  be  made  of  the  time, 
both  the  exact  moment  at  which  a  sensation  occurs  and  also  the  length 
of  duration  of  the  stimulus;  of  the  spatial  relations  of  the  objects  and 
person  concerned;  of  the  state  of  the  air  and  surroundings;  of  the  mental 
and  physical  condition  of  the  percipient.  If,  after  such  an  exhaustive 
exploration,  the  presentation  seems  probable,  it  has  the  highest  degree 
of  probability  that  can  be  attained. 

Thus  the  emphasis  laid  upon  the  attitude  of  the  subject  is  very  marked 
in  the  position  of  Carneades.  The  psychological  account  of  presenta- 
tions, their  elements  and  relations,  and  of  the  different  degrees  of  cer- 
tainty attendant  upon  the  personal  interest  and  purpose,  presents  the 
first  detailed  attempt  at  an  analysis  of  attention.  Most  suggestive  is 
the  description  of  the  attitude  of  a  man  pursued  by  enemies  and  of  the 
swift  marshaling  of  arguments  pro  and  con  performed  by  a  person  who 
on  entering  a  dim  room  is  uncertain  whether  the  object  on  the  floor  is  a 
cord  or  a  serpent.4  On  the  basis  of  this  analysis  Carneades  took  a 
middle  ground  between  the  Stoic  affirmation  of  absolute  certainty  and 
the  Skeptic  denial  of  all  knowledge,  between  unqualified  assent  and 
complete  suspension  of  judgment,  between  consciousness  of  reality 

1  Sext.  vii.  169. 

2  Ibid.  170-73,  195;  Cic.  Ac.  ii.  99. 

3  Ibid.  176-81.  4  Ibid.  186-88. 


60      SUBJECTIVE  VIEWPOINT  IN  POST- ARISTOTELIAN  PERIOD 

per  se,  and  of  mere  phenomena  behind  which  an  unknowable  world  of 
reality  exists.1  It  was  also  from  the  standpoint  of  the  judging  subject 
that  he  in  ethics  rejected  all  theories  of  a  supreme  good  which  seemed 
incapable  of  attainment  and  also  the  Skeptic  attitude  of  living  according 
to  instinct  and  custom  without  preference.  So  it  was  also  on  psycho- 
logical grounds  that  he  made  his  most  cogent  criticism  of  Stoic  ethics.2 
Thus  when  a  science  of  external  reality  seemed  impossible,  the  science 
of  the  attitudes  of  a  perceiving,  judging,  acting  subject  developed;  in 
the  examination  of  these  processes  were  discovered  methods  of  inference, 
criterion,  and  degrees  of  probability. 

An  illustration  of  the  methodical  aspect  of  the  subjective  standpoint 
on  the  philosophical  side  is  given  in  a  treatise  on  morality  by  Philo 
of  Larissa.3  Comparing  philosophy  to  the  art  of  medicine,  he  begins 
by  showing  the  advantages  of  virtue,  just  as  the  physician  must  first 
persuade  the  patient  that  he  ought  to  make  use  of  a  remedy.  Next  the 
treatment  of  things  good  and  bad  corresponds  to  the  physician's  search 
for  the  cause  and  remedies  of  disease.  Furthermore,  as  the  art  of  heal- 
ing aims  at  health,  so  ethics  has  its  end,  happiness.  Finally,  since 
the  physician  must  lay  down  precepts  for  the  maintenance  of  health,  so 
Philo  also  discussed  regulations  of  social  life  and  the  common  relations 
of  society  as  well  as  political  questions  in  general.  Here  we  find  not 
mere  acceptance  of  popular  beliefs  or  formal  concepts  and  analysis  of 
these,  but  an  investigation  from  the  standpoint  of  an  inquiring  and 
judging  mind. 

C.  Analysis  of  Inference  in  Theory  of  Signs  by  Carneades,  Middle  Stoa, 

and  Progressive  Epicureans 

In  its  application  to  scientific  methods  the  effect  of  the  advanced 
psychological  analysis  incident  to  the  adoption  of  a  subjective  stand- 
point is  manifested  in  the  criticism  of  modes  of  verification  and  grounds 
of  certainty  as  treated  in  the  theory  of  signs.  This  theory  had  been 
briefly  treated  by  Aristotle  in  his  Rhetoric  and  had  formed  an  important 
part  of  Stoic  logic  as  is  evident  from  the  controversy  between  Zeno  and 
Arcesilas  and  afterward  between  Chrysippus  and  Carneades  in  regard  to 
the  <f>avTaa-ia  KaTaXrjirTiKTfj,  which  was  considered  an  infallible  criterion4 
because  the  sign  on  the  basis  of  which  it  is  recognized  as  true  is  not  a 
common  but  a  special  sign. 

1  Sext.  vii.  160;  cf .  Vol.  Here.  xxvi.  4. 

2  Cic.  Fato  23,  31.  s  Stob.  Ed.  ii.  40. 
•»  Cic.  Ac.  ii.  101,  103;  cf.  34,  42,  84-85. 


THE  SUBJECTIVE  ATTITUDE  AND  SCIENTIFIC  METHOD        6 1 

In  place  of  this  infallible  sign  completely  and  indubitably  presented, 
to  which  a  sound  mind  must  give  assent,  a  "calculus  of  probabilities" 
was  developed  by  Carneades  on  the  basis  of  his  psychological  analysis. 
The  criterion  of  the  merely  probable  presentation  was  to  be  employed 
in  unimportant  matters  and  in  cases  where  time  is  not  allowed  for 
investigation.  The  criteria  of  greater  probability  must  be  used  in 
important  decisions,  the  third  especially  in  ethics,  science,  and  philosophy 
in  general.1  The  Academic  philosopher  enjoyed  research  into  the  most 
important  and  hidden  things  (physics).  Unlike  the  dogmatist  he  did 
not  assent,  believe,  and  affirm,  but  abstained  from  rash  judgment  and 
rejoiced  in  discovering  what  seemed  probable  in  such  matters.2  As  all 
knowledge  depends  on  experience,  the  formulation  of  hypotheses  neces- 
sarily involves  induction  based  on  the  agreement  of  signs.  For  in- 
ference is  founded  on  the  agreement  of  signs  as  is  the  diagnosis  of 
the  physician.3  In  discussing  the  case  of  the  cord  that  resembled 
a  serpent  Carneades  clearly  showed  that  in  sound  reasoning  a  man 
does  not  judge  according  to  common  signs,  but  that  a  thorough 
investigation  of  all  the  signs  is  indispensable  to  discover  the  special 
sign  that  insures  correct  inference.4  The  conditions  under  which  the 
most  probable  inference  can  be  drawn  are  analyzed  in  treating  of  the 
third  criterion.5  Furthermore,  inference  from  what  has  been  observed  to 
something  else  immediately  perceived  demands  indistinguishability 
of  signs,  and  from  what  is  observed  to  what  is  not  directly  observed 
requires  the  greatest  possible  resemblance.  Here  the  subjective  atti- 
tude is  clearly  utilized  in  the  determination  of  method. 

Thus  the  modification  made  by  the  Middle  Stoa  in  the  theory  of 
the  criterion  is  seen  to  be  a  requirement  demanded  by  Carneades  for 
the  highest  degree  of  probability.  Moreover,  Carneades  had  outlined 
in  his  calculus  of  probabilities  the  chief  features  of  the  inductive  method 
set  forth  by  the  Epicureans,  Demetrius  and  Zeno,  in  the  treatise  of 
Philodemus,  Hept  o-^/xetW  KCU  (nj/xeuocrewv.  Furthermore,  besides  these 
Epicurean  criticisms  of  the  Stoic  position  as  supported  by  Dionysius 
of  Cyrene,  otherwise  famous  for  his  mathematical  ability,  there  is  also 
another  exposition  of  the  Epicurean  standpoint  that  gives  evidence  of 
an  earlier  stage  of  the  theories,  perhaps  as  expounded  by  Apollodorus. 
For  these  reasons  it  may  be  concluded  that  the  detailed  investigation  of 
methods  of  inference  and  grounds  of  certainty  was  provoked  and  largely 

1  Sext.  vii.  181. 

2  Cic.  Ac.  127-28;  cf.  108.  *  Ibid.  187;  P.H.  i.  227. 

3  Sext.  vii.  179,  182.  s  Ibid.  vii.  182-89. 


62       SUBJECTIVE  VIEWPOINT  IN  POST- ARISTOTELIAN  PERIOD 

determined  by  the  criticisms  of  the  Stoic  and  Epicurean  doctrines  made 
by  Carneades.1 

The  discussion  of  scientific  methods  and  grounds  of  validity  by  these 
Stoics  and  Epicureans  represented  by  Dionysius,  Demetrius,  and  Zeno 
may  be  briefly  summarized.  As  all  existing  things  are  divided  into  two 
classes,  the  obscure,  which  either  are  not  manifest  for  the  time  being  or 
else  can  never  be  directly  experienced,  and  the  apparent,  there  is  need 
of  signs  only  in  the  case  of  the  former,  by  which  their  existence  and  con- 
stitution may  be  inferred  from  the  latter  by  virtue  of  the  interrelation 
of  all  things.  Since  things  in  general  are  classified  into  genera,  these 
into  species  which  in  turn  are  composed  of  individuals,  signs  are  either 
common  or  special.  The  older  dogmatists,  as  has  been  noted,  had  insisted 
that  correct  inference  must  be  made  on  the  basis  of  a  special  sign  and  that 
the  essential  requirement  was  the  determination  of  such  sign.  The 
contention  of  Carneades,  that  signs  are  common  and  that  only  varying 
degrees  of  probability  and  not  absolute  certainty  can  be  attained,  com- 
bined with  their  own  advance  in  psychological  analysis,  had  effected 
important  modifications  in  the  views  of  scientific  methods  supported 
by  their  successors. 

The  Middle  Stoa  maintained  that  conclusions  based  on  resemblance 
of  signs  are  never  certain.  As  it  is  a  matter  of  observation  that  things 
and  properties  differing  from  those  usually  experienced  have  been  dis- 
covered,2 there  may  also  be  unknown  forces  and  substances  different  from 
those  yet  observed.  Thus  if  it  is  inferred  that  all  men  are  mortal  because 
that  is  true  among  us,  such  a  conclusion  is  not  certain,  just  as  it  did  not 
follow  that  the  Acrothoites  are  shortlived  because  that  is  true  of  all 
human  beings  known  to  us.  To  insure  certainty,  it  must  be  presupposed 
that  beings  unknown  to  us  are  similar  to  us  in  every  respect;  then  no 
new  knowledge  is  gained,  no  inference  is  made.  Hence  the  query  is 
raised  whether  a  certain  degree  of  similarity  is  sufficient  or  if  absolute 
sameness  is  indispensable  for  correct  inference.  The  latter  is  nonsense; 
the  former  gives  no  certain  conclusion.3  The  Stoics  therefore  concluded 
that  only  the  second  method,  logical  connection  of  antecedent  and 
consequent,  gives  certainty.  If  a  is  so  related  to  b  that  if  the  one  is 
disproved,  the  other  is  sublated,  then  only  is  the  inference  certain  and 
not  merely  probable.4  Such  relation  can  be  recognized  only  through 

1  Cf.  Schmekel34off. 

2  Illustrated  by  the  magnet  and  skeleton  of  a  giant  in  Crete. 

3  Cf.  Criticism  of  Epicurean  Tenets,  Vol.  Here.  5,  1-7;  20,  22. 

4  Ibid.  6,  34;  3,  30;   29,  4. 


THE  SUBJECTIVE  ATTITUDE  AND  SCIENTIFIC  METHOD        63 

reason.  The  Epicureans,  they  held,  were  mistaken  in  their  assertion 
that  such  a  judgment  depends  upon,  and  receives  its  validity  from, 
inference  based  on  observed  resemblances.1  Analogy  is  useful  for  it 
must  be  employed  in  observation  and  experiment;2  but  it  does  not 
give  certainty  which  is  afforded  by  logical  proof  alone.3 

Zeno,  the  Epicurean,  contended  against  the  Stoics  that  inference 
by  induction  is  the  basis  of  all  formal  inference.  He  drew  a  distinction 
between  coexistence  and  sequence,4  discussing  not  only  the  properties 
of  kinds,  general  and  particular,  but  also  inferences  such  as,  smoke  is 
the  sign  of  fire  that  may  not  be  visible,  a  wound  through  the  heart 
signifies  death.5  He  laid  down  and  illustrated  the  principle  that  infer- 
ences must  rise  from  restricted  to  wider  generalizations,  and  from  these 
descend  again  to  particulars.6  He  acknowledged  that  such  a  method 
gave  only  probability ;  but  also  asserted  that  there  is  no  other  means  of 
gaining  new  knowledge.7  To  the  Stoic  query:  How  can  there  be  valid 
inference  from  the  observed  to  the  unobserved  when  it  is  impossible 
to  know  all  cases  and  it  does  not  suffice  to  know  merely  some,  he  replied 
that  it  is  necessary  to  observe  what  is  inseparably  connected  with  each 
phenomenon.8  Experience  is  the  test  of  experience.  Experience 
teaches  that  in  some  cases  observation  of  one  characteristic  is  sufficient 
to  pass  a  judgment  about  the  unknown;  in  others,  several  observed  resem- 
blances give  no  basis  for  inference.9  False  conclusions  are  corrected 
through  experience,  that  is,  by  observation  of  phenomena. 

The  Stoics  then  urged  that  observation  alone  is  not  enough;  certain 
inference  depended  on  a  general  law  which  is  grasped  only  by  reason. 
In  fact,  the  Epicureans  implied  that  the  basis  of  inference  is  found  in 
the  nature,  peculiar  characteristic,  or  uniformity  on  which  the  Stoics 
laid  such  stress;  no  clear  formulation  of  this  causal  connection,  however, 
is  found  in  the  fragments.  It  is,  therefore,  noteworthy  that  in  Lucretius 
no  principle  is  more  emphasized  than  the  constancy  of  nature.  "It 
is  absolutely  decreed  according  to  the  conditions  of  nature  what  each 
thing  can  do  and  what  it  cannot  do."10 

These  Stoics  and  Epicureans,  then,  did  not  merely  accept  the  deliver- 
ances of  reason  and  sense  in  their  search  for  the  unknown.  Observation 
and  comparison  were  completed  by  the  insight  of  reason  in  the  one  case; 

1  Ibid.  7,  5.  6  Ibid.  5,  7,  23. 

2  Ibid.  32,  34;  34,  i;  35,  5,  27.  7  Ibid.  5,  30,  3. 

3  Sext.  P.H.  ii.  99,  103-4.  8  Ibid.  37,  26. 
-»  Vol.  Here.  2,  7;  5,  12,  36.  9  Ibid.  26-31. 

s  Ibid.  36,  2;   i,  35.  IOLucr.  i.  586;  v.  677-79;  cf-  vi-  29-32. 


64       SUBJECTIVE  VIEWPOINT  IN  POST- ARISTOTELIAN  PERIOD 

in  the  other,  rational  scrutiny  was  required  for  sense-experience,  and 
some  elucidation  had  been  given  of  the  contributions  of  reason  which 
had  been  only  a  problem  to  Epicurus.  These  significant  modifications 
in  their  scientific  methods  are  clearly  due  to  an  inspection  of  these  modes 
of  procedure  from  a  subjective  standpoint. 

It  was  not  merely  a  theoretical  interest  that  aroused  these  discussions 
about  the  theory  of  knowledge  and  the  methods  of  investigation  and 
demonstration.  In  connection  with  the  work  in  history,  geography,  and 
mathematics  that  engaged  the  philosophers  of  this  period,  the  examples 
used  in  the  disputes  about  the  validity  of  inference  deserve  notice. 
They  deal  with  characteristics  of  men  under  varying  conditions,  plants 
in  different  climates,  minerals,  and  laws  of  number.  Zeno's  criticisms 
of  the  principles  of  geometry  were  perhaps  called  forth  by  the  arguments 
of  Dionysius  whose  mathematical  achievements  were  celebrated,  and 
his  own  views  of  mathematics  were  based  on  his  empirical  method. 
The  controversy  between  Carneades  and  the  Stoics  about  the  basis  of 
moral  laws,  wrhether  reason  or  utility,  was  not  mere  dialectical  sword- 
play,  but  a  vital  question,  as  the  modifications  in  doctrine  and  divisions 
among  the  leaders  of  the  Stoa  suggest.  As  the  ethical  tenets  were  made 
more  adapted  to  the  needs  of  the  time,  so  in  specifically  political  doctrines 
an  attempt  was  made  to  reconcile  cosmopolitanism  with  the  actual 
conditions.  The  steady  growth  of  Rome  and  the  contrast  between  the 
position  of  this  great  power  and  the  political  impotence  of  the  Greek 
cities  led  these  philosophers  to  consider  the  nature  of  the  best  state  and 
the  value  of  government.  As  the  discussions  in  the  Scipionic  circle 
left  their  impress  upon  the  political  theories  of  Panaetius,  Posidonius, 
and  Cicero,  so  the  problems  and  the  interests  of  the  period  influenced 
the  general  trend  of  thought  in  turn.  The  effect  of  Greek  philosophy  on 
Roman  law  as  a  whole  was  significant  and  especially  important  in  the 
creation  of  a  jus  naturale.  Sophocles  and  Socrates  had  enunciated 
the  principle  of  universal  law;  the  Stoa  developed  it  theoretically  and 
practically.  Then  the  Skeptical  Academy  worked  out  the  theory  of 
probability,  the  basis  of  jurisprudence.  "  Greece  had  philosophy,  but 

no  jurisprudence It  was  Rome  that  first  introduced  the  maxim 

that  judicial  decisions  must  be  guided  by  general  principles  and  not  by 
impluses  of  the  moment."  The  Roman  praetors  first  decided  cases  in 
accordance  with  their  own  law  which  was  not  suitable  for  non-Romans. 
Then  by  aid  of  Greek  philosophy  the  juris-consults  created  the  jus 
naturale.  "If  Rome  laid  down  the  proposition  that  laws  were  to  be 
applied  in  accordance  with  fixed  principles,  Greek  philosophy  taught 


THE  SUBJECTIVE  ATTITUDE  AND  SCIENTIFIC  METHOD        65 

the  judges  how  to  group  the  particulars  under  general  rules."1  Interest- 
ing in  this  connection  is  the  account  of  the  development  of  civilization 
and  the  origin  of  institutions,  social,  political,  and  religious,  given  by 
Lucretius.2  He  has  transferred  the  Greek  cosmic  strife  into  the  life 
of  man  and  thus  anticipated  Hobbes.  His  aim  is  to  help  men,  to  free 
them  from  the  supreme  evils,  superstition  and  fear  of  death.  Epicurus 
is  to  him  a  god  not  because  he  has  added  to  the  knowledge  of  the  world, 
but  rather  because  he  has  brought  freedom  to  the  human  spirit.  Thus 
in  every  line  of  thought  a  change  of  viewpoint  is  evident.  With  the 
dissolution  of  tribal  and  customary  institutions  incident  to  the  social 
and  political  changes,  and  the  consequent  bankruptcy  of  many  in  beliefs 
and  tenets,  the  individual  was  thrown  back  upon  himself,  and  the  analysis 
of  his  own  attitudes  became  imperative. 

It  is  convenient  at  this  point  to  recapitulate  the  phases  of  this  move- 
ment in  which  the  development  of  the  subjective  point  of  view  is  most 
conspicuous.  Epicurus,  starting  on  an  empirical  basis,  had  attributed 
to  sense  the  capacity  of  grasping  infallibly  things  as  they  are ;  inference 
to  the  unknown  must  begin  with,  and  return  to,  this  incontrovertible 
basis.  The  reason  for  such  a  position  becomes  manifest  when  it  is 
taken  into  consideration  that  the  foundation  of  his  ethics  was  freedom 
of  the  will.  Therefore  reason  might  make  modifications  "of  its  own 
accord."  Here  is  the  essence  of  subjectivity;  but  he  made  no  attempt 
to  determine  the  relation  of  the  process  of  reasoning  to  this  brute  sense- 
material.  In  ethics  the  stress  was  placed  on  immediate  feelings  though 
the  importance  of  the  quality  of  pleasure  was  made  prominent;  in  the 
theory  of  knowledge  the  need  of  regulations  and  principles  became  evi- 
dent as  the  function  of  reason  was  accentuated  especially  by  the  criticisms 
of  the  Skeptical  Academy.  A  similar  attitude  is  reflected  in  the  treat- 
ment of  scientific  method.  Logical  inference  was  to  be  applied  only 
to  the  unknown  which  was  rigidly  restricted  and  no  attempt  was 
made  to  determine  the  relation  of  this  irresponsible  rational  activity  to 
sense-experience  or  to  analyze  its  mode  of  procedure.  The  Pyrrhonists 
had  withdrawn  into  the  "field  of  self,"  abandoning  all  cognitive  problems 
as  insoluble.  Assuming  a  similar  standpoint,  Arcesilas  constrained  by 
the  requirements  of  practical  life  endeavored  to  utilize  the  subjective 
attitude  methodically.  With  Carneades  the  problem  of  attention  became 
the  focus  of  interest  while  he  tried  to  find  grounds  and  limits  of  inference 
by  analyzing  concrete  acts  of  judgment.  Thus  the  subjective  stand- 
point was  definitely  utilized  for  developing  a  scientific  method.  From 

1  Holm  Hist,  of  Gr.  IV,  498-524.  2  Lucr.  v.  771-1457. 


66       SUBJECTIVE  VIEWPOINT  IN  POST-ARISTOTELIAN  PERIOD 

this  vantage-ground  the  analysis  of  methods  of  investigation  and  demon- 
stration was  conducted.  Here  both  Stoics  with  their  insistence  on 
logical  proof  and  Epicureans  with  their  emphasis  on  actual  observation 
and  experience  discovered  a  common  starting-point  in  their  attempt 
to  ascertain  the  basis  of  correct  inference. 

4.   DEMOLITION    OF    DEDUCTIVE    ANALYSIS    AND    FORMAL    SCIENTIFIC 
CONCEPTS   BY  THE   SKEPTICS 

A .  Destructive  Criticism  of  Scientific  Concepts  by  A  enesidemus  and  A  grippa 

It  has  already  been  shown  what  influence  the  Skeptical  criticisms, 
more  specifically  the  arguments  of  Carneades,  had  on  the  Middle  Stoa 
and  their  Epicurean  opponents.  The  radicals  among  the  latter  seem 
to  have  yielded  to  the  more  orthodox  members  and  the  school  as  a  whole 
apparently  abandoned  the  bolder  scientific  researches.  Progress  along 
this  line,  however,  was  made  through  the  labors  of  Skeptics  and  physi- 
cians of  the  Logical  and  Empirical  schools.  With  Antiochus  the  dog- 
matism of  the  Middle  Stoa  triumphed  in  philosophy.  He  was  a  con- 
servative of  conservatives  and  an  acute  champion  of  purely  formal 
analysis.  Stoicism  in  its  earlier  stages  had  given  evidence  of  the  inter- 
action of  the  theory  of  absolute  truth  and  certainty  with  the  social- 
political  tendency  to  cosmopolitanism  and  the  undermining  of  traditions 
and  customs.  That  the  formal  concept  was  dominant  at  first  is  evinced 
by  the  advance  of  the  exact  sciences,  mathematics  and  astronomy.  But 
the  importance  of  assent.in  all  forms  of  judgment  and  activity  was  accen- 
tuated as  psychological  analysis  was  quickened  by  Skeptical  criticisms. 
When  the  contrast  between  the  ideal  of  science  and  the  variability  of 
practical  conditions  was  brought  to  consciousness,  self-examination  led 
to  discrimination  between  truth  and  certainty1  and  to  an  investigation 
of  the  validity  of  all  inference  in  a  theory  of  implication  (signs).  The 
empirical  basis  and  the  problematical  character  of  social  life  were  brought 
into  sharp  opposition  with  the  ideal  of  method  and  knowledge.  Hence 
the  fact  that  Antiochus,  while  trying  to  reconcile  two  diverse  phases 
of  thought,  attributed  the  greatest  weight  to  the  practical  argument  is 
an  indication  of  the  trend  which  philosophy  was  taking.  In  the  treat- 
ment of  scientific  methods  this  same  tendency  was  manifested  in  the 
joint  labors  of  the  Skeptics  and  Empirics.  For  the  apparent  triumph  of 
dogmatism,  when  Antiochus  became  president  of  the  Academy,  brought 
about  a  strong  reaction  on  the  part  of  Pyrrhonic  Skepticism,  which  had 

1  Cic.  Ac.  ii.  in,  58,  73,  119. 


THE  SUBJECTIVE  ATTITUDE  AND  SCIENTIFIC  METHOD        67 

been  in  abeyance  during  the  ascendency  of  the  Skeptical  Academy, 
in  the  person  of  Aenesidemus,  a  former  member  of  the  Academy. 

Now  began  the  formulation  of  a  correspondence  theory  of  knowledge, 
on  which  was  based  the  demolition  of  prevalent  scientific  methods  on 
formal  grounds.  Identifying  reason  with  sense  and  considering  the 
latter  universal,  Aenesidemus  defined  true  appearances  as  those  appear- 
ing in  the  same  way  to  all,  while  those  appearing  only  to  particular 
individuals  are  false.  Thus  his  criterion,  the  sensuous  counterpart  of 
the  rational  standard  set  up  by  the  Middle  Stoa,  was  the  harmonious 
judgment  of  all  normal  individuals.  For  he  maintained  that  it  is  possible 
for  the  individual  to  say  how  the  external  objects  appear  to  him,  but  not 
what  they  are  in  themselves.  In  the  ten  tropes  he  made  a  clear  and 
comprehensive  arrangement  of  his  arguments:  difference  in  sense-organs, 
divergent  emotional  reactions,  diverse  modes  of  judging,  variations  in 
aesthetical  and  emotional  values.1  From  these  tropes  it  is  evident  that 
Aenesidemus  implicitly  assumed  things  qualified  by  all  sensuous, 
aesthetic,  and  value  attributes  existing  independent  of  the  subject. 
Being  always  in  some  relation  to  the  subject  in  the  act  of  knowing, 
things  in  themselves  cannot  be  known.2 

On  this  same  basis,  Aenesidemus  formulated  a  systematic  line  of 
arguments  to  show  that  there  is  no  absolute  truth,  no  causality,  and 
no  demonstration.  The  proof  is  consistent  and  cogent,  as  long  as  truth 
and  cause  are  taken  as  absolute  entities.3  The  dogmatists,  however, 
asserted  that  causes  may  be  known  from  their  effects,  that  phenomena  are 
the  signs  of  the  reality  of  causes  as  being  their  effects.  Aenesidemus 
replied  that  no  such  absolutely  necessary  relation  can  be  proved  by  the 
criterion  of  the  agreement  of  all  normal  individuals.4  Thus  while  taking 
part  in  the  controversy  about  scientific  methods  carried  on  by  the  Stoics 
and  Epicureans,  Aenesidemus  proceeded  like  a  dialectician,  demolish- 
ing a  logic  of  consistency  dealing  with  absolute  entities.  The  outcome  of 
his  destructive  criticism  was  virtually  to  destroy  logical  entities  and  the 
formal  method  which  he  used,  and  to  leave  for  both  theory  and  practice 
an  empirical  procedure5  that  gave  scope  to  individual  initiative  and 
judgment. 

A  purely  analytical  method  of  criticism  became  dominant  in  the 
Skeptical  school  with  the  five  tropes  of  Agrippa,  a  systematic  attack  on 
the  reasoning  process  nominally,  but  in  fact  an  assault  on  sheer  analysis,6 

1  Sext.  P.H.  i.  40-144.  4  Ibid.  viii.  215. 

2  Ibid.  i.  139-40.  s  Ibid.  vii.  349-50;  viii.  216. 

3  Ibid.  viii.  40-48;  ix.  218-27.  6  Ibid.  i.  177. 


68       SUBJECTIVE  VIEWPOINT  IN  POST-ARISTOTELIAN  PERIOD 

for  they  are  illustrations  of  analysis  carried  to  its  utmost  limits-  Thus 
Pyrrhonic  Skepticism  began  with  the  denial  of  absolute  knowledge  on 
the  ground  of  contradictions  in  sense-perception  and  general  beliefs, 
man  himself  being  a  part  of  the  discord;  then  came  a  systematic  formu- 
lation of  these  arguments  which  implied  that  things  in  themselves 
correspond  to  things  as  known  except  as  regards  the  relation  to  the 
knower;  and  on  this  basis  it  was  shown  that  the  demonstration  of  the 
truth  of  things  unrelated  to  the  subject  that  perceives  and  knows  is 
futile.  Finally,  the  modes  of  reasoning  were  abstracted  and  treated  as 
independent  of  the  material  to  be  related.  The  mind  had  been  set  over 
against  the  thing  which,  when  known,  was  not  itself  but  affected  by  that 
relation.  Thus  the  theory  of  objects  of  knowledge  constituting  absolute 
entities  was  being  gradually  demolished  by  carrying  out  to  its  logical 
limits  the  method  by  which  it  was  established. 

B.  Criticism  of  All  Speculative  Systems  on  the  Basis  of  Real  and 

Phenomenal,  and  Outline  of  a  Method  of  Applied  Science: 

Sextus  Empiricus 

For  this  same  method  of  purely  formal  analysis  was  soon  being 
applied  not  merely  to  sense-perception  and  reason  as  such,  but  to  specific 
systems  of  thought.  Thus  in  Sextus  Empiricus  the  logic,  ethics,  and 
physics  of  all  schools  are  criticized  on  this  ground,  by  presenting  argu- 
ments of  equal  strength  for  and  against  every  doctrine.  The  Skeptic's 
doubt,  however,  does  not  include  phenomena,  things  as  they  appear  to 
and  affect  him;  every  statement  made  applies  only  to  his  own  subjective 
states.1 

Both  phenomena  and  things  in  themselves  were  included  under  the 
general  term,  irpdy/juaTa.2  Phenomena  or  <£avTao-tai  were  regarded  as 
things  in  relation  to  the  subject,  objects  of  which  he  is  conscious.  Within 
this  limit,  the  term  indicates  varying  degrees  of  relation,  from  well- 
nigh  complete  severance  to  a  purely  subjective  state.  It  is  in  this 
sense  that  the  phenomenon  is  the  Skeptic's  criterion;  for  it  cannot  be 
doubted  as  it  is  based  on  susceptibility  and  involuntary  affection.3 
From  the  fourfold  observance  of  phenomena  it  is  clear  that  the  term 
was  not  restricted  to  sensuous  appearances  but  included  moral,  religious, 
and  aesthetic  values.4  In  general  then  the  Skeptic  made  relation  to 

1  Sext.  i.  13,  15,  190,  198,  200.  a  Ibid.  12,  31,  190. 

3  Ibid.  19-22,  190,  197;  cf.  D.  L.  ix.  107. 

4  It  may  be  mentioned  that  the  term  also  means  percept  in  contrast  to  concept, 
and  in  contrast  to  48i?Xa  that  which  is  clear,  distinct,     i.  9;  viii.  216;  ii.  124;  iii. 
266,  etc. 


THE  SUBJECTIVE  ATTITUDE  AND  SCIENTIFIC  METHOD        69 

consciousness  the  distinguishing  mark  between  phenomena  and  things 
per  se.  The  latter  are  the  unknown  things  investigated  by  science, 
indeterminate  and  incomprehensible. 

While  the  distinction  between  things  per  se  and  phenomena  had  at 
first  been  limited  to  objects  of  sense-perception,  Sextus  applied  it  to  the 
whole  field  of  philosophy,  an  attempt  that  was  facilitated  by  the  logical 
tropes  of  Agrippa  and  that  rendered  easier  destructive  criticism.  In 
view  of  the  importance  assigned  to  ethics  during  this  whole  period,  the 
critical  method  used  by  the  Skeptics  had  to  stand  its  severest  test  at 
this  point.  Though  ambiguous  expressions1  predominate  in  the  ethical 
treatises  of  Sextus,  not  only  is  the  knowledge  of  ethical  values  per  se 
combated,  but  their  existence  is  doubted  or  denied.2  The  whole  argu- 
ment rests  on  the  presupposition  that  if  there  are  such  objective  moral 
values  as  maintained  by  the  dogmatists,  they  must  be  entities  endowed 
with  specific  attributes  just  as  the  material  objects  and  all  individuals 
must  recognize  and  accept  them  in  the  same  manner.  But  a  good  that 
is  the  absolute  good  of  all  cannot  be  discovered,3  and  good  has  a  meaning 
only  as  related  to  the  individual  will.  So  from  all  sides  the  knowledge 
of  things  per  se  was  refuted  on  formal  grounds,  and  the  conflict  between 
absolute  entities  whose  reality  is  vitiated  by  entering  into  relation  with  a 
conscious  subject  and  the  world  as  experienced  by  that  subject  gave  rise 
to  a  situation  in  which  the  individual  recognized  the  real  for  him  in  his 
own  consciousness  and  just  for  this  reason  disdained  it  as  phenomenal. 

Having  demolished  all  systems  of  speculation  by  this  sheer  analysis, 
the  Skeptic  limited  himself  to  an  empirical  mode  of  life  without  express- 
ing any  firm  conviction.  When  differences  in  beliefs  and  customs  were 
first  prominently  emphasized,  personal  conviction  was  made  responsible 
for  all  affirmations,  opinions,  and  regulations.  The  Socratic  schools 
had  put  the  stress  on  the  universal,  permanent,  impersonal  element  while 
they  admitted  the  personal  contribution  in  various  forms.  In  later 
Stoicism  the  personal  judgments4  filled  the  largest  place;  they  formed 
the  inalienable  part  of  the  individual  because  he  participated  in  the 
universal  reason.  Moreover,  what  was  originally  expressed  as  personal 
conviction,5  by  the  acquiescence  of  a  large  number  acquired  a  higher 
degree  of  certainty,  as  is  most  clearly  shown  in  the  criterion  of  the 
Middle  Stoa,  of  Aenesidemus  and  the  later  Skeptics.  The  Stoics, 
especially,  deemed  general  agreement  of  high  importance.  For  hi  their 
opinion  conceptions  exhibiting  logical  consistency  must  correspond  to 

1  iii.  178,  190-91,  278;  xi.  18-19,  69-78,  etc. 

3  xi.  69-86;  iii.  184-86.  3  xi.  6,  83-86.  4S6ryfMra. 


70       SUBJECTIVE  VIEWPOINT  IN  POST-ARISTOTELIAN  PERIOD 

reality.  Hence  subjective  convictions  became  objective  truths.  Sextus, 
in  opposition  to  the  Dogmatists,  distinguished  the  general  meaning 
"assent  to  feelings  that  necessarily  result  from  sensation"  from  "the 
acceptance  of  any  opinion  in  regard  to  the  unknown  things  investigated 
by  science."  Such  assent  may  be  a  personal  feeling,  an  indefinite 
impression  or  else  a  firm  conviction.  The  Skeptic  admitted  that  the 
former  was  unavoidable;1  but  he  rejected  positive  assertion.  So  far, 
then,  the  Skeptic  definitely  adopted  the  subjective  standpoint,  but  did 
not  utilize  it  in  any  way. 

But  these  later  Skeptics  did  not  restrict  themselves  to  following 
passively  the  guidance  of  intelligence  and  affection,  laws  and  customs. 
The  Skeptic  had  rejected  the  logical  criterion  for  distinguishing  between 
the  existent  and  non-existent,  the  true  and  the  false.  He  admitted  a 
practical  standard  as  a  basis  for  action  in  ordering  life.2  The  Skeptic's 
daily  life  was  directed  by  the  natural  suggestions  of  intelligence,  by  the 
necessity  of  affections  and  feelings,  by  laws  and  customs,  and  by  arts, 
and  these  four  criteria  were  to  be  heeded  in  an  unprejudiced  way.3 
The  admission  of  the  pursuit  of  certain  arts  is  significant.  Sextus 
acknowledged  the  value  of  training  and  learning  that  were  practically 
useful,  rejecting  pure  mathematics,  astronomy,  astrology,  but  admitting 
grammar,  calculation,  meteorology.  So  while  Stoicism  was  trying  to 
satisfy  the  moral  and  religious  needs,  the  Skeptic  of  the  Imperial  period, 
free  from  the  fetters  of  impossible  theories,  made  a  philosophy  of  every- 
day routine  on  the  basis  of  practical  utility,  and  sanctioned  only  a  method 
deduced  from,  and  applying  to,  immediate  experience. 

5.   PERSONAL    EXPERIENCE    MADE    BASAL    IN    SCIENTIFIC    PROCEDURE    BY 
EMPIRICAL  PHYSICIANS 

A.  Early  Stages  of  Empirical  Method;    Influence  of  Psychological 

Analysis 

While  on  the  theoretical  side  the  rejection  of  absolute  knowledge, 
logical  methods  and  criteria  led  to  the  establishment  of  methods  and 
standards  based  on  personal  judgment  and  experience,  a  similar  move- 
ment along  more  strictly  practical  and  scientific  lines  was  taking  place 
through  the  labors  of  the  Empirical  physicians,  who  were  closely  allied 
in  method  to  the  Epicureans  and  Skeptics.  The  mutual  influence  of  medi- 
cine and  philosophy  was  frequently  noticed  by  ancient  writers.4  As 

1  Sext.  i.  13,  19,  197.  3  Ibid.  i.  21-24. 

3  Ibid.  vii.  29-30.  4  Cf.  Celsus  Praef.  2;  Tertul.  De  An.  2. 


THE  SUBJECTIVE  ATTITUDE  AND  SCIENTIFIC  METHOD        71 

early  as  500  B.C.  there  were  public  physicians  in  the  Greek  cities1  and 
references  to  the  art  of  medicine  are  numerous  in  philosophic  literature. 
It  has,  therefore,  been  suggested  that  the  art  of  medicine  served  the  same 
purpose  in  ancient  philosophy  that  mathematics  and  the  natural  sciences 
serve  in  the  thought  of  the  present  day.  While  the  physicians  were 
taught  by  their  art  the  importance  of  observation  and  experiment,  they 
also  learned  from  the  philosophers  the  method  of  exact  formulation  and 
definition,  which  being  carried  to  an  extreme  led  some,  who  cited  Hip- 
pocrates as  their  model,  to  react  against  definitions,  demonstration,  and 
all  formal  logic  and  to  endeavor  to  submit  the  art  of  medicine  to  the 
test  of  experience  alone.2  Whoever  was  the  founder  of  this  Empirical 
school,  the  movement  seems  to  have  begun  about  the  middle  of  the  third 
century  before  our  era.3  The  three  principles  which  formed  the  basis  of 
the  Empirical  method  as  stated  by  Serapio  were  explained  by  Glaucias 
in  a  treatise  entitled  the  Tripod.4  The  next  important  representative 
of  this  school  was  Heraclides  of  Tarentum,  a  contemporary  of  Carneades 
and  Zeno,  the  Epicurean.  How  far  he  was  affected  by  the  theories  of 
Carneades  cannot  be  ascertained;  but  it  is  certain  that  the  latter  was 
acquainted  and  agreed  with  the  methods  expounded  by  the  Empiric.5 

The  account  of  the  Empirical  method  given  in  Celsus  and  Galen 
belong  to  a  later  period  and  it  is  precarious  to  interpret  the  beginnings 
of  a  system  by  its  more  developed  stages ;  still  the  fundamental  principles 
may  probably  be  safely  referred  to  the  older  expounders  of  the  method 
as  they  agree  with  the  general  philosophic  development.  According 
to  the  Empirics,  the  science  of  medicine  must  be  based  on  experience, 
on  the  observation  of  things  and  causes  manifest  to  the  senses,  and  on  the 
memory  of  similar  facts.6  The  general  definition  of  experience  was 
"the  memory  of  those  things  which  have  appeared  frequently  and  in  the 
same  manner."  The  Empirical  method  consisted  of  three  parts:  the 
individual  observation,"  the  recorded  investigation  of  other  observers, 
and  inference  by  analogy.  At  the  occurrence  of  new  forms  of  disease, 
the  recorded  observations  fail  and  personal  examination  becomes  the 
only  resource.  Hence  arises  the  need  of  a  comparison  of  similar  and 
familiar  experiences  in  regard  to  diseased  parts,  symptoms,  and  remedies.7 
Thus  the  reality  and  value  for  knowledge  of  individual  experience  began  to 

1  Herod,  iii.  131. 

2  Galen  S25K;  7yK;    Sext.  viii.  327. 

3  Celsus  Praef.  3;  G.  6?4K. 

4  Subf.  63,  13;  66,  i.  « Subf.  36,  46,  495  C.  5;  G.  i.  65,  73. 

5  Cic.  Ac.  ii.  122;  Sext.  vii.  179.  ''Subf.  i,  39-41;  G.  xiv.  677. 


72       SUBJECTIVE  VIEWPOINT  IN  POST-ARISTOTELIAN  PERIOD 

be  recognized.  Whether  the  oldest  inductive  logic  began  with  Aristippus 
or  Protagoras,1  its  development  can  be  traced  through  Aristotle,2  Epi- 
curus, and  Empirics.  But  the  formulation  of  the  method  was  attempted 
and  demanded  only  after  the  psychological  analysis  instituted  by  the 
investigation  into  the  problems  of  knowledge  had  received  its  impetus 
from  the  criticisms  of  the  Skeptical  Academy  leveled  against  the  doctrines 
of  the  Epicureans  and  Stoics. 

B.  Value  of  Individual  Experience  Emphasized  and  Occuli  Causes 

Rejected  by  Celsus 

The  further  development  of  the  inductive  method  was  due  to  the 
co-operation  of  the  Empirics  and  Skeptics.  In  the  first  century  of  our 
era,  Celsus  founded  his  Empiricism  on  the  ten  tropes.  This  famous 
physician  is  an  excellent  example  of  that  union  of  Skepticism  with 
Empiricism  that  was  becoming  so  prominent  during  the  Roman  Empire. 
His  position  is  characterized  by  a  desire  to  get  away  from  dogma  and 
to  recognize  the  value  of  individual  experience  in  the  art  of  medicine, 
an  attitude  first  suggested  by  the  work  of  Hippocrates.  Like  the 
Skeptics  he  was  seeking  truth  but  found  that  there  is  no  absolute  truth 
but  only  probability;  for  the  variations  and  contradictions  in  things 
produce  doubt.  The  senses  are  deceitful;  then,  too,  no  help  can  be 
obtained  from  philosophers,  for  they  also  disagree.  The  ignorance 
of  the  how  and  why  is  most  evident.  Everything  can  be  viewed  from 
two  sides,  and  the  evidence  exactly  balances.  In  medicine,  therefore, 
the  treatment  and  remedies  used  depend  on  ever-changing  circum- 
stances.3 Accordingly  experience  can  be  the  only  guide.  This  is  the 
justification  of  the  Empirical  Tripod  and  the  abandonment  of  the 
search  for  a  hidden  "nature"  on  the  ground  of  its  incomprehensibility. 
It  is  not  a  question  of  how  we  breathe,  but  of  what  will  cure  labored 
breathing.  Diseases  are  healed  not  through  dialectical  skill  but  through 
remedies,  just  as  the  husbandman  and  helmsman  are  trained  not  by 
disputation  but  by  practice.  The  essential  matter  is  not  what  causes 
the  disease,  but  what  dispels  it. 

According  to  Celsus,  physicians  who  believe  in  change  and  variability 
are  Empirics,  those  who  do  not  are  Dogmatists,  adherents  of  the  Logical 
school  of  medicine ;  the  difference  between  them  is  manifest  in  the  mode  of 
medical  treatment.  "Those  who  call  themselves  Empirics  limit  them- 
selves to  evident  causes;  they  contend  that  the  investigation  of  hidden 

1  Gomperz  II,  237;  Natorp  149;  PL  Rep.  v.  5i6c. 

2  Anal.  P.  Sjb,  28;  goa,  24.  3  Proem,  i.  5,  32. 


THE  SUBJECTIVE  ATTITUDE  AND  SCIENTIFIC  METHOD        73 

causes  and  processes  is  futile,  for  the  nature  of  things  is  incompre- 
hensible." The  phenomena  are  objects  of  examination;  all  reference 
to  properties  and  forces  which  cannot  be  directly  observed  must  be 
banished.1  On  account  of  the  continual  change  to  which  everything 
is  subjected,  no  invariable  prescription  can  be  given;  even  after  careful 
observation  and  treatment,  the  expected  result  does  not  always  ensue. 
Hence  the  physician  must  vary  his  methods  and  try  different  remedies 
again  and  again.2  The  art  of  medicine  is  based  on  conjecture3  and, 
while  the  hypotheses  often  work  successfully,  they  sometimes  fail. 
Conjecturalem  artem  esse  medicinam.4  The  physicians  of  the  Logical 
school  not  only  dissected  dead  bodies  but  vivisected  criminals.  The 
Empirics,  on  the  other  hand,  insisted  that  such  procedure  was  both 
cruel  and  useless.  The  futility  was  argued  not  merely  from  change 
and  variability  in  general,  but  on  ground  of  the  shifting,  transitory 
affections  that  the  living  being  experiences.5  Here  the  reaction  against 
the  conceptions  of  things  in  themselves  and  of  a  permanent  unchangeable 
"nature"  is  based  on  individual  experience  both  observational  and 
introspective.  The  attempt  to  refer  both  method  and  analysis  to  experi- 
encing subject  finds  here  a  practical  counterpart  to  the  philosophic 
movement  in  Roman  Stoicism. 

C.  Experimentation  Based  on  Individual  Experience:    Galen 

Though  medicine  must  always  to  some  extent  have  been  an  experi- 
mental science,  at  the  earlier  stage  the  purpose  of  experimentation  was 
to  demonstrate,  or  rather  analyze  into  their  presuppositions,  proposi- 
tions acquired  by  intuition  or  formal  deduction — a  position  generally 
maintained  by  the  Logical  school.  During  this  period  as  a  result  from 
the  change  in  standpoint,  an  attempt  was  made  to  build  up  theories  by 
means  of  careful  observation  and  experiment.  Celsus  had  endeavored 
to  reject  the  fixed  dogmas  which  hampered  the  advance  of  the  science. 
This  reform  was  continued  by  Galen,  who  made  great  progress  in 
experimentation.  Contrary  to  the  accepted  usage  of  the  day  Galen 
insisted  that  no  matter  how  distinguished  the  authority,  no  man  of 
intelligence  would  deem  it  right  to  give  credence  to  the  statements 
without  proof.6  Galen  had  as  little  patience  with  dogma  as  Sextus. 
He  insisted  on  facts  as  over  against  theories.7  Thus  in  his  arraignment 

1  Proem,  i.  5,  18.  3  Ibid.  75;    vii.   273. 

3  C.  iii.  93-91.  4 Ibid.  i.  8,  25;  iii.  38,  17. 

s  C.  i.  7,  20-27;  Cic.  Ac.  ii.  122;  cf.  G.  viii.  72iK. 

6  Plac.  286.  7  irpdynara.  oi>K  6v6fja.ra. 


74       SUBJECTIVE  VIEWPOINT  IN  POST -ARISTOTELIAN  PERIOD 

of  Chrysippus  for  his  lack  of  consistency  and  introspective  analysis  in 
his  treatise  on  the  ^ye/xovucdv,  he  also  severely  criticized  the  Stoic  for 
using  quotations  without  bringing  evidence  to  prove  the  assertions.1 
So  he  also  refused  to  accept  the  various  theories  about  soul  that  were 
in  vogue  in  the  different  philosophic  schools  because  he  could  not  recon- 
cile them  with  the  observed  interaction  of  soul  and  body. 

It  is,  however,  in  his  experiments  that  the  effect  of  the  new  attitude 
is  most  clearly  shown.  Though  he  opposed  fixed  dogmas,  Galen  believed 
that  a  fortuitous  combination  of  atoms  could  not  account  for  the  uni- 
verse and  that  the  guidance  of  a  wise  Providence  guaranteed  the  results 
of  experiments  when  uniformity  had  been  duly  observed.  He  proved 
the  functions  of  the  brain  and  nerves  by  the  different  effects  of  injury 
to  the  brain  and  to  the  heart  which  had  previously  been  considered  the 
seat  of  mental  activity.2  He  also  examined  the  structure  and  function 
of  the  different  sense-organs,  laying  special  emphasis  on  psychological 
analysis.3  In  his  dissections  and  vivisections  he  made  use  of  animals 
and  corpses  and  supported  his  theories  by  experiments.  He  worked  in 
a  scientific  spirit,  on  the  principle  that  the  physician  is  a  servant  of 
nature.4 

The  definite  formulation  of  this  inductive  method  was  the  result 
of  the  combined  labors  of  Skeptics  and  Empirics.  The  Empirical  tripod 
was  made  the  basis  of  this  methodology.  The  first  stage,  personal 
observation,  was  divided  into  three  phases:5  direct  and  accidental 
experience  of  some  treatment  that  is  either  beneficial  or  injurious; 
intentional  experimentation  with  different  remedies;  trying  the  reme- 
dies thus  discovered  in  various  cases.  Such  individual  investigation 
must  be  supported  by  the  experience  of  other  observers.6  When,  by 
experimentation  in  a  number  of  cases,  the  regularity  of  the  effects  is 
demonstrated,  then  a  rule  may  be  formed  and  a  system  of  such  rules 
constitutes  an  art.7 

D.  Scientific  Development  of  Inductive  Method  by  Menodotus;    Logical 
Formulation  by  Sextus  Empiricus 

The  scientific  development  of  this  method  was  chiefly  due  to  Meno- 
dotus. According  to  him,  since  the  same  remedies  do  not  always 
bring  the  same  result  in  similar  diseases,  it  does  not  suffice  to  enumerate 

1  Plac.  312-19.  3  Cf.  Ar.  ii.  855-60. 

*  Ibid.  300-301.  4  G.  xvi.  35. 

5  (j)  Trepiirrwffis;   (2)  airroffx^ov;   (3)  /wyitTjTuciJ;  Subf.  36;  G.  i.  66. 

6lffTopla.  ^  G.  i.  66;  Subf.  88. 


THE  SUBJECTIVE  ATTITUDE  AND  SCIENTIFIC  METHOD        75 

the  favorable  results,  but  it  is  necessary  to  observe  whether  the  same 
remedy  produces  the  same  result  always,  frequently,  or  rarely.  The 
physicians  of  the  Logical  school  also  admitted  inference  from  similar 
cases  but  claimed  that  knowledge  of  the  real  causes  can  be  attained 
only  through  logical  proof.  In  opposition  to  them  the  Empirics  used 
the  term  inferential  reasoning*  to  designate  the  method  of  discovering 
phenomena  temporarily  obscure  (not  the  intrinsic  nature),  and  con- 
tended that  they  did  not  use  demonstration  but  observation.  They 
acknowledged  that  such  inductive  inference  afforded  probability  not 
certainty.2  But  when  experience  has  verified  such  inference,  even 
though  it  be  only  in  a  single  case,  practical  certainty  is  obtained.  Thus 
the  Empirical  method  as  practiced  by  Menodotus  did  not  employ  mere 
observation  of  facts  nor  purely  logical  inference  but  a  combination  of 
the  two.  For  the  Empirics,  like  the  Stoics  before  them,  recognized  the 
need  of  reasoning  in  the  repetition  of  experiments  but  maintained  that 
only  sequences,  and  not  occult  causes,  became  known  in  this  way. 
Hence  the  Empirical  method  had  made  a  decided  advance  over  that  of 
the  Stoics  and  Epicureans  already  discussed,  because  it  made  use  of 
the  subjective  attitude.  Among  the  Empirical  physicians  the  method 
of  induction  which  had  been  given  its  greatest  impetus  by  the  psycho- 
logical analysis  quickened  by  Skeptical  criticism,  particularly  of  Car- 
neades,  reached  its  climax  in  ancient  times. 

In  Sextus  we  get  the  logical  form  of  this  method  in  his  theory  of 
the  so-called  reminding  or  suggesting  signs.3  Things  which  are  directly 
and  immediately  experienced  or  are  entirely  beyond  experience  have 
no  signs;  no  demonstration  applies  to  them  but  only  to  things  that  are 
for  the  moment  not  perceived  or  those  that  are  by  nature  capable  of 
being  observed  only  indirectly.4  To  the  latter,  the  Stoics  applied  the 
indicative  signs;  for  example,  the  movements  of  the  body  are  signs  of 
the  soul.  In  the  hypothetical  syllogism  the  indicative  sign  forms  the 
antecedent  and  the  thing  signified  the  consequent.3  Against  this  form 
of  inference  Sextus  made  a  determined  assault.6  For  the  Skeptic  ad- 
mitted only  the  reminding  sign  by  which  things  temporarily  unobserved 
are  inferred.  Such  inference  proceeds  by  the  law  of  association  of 
ideas  which  reminds  us  of  what  we  have  perceived  in  connection  with 
the  object  in  question.  Thus  smoke  suggests  the  presence  of  fire,  the 
scar  the  previous  wound.  Having  often  observed  phenomena  con- 
nected, as  soon  as  we  perceive  the  one,  memory  suggests  the  other  which 


&rtXo"yi<r/u.6s.  3  ai\iuiia.  vironi>i)<TTiKd.  s  Ibid.  101—4. 

Subf.  66;  G.  i.  yyK.  «  Sext.  ii.  97.  6  Ibid.  144,  196,  204-7. 


76       SUBJECTIVE  VIEWPOINT  IN  POST- ARISTOTELIAN  PERIOD 

is  not  visible.  The  illustrations  are  again  the  familiar  examples  of  smoke 
and  invisible  fire,  the  wound  in  the  heart  which  indicates  death.1  Sextus 
even  goes  so  far  as  to  permit  the  search  for  a  cause  according  to  this 
method.  "In  medicine  if  we  know  that  a  wound  in  the  heart  results 
in  death,  it  is  not  as  the  consequence  of  a  single  observation;  but  having 
noticed  the  death  of  Dion  we  also  observe  the  death  of  Theon,  Socrates, 
and  others  resulting  from  a  similar  cause."2 

6.   SUMMARY :  CHANGES   IN   THE   CHARACTER   OF  THE  UNIVERSAL ;    IMPOR- 
TANCE or  INDIVIDUAL  EXPERIENCE;  THE  NATURE  or  A  PROBLEM 

It  is,  therefore,  evident  that  important  changes  in  method  had  been 
wrought  during  the  post-Aristotelian  period  and  that  the  attitude  of 
the  Empirical  physician  differed  widely  from  that  of  the  early  scientific 
investigator.  The  freedom  with  which  the  first  Greek  thinkers  approached 
their  cosmological  problems  was  as  remarkable  as  the  absence  of  method 
to  test  the  bold  theories  which  they  fearlessly  propounded.  So  there 
existed  the  paradoxical  situation  of  a  distinctly  deductive  method  to- 
gether with  inaccurate  statements  of  facts.  After  the  time  of  Socrates, 
when  scientific  thought  became  conscious  of  itself,  we  find  a  remarkable 
coincidence  in  the  procedure  presented  in  the  dialogues  of  Plato  and  the 
logic  of  Aristotle  on  the  one  hand  and  in  the  Euclidean  geometry  on 
the  other. 

In  these  disciplines  solutions  were  analyzed  by  being  traced  back 
to  the  fundamental  principles  from  which  demonstration  could  be  made. 
Such  propositions  on  all  manner  of  subjects,  physical,  mathematical, 
political,  ethical,  had  been  obtained  intuitively,  and  when  they  were 
involved  in  practical  problems  the  demonstration  was  accomplished  by 
their  analysis  into  presuppositions.  Science,  therefore,  dealt  with 
results  virtually  given  and  in  this  form  of  proof  worked  out  a  complete 
method  of  geometry  and  logic.  These  theories  remained  unquestioned 
because  they  were  held  dogmatically,  being  neither  constructed  nor 
altered  by  observation. 

This  ancient  subsumptive  method,  then,  required  a  general  concept 
completely  given.  The  universal  must  be  there  to  begin  with.  The 
investigator's  function  was  to  clarify  the  universal  as  it  appeared  in 
divergent  phenomena.  As  Aristotle  asserted,  final  causes  must  be 
known  in  order  to  make  observations.  If  the  universal  is  clearly  per- 
ceived and  accepted,  the  conclusion  logically  follows  from  the  definition; 
and  the  observed  fact,  or  the  experiment,  is  an  instance,  and  not  the 

1  Sext.  viii.  153-54.  3  Ibid.  v.  104. 


THE  SUBJECTIVE  ATTITUDE  AND  SCIENTIFIC  METHOD        77 

determining  factor,  of  the  theory.  Such  a  view  was  due  not  only  to  the 
treatment  of  the  universal  but  also  to  absence  of  personal  observation 
as  a  part  of  scientific  method.  The  Socratic  and  Aristotelian  theory  of 
knowledge  made  the  typical  and  not  the  individual  significant  for  cog- 
nition. It  was  not  only  that  the  experiences  of  different  individuals 
must  be  explained  as  something  more  than  individual  to  become  scien- 
tific; for  the  Greek  of  the  Socratic  school  individual  experience,  out 
of  which  science  arises,  had  no  value  as  experience.  Reality,  Plato  held, 
belongs  to  the  idea  as  such  and  it  receives  no  validity  from  the  world 
of  becoming.  Aristotle  made  the  advance  of  assigning  reality  to  the 
universal  as  embodied  in  the  particular.  But  though  he  attributed 
great  value  to  observation,  the  phenomenal  was  not  known  till  it  assumed 
the  form  of  ^  fixed  universal.  Thus  the  reality  and  value  for  knowledge 
of  individual  experience  could  not  be  recognized. 

Hence  the  change  of  attitude  toward  the  nature  of  the  universal  and 
the  function  of  inner  experience  which  gradually  took  place  in  the  post- 
Aristotelian  period  was  due  to  the  development  of  the  field  of  inner 
experience.  With  the  study  of  psychology,  there  entered  an  apprecia- 
tion of  personal  experience;  as  the  field  of  introspection  broadened, 
criticisms  of  eternal  verities  became  prevalent.  Epicurus  had  admitted 
various  theories  to  explain  phenomena;  therefore  the  universal  proposi- 
tion need  not  be  necessarily  considered  unalterable.  When  the  psy- 
chological investigation  of  judgment  improved,  suspicion  of  dogmatic 
principles  was  intensified,  so  that  finally  only  practical  precepts  and 
techniques  were  admitted.  As  the  Empirical  physician  made  greater 
use  of  investigation  and  experiment  to  test  the  formulas  accidentally 
or  intentionally  discovered,  the  value  of  individual  experience  was  more 
clearly  recognized.  Established  theories  were  no  longer  baldly  accepted 
and  facts  given  as  illustrative  instances.  The  fact,  not  the  unknown, 
was  the  problem  for  the  later  Skeptics  and  Empirics  and  here  true 
scientific  method  arose.  No  other  field  of  investigation  was  so  definitely 
scientific  as  Empiricism.  Yet  its  development  was  impeded  for  several 
reasons.  Not  only  were  there,  as  is  usually  the  case,  accepted  theories 
which  had  not  arisen  out  of  scientific  observation  and  therefore  could 
not  be  tested;  the  phenomena  under  investigation  were  so  intricate  that 
they  presented  almost  insuperable  obstacles  to  the  testing  of  the  method. 
Besides,  the  social  and  political  conditions  were  not  favorable  to  the 
advance  of  scientific  procedure. 


IV.    THE  SUBJECTIVE  ATTITUDE  AS  A  BASIS  OF 
METAPHYSICS 

I.      GENERAL  CHARACTER  OF   THE   IMPERIAL   PERIOD 

The  most  characteristic  feature  of  the  philosophy  of  the  Imperial 
period  was  its  religious  character,  and  so  the  metaphysical  aspect  was 
again  becoming  prominent.  The  whole  attitude  toward  the  divine  had 
changed.  God  was  no  longer  an  intellectual  postulate,  but  a  moral  neces- 
sity. It  was  not  a  new  problem,  but  the  problem  had  assumed  a  different 
form;  for  a  spiritual  revolution  had  been  taking  place  alongside  of  the 
social  and  political  changes.  Spiritual  needs  had  become  more  clamor- 
ous, and  moral  life  more  self-conscious.  Material  progress  and  munici- 
pal life  were  the  chief  external  characteristics  of  this  age;  its  intensely 
social  life  centered  in  the  city  and  club,  rather  than  in  the  state  or 
family.1  Against  the  materialistic  standards  and  aspirations  of  such 
a  period  there  arose  a  powerful  protest  in  a  widespread  reaction  against 
the  vices  of  the  great  cities,  in  a  growing  belief  that  amendment  was 
required,  in  the  formation  of  religious  guilds,  in  the  bewildering  multi- 
plicity of  religions,  and  on  the  philosophical  side,  in  the  revival  of 
Cynicism  and  the  reconstruction  of  Stoicism.  The  necessity  of  moral 
reformation  was  pressed  home  by  such  earnest  teachers  as  Apollonius  of 
Tyana,  Musonius,  Plutarch,  Dion  Chrysostom,  and  by  stern  Cynics 
who  claimed  they  were  "ambassadors  of  God."  This  movement  was 
not  restricted  to  the  intellectual  aristocracy.  Says  a  well-known  writer:2 
"  Common  ignorant  folk  have  caught  the  passion  for  apostleship.  Every- 
where might  be  met  the  familiar  figure  with  the  long  cloak  and  staff 
and  scrip,  haranguing  in  the  squares  or  lanes  to  unlettered  crowds. 
And  the  preacher  is  often  as  unlearned  as  they,  having  left  the  forge 
or  carpenter's  bench  or  the  slave  prison  to  proclaim  his  simple  gospel 
of  renunciation  with  more  or  less  sincerity."  Thus  on  all  sides  it  is 
evident  that  the  ideal  of  conscience  developed  within  the  limits  of 
classic  life.  On  some  characters  the  times  produced  a  feeling  of  neglected 
duty  that  awakened  a  sense  of  sin  which  both  occasioned  and  was 
fostered  by  the  Oriental  cults.  Another  indication  of  the  same  tendency 
was  the  increased  importance  attached  to  omens  and  dreams.  Others 
again  sought  comfort  in  the  hope  of  a  future  life.  Some  rejected  such  a 

1  Cf.  Dill  R.  Soc.  192-286. 

2  Ibid.  342. 

78 


SUBJECTIVE  ATTITUDE  AS  BASIS  OF  METAPHYSICS  79 

belief;  on  the  whole,  however,  the  desire  for  personal  immortality 
became  more  intense  toward  the  latter  part  of  the  period.  Simultane- 
ously with  this  moral  and  religious  revival,  philosophy  entered  on  a 
new  phase  as  manifested  in  the  reconstructed  Stoicism  and  more  espe- 
cially in  neo-Platonism. 

2.  NEO-PLATONISM:  METAPHYSICS  BASED  ON  PSYCHOLOGY  WITH 
EMPHASIS  ON  INTELLECT 

A.  The  Rise  of  Neo-Platonism 

From  the  beginning  of  the  second  century,  the  combined  movement 
of  neo-Pythagorean  and  Platonic  philosophy  can  be  definitely  traced. 
As  a  philosophic  system  Pythagoreanism  had  disappeared,  though  its 
ao-Krja-is  seems  to  have  continued.  Its  doctrines,  however,  were  revived 
earlier,  about  the  first  century  before  our  era,  when  numerous 
treatises  appeared  under  the  name  of  Pythagoras  or  his  immediate 
disciples.  Two  different  tendencies  can  be  distinguished  in  this  litera- 
ture, the  one  revealing  distinctly  Platonic-Aristotelian  principles,  the 
other  Stoic.1  The  latter  movement  has  with  great  plausibility  been 
traced  back  to  Posidonius'  commentary  on  the  Timaeus  of  Plato;  and 
the  former  to  the  polemic  of  Antiochus  against  the  Stoic  interpreta- 
tion.2 The  origin  of  this  controversy  seems  to  have  been  the  question 
of  the  eternal  existence  of  the  soul  and  the  world,  a  problem  that  may 
well  have  arisen  when  so  many  cherished  beliefs  and  fundamental 
principles  were  subjected  to  criticism.  Carneades,  calling  attention  to 
Plato's  contradictory  statements  in  the  Timaeus,  had  maintained  that 
whatever  is  created  must  also  perish.  Being  unable  to  refute  this  argu- 
ment, Panaetius  rejected  both  the  pre-existence  and  the  immortality  of 
the  soul,  while  Posidonius  upheld  the  opposite  view  in  his  commentary 
on  the  Timaeus  in  which  he  developed  his  Stoic  interpretation  of  the 
Pythagorean-Platonic  philosophy.  These  discussions  may  also  explain 
the  lively  interest  in  the  Timaeus  in  Cicero's  time.  For  during  the  last 
century  of  the  republic,  marked  by  civil  wars,  decay  in  religious  beliefs, 
and  demoralization  especially  among  the  higher  classes,  Epicureanism 
became  popular.  The  poem  of  Lucretius  shows  how  this  philosophy 
combined  with  religious  skepticism  to  stifle  the  hope  of  immortality, 
and  that  he  was  not  the  only  adherent  of  the  school  is  abundantly 
proved  by  Cicero  as  well  as  by  the  fact  that  "Caesar  could  assert  before 
the  senate  without  fear  of  contradiction  or  disapproval  that  death  is 

1  Cf.  Sext.  Phys.  ii.  281. 

2  Schmekel  408-28. 


8o       SUBJECTIVE  VIEWPOINT  IN  POST-ARISTOTELIAN  PERIOD 

final."1  For  this  reason,  Cicero  vigorously  attacked  Epicureanism  and 
drew  upon  Platonic,  Peripatetic,  and  Stoic  sources  to  subvert  its  doc- 
trines. The  later  Peripatetics  had  dogmatically  denied  immortality  and 
Panaetius  had  abandoned  the  older  Stoic  theory  of  limited  after-existence 
so  that  support  of  the  craving  for  prolonged  existence  could  be  obtained 
only  from  Pythagorean  and  Platonic  doctrines.2 

With  the  growing  revival  of  belief  in  a  divine  power  on  moral  grounds, 
as  popular  theology  failed  to  satisfy  the  quickened  moral  intuition  and 
Stoicism  seemed  to  many  to  give  an  inadequate  interpretation  of  the  mys- 
teries of  God  and  of  man's  destiny,  the  revived  Pythagorean  and  Platonic 
philosophy  acquired  great  influence  through  its  attempt  to  justify  and 
unify  pagan  faith.  So  while  empirical  Skepticism  was  assailing  with 
might  and  main  the  ideal  of  absolute  verities  and  urging  the  adoption 
of  popular  standards  and  the  pursuit  of  practical  arts  without  delving 
into  metaphysical  mysteries,  a  stronger  positive  movement  (of  which  in 
philosophy  we  catch  a  glimpse  in  Cicero's  attitude  toward  the  ethical 
systems  and  in  Plutarch's  emphasis  on  the  theological  rather  than  on  the 
ethical  aspect)  came  to  full  development  in  the  system  of  Plotinus. 
Though  he  incorporated  many  elements  from  Stoicism  and  maintained 
that  his  philosophy  was  based  on  a  correct  interpretation  of  Plato,  he 
endeavored  in  fact  to  found  an  immaterial  monism  on  a  psychological 
groundwork. 

B.  The  Soul-Body  Relation  as  a  Problem 

Plotinus  made  psychology  the  starting-point;  from  the  soul  as  a 
center  it  is  possible  to  descend  to  the  world  of  sense  and  to  ascend  to 
the  ineffable  One.3  By  Plato  the  dualism  which  had  become  apparent 
to  philosophic  thought  had  been  focused  on  the  distinction  between 
sense  and  reason  as  based  on  the  discrimination  of  their  respective 
objects.  But  in  the  succeeding  development  we  have  noted  the  gradual 
change  of  stress  until  in  Plotinus  the  opposition  between  soul  and  body 
formed  definitely  the  point  of  departure.  By  showing  that  soul  cannot 
be  described  in  terms  applicable  to  body  and  its  qualities,  he  attempted 
to  prove  that  the  soul  has  real  existence  apart  and  distinct  from  the 
body  and  corporeal  modes  of  being.4  The  argument  may  be  sum- 
marized: It  is  impossible  to  explain  life  as  product  of  an  aggregation 

1  Cic.  Cat.  iv.  7;  Sail.  Cat.  51. 

2  Cf .  Somnium  Scipionis. 

3  Enn.  iv.  3,  i. 

*  Ibid.  ii.  4;  iv.  2. 


SUBJECTIVE  ATTITUDE  AS  BASIS  OF  METAPHYSICS  81 

of  atoms  or  of  material  elements,  for  in  either  case  it  could  possess  only 
the  qualities  of  its  particular  form  of  matter,  and  as  all  bodies  are 
composite,  it  would  not  be  a  unity.1  It  is  equally  impossible  by  means 
of  insensate  elements  to  account  for  apprehension,  sensible  or  intellectual, 
and  for  sensations  of  pleasure  and  pain,  or  even  to  demonstrate  that 
soul  is  body.2  Isolated  parts  of  a  material  mass  can  have  no  knowledge 
of  what  is  suffered  or  done  by  other  parts;  such  power  can  belong  only 
to  a  percipient  who  is  a  self-identical  unity.  Even  if  it  be  not  granted 
that  thought  is  a  perception  of  intelligibles,  still  how  can  intellect  which 
is  magnitude  understand  that  which  is  not  magnitude,3  as,  for  example, 
concepts  of  the  beautiful  and  just  ?  The  unity  of  the  soul  is  not  that 
of  spatial  continuity  with  different  parts,  each  in  a  different  place,  nor 
that  of  quality,  as  color,  which  may  be  in  various  discontinuous  bodies. 
In  its  relation  to  body  the  soul  is  "all  in  all  and  all  in  every  part."4 
The  consequent  difficulties  about  connection  and  interaction  of  body 
and  soul  Plotinus  fully  recognized.5  The  divergence  from  Aristotle,  who, 
feeling  that  the  separation  between  soul  and  body  ought  not  to  have 
been  made,  conceived  of  an  embodied  individual,  is  clearly  illustrated 
in  the  discussion  of  the  term  living  being.6  Plotinus  inquires  whether 
it  is  the  body — physical,  instrumental,  and  potential — or  a  combination 
of  body  and  soul,  or  some  third  composite  nature,  a  duality  composed 
of  both.7  However  this  maybe,  the  soul  must  either  be  unaffected,8 
while  it  is  cause  to  the  body  of  such  affection,  or  it  is  simultaneously 
affected  and  suffers  either  the  same  or  a  similar  affection.  If  the  body 
is  an  instrument  used  by  the  soul,  the  soul  need  not  be  affected  by  the 
bodily  passions  any  more  than  an  artisan  by  the  affections  of  his  tool. 
But  in  sense-perception  there  is  conscious  use  of  the  sense-organs,  "for 
the  soul  must  use  the  organ  while  conscious  of  the  external  affections 
resulting  from  a  sensation;  thus  seeing  is  to  use  the  eyes."  But  in  con- 
nection with  visual  perception,  pleasure-pain  is  involved;  furthermore, 
when  there  is  some  injury  to  the  organ,  the  resulting  pain  awakens  a 
desire  for  healing.  (In  other  words,  even  the  simplest  cognitive  process 
involves  emotion  and  conation  to  a  greater  or  less  degree,  and  the  latter 
processes  implicate  both  body  and  soul.)  But  how  can  the  affections 
come  from  the  body  to  the  soul  ?  That  would  correspond  to  a  case  where 
one  individual  suffers  while  another  suffers.  So  long  as  one  is  the  agent 

1  Ibid.  iv.  7,  1-4.  s  Ibid.  i.  i,  1-4. 

2  Ibid.  5-8.  6  fwox. 

3  Ibid.  8.  7  Enn.  i.  1,4-5. 

4  Ibid.  iv.  2,  1-2;  4,  i.                                        8  dira0i}s. 


82       SUBJECTIVE  VIEWPOINT  IN  POST-ARISTOTELIAN  PERIOD 

and  the  other  the  tool,  body  and  soul  exist  apart.  At  least  he  who 
takes  for  granted  the  agent  using  the  instrument,  makes  such  a  separa- 
tion. Before  this  logical  distinction  was  made,1  the  soul  was  "mixed" 
with  the  body. 

Hence  there  was  some  sort  of  mixture,  either  the  soul  was  interwoven,  as 
it  were,  with  the  body,  or  it  was  a  form  in  some  way  separated,  or  it  was  in  a 
similar  relation  to  the  body  as  the  steersman  to  the  rudder,  or  partly  the  one 
and  partly  the  other:  I  mean  that  it  is  partly  separated  in  so  far  as  it  is  an 
agent,  partly  mixed  as  being  related  to  that  which  it  employs  as  an  instrument; 
so  that  philosophy  may  relate  it  to  that  of  which  it  makes  use  and  when  it  is 
unavoidably  necessary  separate  the  agent  from  the  tool,  so  that  it  is  not  con- 
tinually employing  the  body  as  an  instrument.2 

Plotinus  then  discusses  these  suggested  modes  of  interrelation  and 
asserts  the  need  of  considering  the  sort  of  mixture.  Perhaps  it  may  be 
as  impossible  to  unite  the  corporeal  and  incorporeal  "as  if  one  should 
say  linear  magnitude  is  mixed  with  whiteness,  one  nature  with  another."3 
Thus  the  corporeal  and  incorporeal  are  different  essences.  The  solution 
offered  by  Plotinus  was  that  the  soul  itself  remained  unmixed.  "  Present 
in  bodies  and  illuminating  them,  it  produces  living  beings  not  from 
itself  and  the  body,  but  remains  always  identical,  giving  images  of 
itself  just  as  a  face  in  many  mirrors."4 

C.  Psychology  of  Mental  Processes  and  Reflective  Consciousness 

The  first  image  manifested  in  the  living  being  is  sense-perception. 
The  subject  in  this  activity  is  "the  composite  nature  which  exists 
because  of  the  presence  of  the  soul  and  is  produced  by  the  soul  which 
from  the  body  thus  constituted  and  from  the  light  emanating  from  itself 
makes  the  nature  of  the  living  being  something  different,  to  which 
sense-perception  and  other  so-called  affections  of  the  animated  body 
belong."5  Since  each  sense-organ  is  fitted  for  a  special  function,  in  one 
sense  the  power  of  perception  has  its  seat  there;  but  all  perception  and 
movement  must  start  in  the  brain  where  the  nerves  originate.  Since 
in  perception  a  sort  of  judgment  is  passed,  it  is  an  active  process,  not 
mere  reception  of  impressions.  For  in  sight,  for  example,  we  direct 
our  vision  in  a  straight  line,  and  such  impulse  outward  would  be  unneces- 
sary if  the  object  simply  left  its  impression  on  the  soul.  Plotinus'  chief 
argument  against  the  passivity  of  sense  was  that  we  should  in  that  case 
see  not  the  objects  themselves,  but  images  and  shadows  of  them.  In 

1  irpb  rov  x^pitrai  Sia  <pi\o<ro<ptas. 

*  Enn.  i.  i,  3.  3  Ibid.  iv.  1,4.  4  Ibid.  i.  i,  8.  s  Ibid.  i.  i,  6. 


SUBJECTIVE  ATTITUDE  AS  BASIS  OF  METAPHYSICS  83 

the  case  of  the  other  senses,  Plotinus  also  held  that  a  distinction  must 
be  made  between  the  passive  affections  and  the  perception  and  judg- 
ment of  them.1  A  remarkably  acute  analysis  is  given  of  vision  with 
regard  to  the  accidental  relations  of  size  to  color  and  touch  to  vision.2 
The  process  of  perception  depends  on  physical  conditions;  but  physical 
reactions  cannot  explain  the  storing-up  of  mental  impressions.  Hence 
memory  belongs  to  the  soul,  as  it  is  an  activity  of  the  soul,  though  it 
may  start  from  the  composite  nature.3  Remembering  may  be  incited 
by  the  activities  and  affections  of  the  dual  nature,  but  the  memories 
are  purely  psychical.4  So,  too,  in  pleasure-pain,  the  feeling  belongs  to 
the  animated  being,  the  perception  to  the  soul.  Reasoning  has  properly 
no  psychical  organ,  for  it  is  an  activity  that  does  not  pertain  to  bodies, 
but  is  the  peculiar  life  of  the  soul.  "Thought  belongs  to  us  because 
the  soul  is  mental  and  thought  is  the  better  life  both  when  the  soul 
thinks  and  when  Reason  extends  its  activity  to  us;  for  Reason  is  a 
part  of  us  and  we  ascend  to  it."5  Error  is  due  to  the  dual  nature  which 
weakens  right  reason,  as  the  wisest  counselor  in  an  assembly  may  be 
overcome  by  the  general  clamor.6  In  the  faculty  of  productive  ima- 
gination (<t>avTao-ia)  the  higher  and  lower  processes  meet,  as  it  is  the 
psychical  organ  of  memory  and  self-consciousness.7  This  whole  psy- 
chology treatment  is  most  obviously  based  on  introspection  and  shows 
advance  in  a  more  definite  utilization  of  the  subjective  attitude. 

Plotinus  first  clearly  made  use  of  the  conception  of  reflective  con- 
sciousness,8 which  had  become  ever  more  and  more  prominent  as  intro- 
spective analysis  was  more  widely  applied.  Without  reflective  con- 
sciousness, Plotinus  contended,  there  could  be  no  synthesis  of  the 
impressions  and  in  a  sense  no  understanding.  It  was  especially  by 
emphasizing  the  unity  of  mental  activity,  as  distinguished  from  a 
material  process,  and  its  synthesizing  power,  that  he  was  able  to  develop 
his  philosophical  system.  He  made  a  clear  analysis  of  subject  and 
object  in  thought,  distinguishing  also  between  activity  and  content.9 
Reflective  consciousness  is  the  peculiar  characteristic  of  thought.10  On 
the  other  hand,  lack  of  self-consciousness  is  no  evidence  of  the  absence 
of  mental  activity.  Theoretical  and  practical  activities  may  be  unac- 
companied by  consciousness  of  them;  for  example,  in  intense  reading  or 

1  Ibid.  2.  6  Ibid.  iv.  4,  17. 

3  Ibid.  ii.  8.  7  Ibid.  iv.  3,  29-31. 

3  Ibid.  iv.  6,  3.  8  ffvvalff6i)ffts,  Trapa.Ko\o66iio'ls. 

•»  Ibid.  iv.  3,  27.  9  Enn.  v.  3,  5. 

s  Ibid.  i.  i,  13.  I0  Ibid.  ii.  9,  i;  v.  i,  12. 


84       SUBJECTIVE  VIEWPOINT  IN  POST-ARISTOTELIAN  PERIOD 

in  the  performance  of  a  brave  act.1  His  introspection  also  taught  him 
that  self-consciousness  makes  activities  less  distinct  and  that  the  mind 
functions  better  when  it  is  not  so  diffused  but  withdrawn  within  itself. 
Self-consciousness  differs  from  the  conscious  apprehension  of  external 
objects.  "The  knower  cannot  place  himself  outside  like  an  observer  and 
gaze  on  himself  with  the  eyes  of  the  body."2  This  stage  of  reflective 
thought  is,  according  to  Plotinus,  inferior  only  to  the  complete  unification 
in  which  even  thought  disappears. 

D.  Metaphysical  System  Based  on  Psychology 

In  the  unbroken  hierarchy  which  Plotinus  established  from  matter 
(formless,  indeterminate,  a  mere  recipient  of  forms)  to  the  absolute  One, 
universal  mind  (that  is,  intellect  at  one  with  the  intelligible)  is  formed 
by- the  One  and  in  turn  produces  the  Soul  of  the  Whole  which  creates 
all  other  existences.  On  the  basis  of  his  psychological  analysis,  Ploti- 
nus then  declared:  "As  in  the  nature  of  things  there  are  these  three  prin- 
ciples, so  also  with  us."3  "Everything  there  is  also  here,"4  the  "world 
here"  being  taken  to  signify  the  soul  and  what  it  contains.  "There  are 
as  many  formal  differences  as  there  are  individuals,  and  all  pre-exist  in  the 
intelligible  world."5  "Not  only  the  Soul  of  the  Whole,  but  each  partic- 
ular soul,  has  all  things  in  itself;  they  differ  in  energizing  with  different 
powers."6  Matter  was  to  him  a  conception  useful  to  explain  evil. 
He  defined  it  as  "incorporeal  and  unextended,  like  a  mirror  that  repre- 
sents all  things  so  that  they  seem  to  be  where  they  are  not  and  itself 
keeps  no  impression."7 

Though  Plato  had  suggested  the  identification  of  the  spiritual  with 
immaterial,  all  psychical  activities  were  restricted  to  the  world  of  becom- 
ing. Aristotle,  limiting  it  to  the  divine,  had  attempted  to  unite  tran- 
scendence and  immanence  in  his  doctrine  of  vovs,  an  immaterial  principle 
entering  the  human  being  from  without.  These  supra -scientific  specula- 
tions had  been  set  aside  on  account  of  the  Peripatetic  devotion  to  strictly 
scientific  investigation  and  Academic  Skepticism,  while  Stoic,  Epi- 
curean, and  Skeptic  schools  had  brought  other  doctrines  into  the  fore- 
ground. With  the  development  of  the  subjective  attitude,  epistemo- 
logical  considerations  based  on  ethical  idealism  among  the  Stoics  and  in 
the  neo-Platonic  movement  the  predominantly  religious  spirit  which 

1  Enn.  i.  4,  10. 

2  Ibid.  v.  8,  ii.  s  Ibid.  v.  7;  v.  8,  4. 
s  Ibid.  v.  i,  10.  6  Ibid.  iv.  3,  6. 

4  Ibid.  9,  13.  '  Ibid.  iii.  6,  7. 


SUBJECTIVE  ATTITUDE  AS  BASIS  OF  METAPHYSICS  85 

referred  the  Platonic  dualism  to  the  antagonism  between  soul  and  body 
as  exemplified  in  ascetic  practices  and  in  the  spirituality  of  God,  had 
made  individual  personality  the  essential  basis  of  philosophic  inter- 
pretation. On  all  sides,  then,  a  separation  had  been  made  between 
physical  and  psychological  activities,  that  compelled  Plotinus  to  struggle 
with  the  mind-body  relation.  Fluctuating  distinctions  were  drawn  by 
the  later  Stoics  who  accorded  to  the  mind's  interpretation  and  evaluation 
of  presentations  the  chief  importance  in  life.  According  to  Plotinus, 
all  reality  is  mental,  and  the  so-called  physical  is  an  image  of  the  soul. 
Moreover,  the  Platonic  ideas  were  regarded  by  the  neo-Platonists  as  the 
original  thoughts  of  deity  and  as  such  the  constitutive  elements  of 
intellectual  activity,  thus  spiritualizing  an  immaterial  world.  Mind 
self-active  and  creative,  as  experienced  by  an  individual  as  individual, 
not  only  began  to  be  basal  in  psychology  and  epistemology,  but  as  a 
metaphysical  principle  bridged  the  dualism  provocative  of  the  religious 
movement.  All  that  really  exists  in  the  world  of  sense  is  spirit;  cor- 
poreal substance  is  an  idea  as  it  has  shaped  itself  in  matter.  Now 
mind  did  not  mean  mind  in  general,  as  a  logical  concept.  The  indi- 
vidual soul,  as  revealed  in  introspection,  differed  from  the  Soul  of  the 
Whole  only  in  energizing  with  different  powers.  From  the  subjective 
standpoint  anx  explanation  had  been  given  of  the  fundamental  tenet, 
"Not  only  the  Soul  of  the  Whole,  but  each  particular  soul  has  all  things 
in  itself."1  Standing  at  opposite  poles  of  thought,  Aristotle  and  Plotinus 
had  both  declared  that  the  "soul  is  somehow  all  existing  things." 

Yet  with  the  adoption  of  a  new  standpoint  Plotinus  maintained  in 
fundamental  details  the  position  of  Aristotelian  thought.  For  he  held 
that  the  contemplative  life  is  higher  than  the  practical.  To  the  former 
belong  freedom  and  self-dependence.2  Practice  issues  from  theory  and 
returns  to  it.  Production  and  action  imply  either  the  inability  of 
thought  to  grasp  its  object  adequately  without  going  forth  from  itself, 
or  else  a  by-product,  not  willed  but  naturally  resulting  from  that  which 
remains  in  its  own  higher  reality.  External  activity  whether  in  man 
or  nature  was,  therefore,  regarded  as  an  attenuated  product  of  contem- 
plation.3 But  Plotinus  showed  the  influence  of  the  new  standpoint  when 
he  asserted  that  complete  apprehension  of  the  absolute  was  impossible 
through  any  forms  of  thought  but  was  attained  through  an  emotional 
attitude  in  which  self-consciousness  was  lost.4  Man  must  of  his  own 
free  will  prepare  for  this  union  with  deity  by  divesting  himself  of  his 

1  Ibid.  iv.  3,  6.  3  Ibid.  iii.  8,  6. 

2  Ibid.  vi.  8,  5.  *  Ibid.  vi.  7;  v.  3. 


86       SUBJECTIVE  VIEWPOINT  IN  POST- ARISTOTELIAN  PERIOD 

sensuous  nature  and  individual  will.  Though  the  inspiration  was 
gained  only  by  absolute  absorption  of  the  individual  into  the  divine, 
this  ideal  of  ecstasy  issued  from  an  attempt  to  recognize  individual 
experience,  not  only  from  the  cognitive  but  from  the  emotional  and  voli- 
tional aspect. 

3.   PSYCHOLOGY  AND   METAPHYSICS   OF  AUGUSTINE   BASED   ON   ANALYSIS 

OF  WILL 

Will  became  definitely  fundamental  in  the  psychology  and  philosophy 
of  St.  Augustine.  He  turned  to  the  inner  world  of  individual  experience 
and  there  found  a  means  to  reconcile  religious  dogmas  with  philosophical 
tenets  by  emphasizing  will  in  preference  to  intellect.  Thus  he  discovered 
the  basis  of  all  knowledge  of  God  and  of  the  human  soul ;  for  the  scru- 
tiny of  his  own  personality  revealed  will  as  the  essence  of  reality.  Augus- 
tine was  impelled  to  this  psychological  analysis  by  the  problem  of  evil 
which  had  been  steadily  growing  in  importance  in  the  consciousness  of 
men  and  more  urgently  pressing  for  solution.  He  first  sought  an 
answer  in  Manichaeism,  then  in  Skepticism;  neo-Platonism  seemed  to 
offer  a  more  satisfactory  explanation,  but  finally  free-will  appeared 
to  solve  the  problem.1  The  more  he  considered  the  matter,  the  more 
this  point  of  view  appealed  to  him.  Instead  of  stopping  with  a  mere 
assertion,  he  began  to  defend  and  strengthen  his  position  by  psycho- 
logical analysis. 

Augustine  seeking  a  starting-point  for  his  philosophy  made  indi- 
vidual experience  as  such  the  basis  and  contrary  to  the  opinion  of  the 
Skeptics  he  found  a  way  to  certainty  in  doubt.  Against  the  Academy 
in  particular,  he  urged,  as  Antiochus  had  done,  that  probability  pre- 
supposes certitude.2  Though  familiar  with  illusions,  dreams,  and  other 
favorite  arguments  of  the  Skeptics,3  he  maintained  that  when  one  per- 
son says  a  certain  object  is  perceived  and  another  denies  it,  the  dispute 
is  in  fact  a  matter  of  terms  as  long  as  something  is  perceived.  Doubt 
itself  furnishes  a  strong  foothold  for  certainty,  for  it  implies  the  reality 
of  the  conscious  being.4  The  soul  is  the  whole  personality,  a  living 
unity;  by  its  very  existence  and  self-consciousness,  it  is  certain  of  its 
own  reality  as  the  most  incontrovertible  truth. 

From  Platonism  Augustine  adopted  the  theory  of  the  dualism  between 
two  worlds,  the  intelligible  in  which  truth  dwells,  and  the  sensible 
which  we  experience  through  the  senses  and  which  affords  only  probable 

1  Conf.  viii.  3,  5.  3  Ibid.  iii.  24. 

2  Contr.  Ac.  ii.  A  De  Tr.  xv.  21;  x.  12-14. 


SUBJECTIVE  ATTITUDE  AS  BASIS  OF  METAPHYSICS  87 

grounds  of  certainty.1  Through  sense-perception  the  external  and 
spatial  world  is  perceived;  that  which  is  conceived  through  reason  is 
non-spatial  and  is  located  in  the  knowing  mind.2  The  understanding 
transfers  sense  experience  into  knowledge  and  thus  forms  an  interme- 
diary between  sense  and  reason.  The  information  given  by  the  senses 
concerns  changeable  objects3  which  therefore  cannot  be  grasped  by 
reason  which  alone  gives  absolute  certainty.  When  the  object  is  beyond 
the  province  of  intellect  or  sense,  speculations  to  which  it  gives  rise  are 
baseless  and  trifling.4 

But  in  spite  of  this  Platonic  tendency,  Augustine  fully  acknowledges 
the  importance  of  empirical  knowledge.5  In  his  detailed  study  of  sense- 
perception  he  lays  the  foundation  of  one  of  the  processes  by  which  the 
mind  arrives  at  the  knowledge  of  intelligible  objects  and  finally  of  God. 
The  objects  of  our  awareness  are  of  two  kinds,  the  external  objects  of 
sense  and  the  mental  activities  apprehended  by  the  internal  sense  which 
also  distinguishes  objects  of  the  external  sense.6  The  object  as  visually 
perceived  is  an  object  of  the  external  sense;  the  seeing,  itself,  of  the 
internal  sense.  Without  the  latter  sense,  we  should  be  unable  to 
influence  our  sense-organs;  for  we  would  not  open  our  eyes  to  see  unless 
we  knew  that  by  lifting  the  eyelids,  the  rays  of  light  are  permitted  to 
stream  in,  nor  close  our  eyes  to  avoid  some  unpleasant  sight  unless  we 
believed  that  by  so  doing  we  should  be  unable  to  see.  Here  a  distinct 
emphasis  is  laid  on  the  volitional  and  purposive  aspect. 

This  prominence  of  will  becomes  even  more  evident  in  his  detailed 
psychological  treatment.  In  every  form  of  sense-perception  there  are 
three  factors:  for  instance  in  vision,  the  visible  object  which  may  exist 
before  it  is  seen;  the  act  of  seeing  which  did  not  exist  before  the  object 
was  seen;  the  attention  of  the  mind,  the  act  of  will  which  directs  the 
sense-organ  toward  the  object  and  keeps  the  attention  fixed  during  the 
act  of  perception.7  Augustine  made  further  advance  by  noting  that 
for  an  act  of  will,  reflective  consciousness  is  an  essential  requirement. 
External  objects  may  make  impressions  that  remain  unnoticed.  Thus 
he  had  found  himself  reading  a  letter  without  knowing  what  he  read, 
"the  will  being  fixed  on  something  else  and  consciousness  not  being  so 
applied  to  the  bodily  sense  as  the  latter  to  the  letter."  So  also,  when 
conversing,  we  may  be  thinking  of  something  else  and  not  observe  the 

1  Ibid.  iii.  37. 

2  De  Gen.  xii.  15.  s  De  Tr.  xii.  i. 

3  De  Div.  Quaest,  83,  9.  6  De  Lib.  Arb.  ii.  10. 

4  Epist.  13,  2.  7  Epist.  137,  5;  Trin.  xi.  2,  5. 


88       SUBJECTIVE  VIEWPOINT  IN  POST-ARISTOTELIAN  PERIOD 

words  of  the  speaker.  "We  hear  the  words  but  are  not  conscious  of 
them,  because,  as  the  words  fall  upon  our  ear,  the  act  of  will  by  which 
they  are  wont  to  be  impressed  in  consciousness  is  absent.  It  is  nearer 
the  truth  to  say  that  we  are  not  aware  of  the  words,  than  that  we  do 
not  hear  them."1  Thus  Augustine  gives  a  psychological  explanation  of 
phenomena  that  had  been  previously  noted  by  Aristotle  and  commented 
upon  by  Plotinus.  An  act  of  will  explained  to  Augustine  how  the 
countless  forces  impinging  on  our  sense-organs  are  brought  to  con- 
sciousness. Hence  the  will  has  a  twofold  function  to  perform  in  sense- 
perception:  to  make  sense-impressions  into  objects  of  consciousness, 
and  through  attention  to  transform  an  immediate  into  a  cognitive 
experience. 

Augustine  also  found  will  to  be  the  essential  element  in  imagination. 
This  reproductive  activity  of  the  internal  sense  likewise  presents  three 
factors:  memory,2  which  with  its  contents  received  through  sense, 
corresponds  to  the  external  world  in  the  process  of  sense-perception; 
an  image  of  the  thought-object;  an  act  of  will  which  directs  the  atten- 
tion to  the  image  and  makes  it  an  object  of  consciousness.  When  we 
cease  to  attend  to  this  presented  object,  it  disappears  as  a  thing  of  which 
we  are  aware,  but  is  still  retained  in  memory  until  called  forth  by  another 
act  of  will.3  The  will  is  still  more  influential  in  productive  imagination. 
In  this  field  the  will  is  free  to  build  its  fanciful  structures  and  error 
results  when  these  are  interpreted  as  actual  objects.4 

A  study  of  thought  revealed  to  Augustine  a  similar  significance  of 
will.  He  distinguished  a  twofold  aspect  of  reason,  the  one  concerned 
with  corporeal  and  temporal  objects  and  the  other  with  the  intelligible 
world.3  Still  he  guarded  carefully  against  the  interpretation  of  any 
real  separation  of  the  mind  into  two  parts.  Practical  reason  presupposes 
certain  premises  and  standards.  In  order  to  proceed  from  presupposi- 
tions beyond  the  immediate  content  of  knowledge,  will  must  be  in  evi- 
dence as  a  desire  for  inquiring  and  investigating.  Thinking  is  there- 
fore a  willed  act  of  thought.6  Augustine  struggled  manfully  with  the 
problem  of  their  relation.  He  acknowledged  that  we  would  not  seek 
a  thing  we  know,  but  also  that  it  is  impossible  to  will  the  unknown. 
The  solution  of  the  problem  seemed  to  him  to  be  that  an  act  of  will 
must  have  reference  to  something  partly  known;  and  because  our  knowl- 

1  Trin.  xi.  15. 

2  Memoria  denotes  both  memory  and  awareness:  Trin.  xiv.  14. 

3  Ibid.  xi.  6-8.  s  Ibid.  xii.  2-3;  ratio,  metis. 
*  Ibid.  17.  6Ibid.  ix.  18. 


SUBJECTIVE  ATTITUDE  AS  BASIS  OF  METAPHYSICS  89 

edge  is  partial,  the  will  drives  us  to  know  more.  On  this  basis  will  is 
superior  to  practical  reason. 

In  its  contemplative  function,  reason  deals  with  the  objects  of  the 
intelligible  world,  the  supreme  principles  of  thought  and  conduct.  It 
is  somewhat  difficult  to  interpret  Augustine's  position,  as  it  underwent 
various  changes.1  At  first  he  held  the  Platonic  theory  of  reminiscence; 
but  finding  it  impossible  to  reconcile  it  with  his  religious  views,  he 
identified  the  neo-Platonic  vovs  with  the  Ao'yos,  divine  wisdom.  Then 
Augustine  contended  that  the  will  directs  the  activity  of  practical  reason 
in  bringing  the  data  of  the  outer  and  inner  sense  under  the  principle  of 
rational  insight,  but  that  knowledge  of  these  principles  is  essentially 
revelation.  For  here  divine  grace  and  personal  faith  both  enter  in. 
The  illumination  of  the  individual  consciousness  by  the  eternal  truths, 
the  prototypes  of  concrete  existences,  is  an  act  of  grace,  in  which  the 
human  mind  lacks  the  initiative  power.2  The  attitude  of  the  individual, 
however,  is  also  important.  Such  rational  insight  is  bestowed  only  on 
the  person  who  by  his  efforts  shows  himself  worthy  of  the  privilege. 
Then,  too,  faith  rather  than  insight  effects  the  appropriation  of  these 
principles,  and  faith  contains  the  factor  of  assent,  determined  by  no 
intellectual  compulsion.  Thus  in  all  psychical  activities  Augustine  held 
the  volitional  attitude  as  basal.  Like  Plotinus  he  recognized  the  inter- 
relation of  conative,  cognitive,  and  affective  elements  and  found  a 
solvent  for  his  psychological  problems  in  will. 

Augustine's  analysis  of  error  also  gives  evidence  of  the  prominence 
of  will.  External  objects  present  themselves  just  as  they  are,  and  the 
sense-organs  merely  receive  the  impulse  from  without,  having  no  power 
to  make  any  alterations.3  "Corporeal  appearance,  because  it  has  no 
will,  does  not  lie  or  deceive;  nor  do  the  eyes  deceive,  for  they  cannot 
report  to  the  mind  anything  but  their  affection.  So  it  is  with  the  other 
senses.  If  anyone  thinks  the  oar  in  the  water  is  broken,  he  does  not 
have  a  poor  messenger,  but  a  poor  judge."4  Error,  then,  is  caused  by 
the  will  which  too  hastily  and  indiscriminately  refers  the  impressions 
to  some  object  without  due  consideration  of  the  subjective  factors. 

Thus  the  subjective  standpoint  became  dominant  in  psychology  by 
the  recognition  of  the  significance  of  unconscious  elements,  by  emphasis 
on  the  object  of  knowledge  as  the  object  of  attention,  the  importance  of 
will  in  error,  the  identification  of  thinking  with  an  act  of  will,  and  the 
discovery  of  the  essence  of  personality  in  the  conative  attitude. 

1  Ibid.  xii.  24;  De  In.  An.  34;  Retract,  i.  8. 

2  De  Civ.  Dei  viii.  i.  3  De  V.  R«l.  61.  *  Con.  Ac.  iii.  26. 


go       SUBJECTIVE  VIEWPOINT  IN  POST-ARISTOTELIAN  PERIOD 

Not  only  was  the  inmost  reality  of  the  human  being  ascribed  to  will, 
but  the  grounds  of  all  reality  were  discovered  in  psychical  activity. 
For  according  to  Augustine  the  one  form  of  knowledge  ascends  from 
sense-data  to  the  highest  principles;  the  other,  more  noble,  consists  in 
the  study  of  the  inner  mental  activity  which  reveals  these  norms  of 
reason,  invariable  and  universal.  As  changeless  forms  of  all  reality 
they  are  ideas  in  God  who  is  the  sum  and  source  of  all  truth.  Although 
complete  knowledge  of  God  is  unattainable,  all  rational  knowledge  is 
ultimately  of  God.  Hence  the  deity  is  the  essence  of  all  truth  and  also 
the  absolute  personality  who  can  be  comprehended  only  by  self-knowl- 
edge of  the  finite  personality.  The  three  aspects1  of  psychical  reality, 
conscious  presentation,  understanding,  and  will,  are  also  the  categories 
of  all  reality,  being,  knowing,  and  willing  which  are  encompassed  by  the 
omnipresence,  omniscience,  and  absolute  perfection  of  God.  So  in  a 
knowing  and  willing  personality,  Augustine  discovered  not  only  the 
fundamental  psychical  principles,  but  the  highest  metaphysical  and 
religious  reality. 

1  Memoria,  intellectus,  volunlas,  or  esse,  nosse,  velle. 


V.     SUMMARY 

In  conclusion,  some  of  the  main  phases  in  the  development  of  the 
subjective  attitude  may  be  summarized.  The  problem  of  knowledge 
was  a  product  of  the  consciousness  of  the  contradictions  involved  in  the 
philosophic  systems  on  the  one  hand,  and  of  the  uncertainties  incident 
to  the  disruption  of  customs  and  beliefs  on  the  other.  These  made  an 
examination  of  the  grounds  of  knowledge  imperative.  During  the 
pre-Socratic  period,  a  most  significant  change  in  the  philosophical 
standpoint  had  been  brought  about,  from  the  view  of  matter  as  the 
intelligible  phase  of  nature  to  that  of  form  as  alone  knowable.  Socrates 
found  that  a  more  thorough  examination  of  self  brought  to  light  uni- 
versal and  permanent  elements  of  knowledge.  Plato  accepted  his 
results  and  endeavored  to  mediate  between  the  world  of  being  and 
becoming,  but  it  never  occurred  to  him  to  find  justification  for  the 
universal  in  the  world  of  becoming.  Aristotle  treated  more  definitely 
psychological  problems  than  Plato,  but  his  exposition  was  mainly 
biological.  Taking  his  stand  on  the  reality  of  the  individual  and  the 
necessity  of  the  universal  for  knowledge,  he  worked  out  a  theory  of 
knowledge  that  was  thoroughly  objective  and  realistic.  Thus  the 
emphasis  fell  on  external  control  and  on  mind  in  its  outer  manifestations. 
When  the  attention  began  to  center  not  on  the  type,  but  on  personal 
will  and  assent,  on  the  individual  as  individual,  the  need  of  control  and 
of  a  criterion  became  apparent.  It  was  during  the  investigations  of  this 
problem  by  the  post-Aristotelian  schools,  while  they  tried  to  recognize 
more  adequately  the  ever-widening  and  diversifying  demands  of  indi- 
vidual personality,  that  the  subjective  point  of  view  developed. 

Building  upon  the  cardinal  assumption  of  immanence — the  identity 
of  the  nature  of  man  and  that  of  the  universe — the  most  significant 
innovation  o,f  Stoicism's  founder,  Zeno,  consisted  in  the  insistence  upon 
voluntary  assent  and  the  establishment  of  a  theory  of  knowledge  on 
the  presentations  that  give  certain  knowledge  of  reality.  His  basal 
concept  was  agreement,  harmony  of  the  inner  and  outer,  the  individual 
and  the  universe,  so  that  when  such  a  presentation  was  given,  the  mind 
necessarily  assented.  The  universal  aspect  was  emphasized  by  Clean- 
thes,  who  defined  the  agreement  by  the  physical  theory  of  tension.  This 
predominance  of  the  psycho-physical  point  of  view  forced  Chrysippus, 
when  the  Stoics  were  assailed  by  the  Skeptics,  to  recognize  more  defi- 


92       SUBJECTIVE  VIEWPOINT  IN  POST- ARISTOTELIAN  PERIOD 

nitely  the  human  individual  and  to  resort  to  psychological  analysis  in 
the  attempt  to  base  a  theory  of  knowledge  on  voluntary  assent.  The 
interest  was  thus  transferred  from  the  object  of  knowledge  to  the  process 
of  attention.  Influenced  by  Skeptical  criticism  of  the  given  infallible 
criterion,  the  Middle  Stoa  turned  to  a  scrutiny  of  the  formation  of  the 
judgment  and  accorded  the  individual  a  greater  share  in  determining 
a  standard. 

The  Pyrrhonists  had  assumed  the  ultra-subjective  standpoint  but 
had  at  the  same  time  renounced  all  epistemological  problems  and 
attempted  to  find  the  goal  of  all  endeavor  in  this  very  attitude.  Prac- 
tical exigencies  forced  them  first  to  recognize  and  interpret  their  affec- 
tions. Then  Arcesilas,  though  denying  a  theoretical  criterion  of  cer- 
titude, was  compelled  to  appeal  to  the  "reasonable,"  or  "probable," 
as  the  standard  of  practice,  thus  referring  the  decision  to  individual 
interpretation.  In  the  controversy  between  Carneades  and  the  dog- 
matic schools,  the  analysis  of  attention  wrought  remarkable  changes  in 
the  view  generally  held  of  the  criterion  and  method  of  verification. 
The  grounds  of  certainty  were  examined  and  the  "special  sign"  of  the 
Stoic,  favravia  KaTaXrfTrTuc^,  was  shown  to  depend  for  its  validity  on 
the  individual's  investigation  of  all  circumstances  connected  with  the 
act  of  cognition.  From  the  Skeptic  assault,  especially  that  of  Carneades, 
on  the  criterion  of  truth  which  involved  criticism  of  the  grounds  of 
ethics,  religion,  and  all  scientific  demonstration,  and  from  the  resulting 
restatement  of  the  dogmatic  position,  three  definite  philosophic  move- 
ments can  be  traced:  a  transformed  Stoicism,  neo-Platonism,  and 
Skeptical  Empiricism. 

Epicurus  had  started  on  an  empirical  basis  to  give  a  logical  exposi- 
tion of  atomistic  physics.  His  ethical  principle  of  free-will  made  it 
absolutely  necessary  that  the  sense-data  be  trustworthy,  for  reason 
might  add,  subtract,  combine;  and  therefore  empirical  certitude  would 
otherwise  be  problematical.  Hence  he  inevitably  insisted  on  the  criteria , 
sense  and  affection,  and  on  the  natural  development  of  preconceptions. 
Everything  that  was  directly  experienced  was  tested  by  these  infallible 
standards.  Only  in  reference  to  matters  unknown  was  reason  brought 
into  play,  not  through  formal  demonstration  but  by  calculation  from 
observed  to  unobserved  that  could  not  be  disproved  by  future  experi- 
ence or  at  least  not  refuted  by  actual  experience.  Thus  by  giving 
thought  a  more  dignified  and  influential  position  than  was  accorded  it 
by  sheer  sensationalism,  Epicurus  introduced  the  subjective  attitude 
as  a  solvent  for  problems.  But  no  attempt  was  made  to  determine  the 


SUMMARY  93 

modes  of  operation  of  the  voluntary  rational  activity  upon  the  matter 
of  affection  and  sense  in  valid  inference.  To  Epicurus,  as  to  the  earlier 
Stoics,  the  objects  of  sense  and  thought  were  given  completely  and 
the  manipulating  activity  was  guaranteed  by  the  uniformity  tacitly  as- 
sumed. As  the  Stoics  had  modified  brute  nature  by  the  conception  of 
rational  activity,  so  Epicurus,  besides  the  rigid  mechanism  of  pure  atom- 
ism, introduced  free-will,  both  evidence  of  the  growing  appreciation  of 
personality. 

The  widening  influence  of  psychological  analysis  combined  with 
Skeptical  criticism  made  the  later  Epicureans  give  added  weight  to  rea- 
soning. As  Epicurus  had  advanced  on  sheer  sensationalism  by  assigning 
awareness  of  sense  and  thought  presentations  to  the  understanding  and 
more  particularly  discriminating  sense  from  thought  not  only  by  the 
kind  of  objects  but  by  difference  in  function,  so  his  followers  made 
further  progress  by  maintaining  that  preconceptions  are  needed  to 
grasp  the  simplest  notions  and  finally  that  reasoning  and  inference  are 
involved  in  all  cognition.  Thus  a  sounder  scientific  method  began  to 
be  formulated  as  a  result  of  the  psychological  analysis  that  had  been 
aroused  especially  by  the  stringent  arguments  of  the  Skeptical  academy. 

When  philosophy  began  its  investigations  into  the  underlying  prin- 
ciples of  ethics,  metaphysics,  and  the  special  sciences,  mathematics 
furnished  the  ideal  of  certainty  and  of  method.  The  habit  of  making 
exact  definitions  and  drawing  deductions  from  them,  fostered  by  the 
discussions  in  which  the  Greeks  were  masters,  developed  into  a  passion 
for  demonstration.  At  the  Socratic  period,  a  great  body  of  solutions 
to  a  variety  of  problems  had  been  accumulated.  Then  during  the 
upheavals  of  the  Sophistic  movement,  practical  problems  arose  in 
which  these  propositions  were  used  and  had  to  be  analyzed  into  their 
presuppositions,  and  scientific  thought  became  conscious  of  itself. 
Thus  there  existed  a  series  of  political  and  ethical  postulates,  and  the 
art  of  the  Sophists  consisted  in  showing  how  these  traditional  dicta  of 
the  community  might  be  analyzed  into  more  fundamental  axioms  and 
how  cases  might  be  presented  effectively  on  this  basis.  Such  is  the 
type  of  analysis  that  prevails  in  Aristotle.  Parallel  with  this  logical 
development  is  the  work  of  Euclid,  in  collecting  different  solutions  and 
tracing  these  back  to  axioms  and  postulates,  thus  giving  novel  demon- 
strations. But  when  moral  and  political  problems  began  to  be  argued, 
it  was  found  that  verbal  agreement  did  not  necessarily  imply  complete 
agreement  in  meaning  and  that  the  wider  the  generalization,  the  greater 
the  opportunity  for  variation.  So  inferences  came  to  be  regarded  as 


94       SUBJECTIVE  VIEWPOINT  IN  POST-ARISTOTELIAN  PERIOD 

expressions  of  individual  belief  and  conviction  and  therefore  the  deter- 
mination of  the  criterion  was  most  important.  Aristotle  showed  that 
the  same  degree  of  certainty  cannot  be  attained  in  practical  disciplines 
as  in  the  mathematical  sciences,  still  the  ideal  of  method  was  retained. 
When  the  universal  was  discovered,  the  work  of  the  scientist  was  com- 
pleted, for  every  experiment  was  then  merely  an  instance  under  the 
general  proposition. 

After  the  academy  had  returned  to  a  dogmatic  position  at  the  ascend- 
ency of  Antiochus,  the  Skeptics  took  up  the  formal  destructive  criticism 
of  the  dogmas  maintained  fixedly  and  often  uncritically  by  the  other 
schools,  and,  by  their  demolition  of  the  validity  of  sense-perception, 
demonstration,  and  all  reasoning  by  deductive  analysis,  aided  the  Empi- 
rical physicians  to  build  up  an  inductive  method.  While  the  Skeptics 
proper,  despairing  of  theoretical  certitude,  devoted  their  attention  to 
practical  pursuits,  the  Empirics  developed  their  special  art  by  construct- 
ing hypotheses  founded  on  observation  and  verified  by  experience.  So 
the  interpretation  of  the  changing  conditions  of  disease  and  the  variable 
effects  of  remedies  grew  into  a  procedure  of  individual  analysis  and 
testing.  Accordingly  the  value  for  knowledge  of  individual  experi- 
ence was  recognized  and  the  universal  became  subject  to  experimenta- 
tion as  the  fact  and  not  the  unknown  appeared  to  be  the  problem. 
Gradually,  however,  by  reliance  on  recorded  observations  and  the 
authority  of  such  physicians  as  Galen,  the  rules  thus  discovered  became 
stereotyped  into  fixed  principles  of  the  art  of  medicine.  A  similar 
congealing  process  was  also  affecting  all  other  lines  of  thought  and 
activity  during  the  last  centuries  of  the  Roman  Empire. 

From  the  concessions  made  to  the  criticisms  of  Carneades,  a  Stoicism 
that  had  reinterpreted  the  doctrines  of  the  older  leaders  gradually 
emerged.  Reason  as  analyzing  and  weighing  evidence,  not  merely 
giving  assent  of  necessity,  became  the  criterion.  The  universal  rational 
law  transformed  by  religious  emotions  became  the  inner  self,  the  ideal, 
potentially  bestowed  on  all,  but  in  actuality  a  character  that  could  be 
degraded  or  elevated  by  individual  effort.  The  effect  of  such  a  change 
is  evident  in  the  doctrine  of  different  stages  of  progress  and  in  the  impor- 
tance placed  on  the  evaluation  of  experience.  The  divine  was  during 
the  later  period  not  primarily  a  formal  law,  but  an  indwelling  spirit. 
In  Seneca  and  Epictetus  the  individual  aspect  predominated,  in  M. 
Aurelius,  the  cosmic.  For  all,  "the  little  field  of  self"  was  the  ultimate 
reality. 

In  neo-Platonism,  the  spiritual  monism,  which  had  been  develop- 


SUMMARY  95 

ing  on  the  moral  and  religious  side  in  later  Stoicism  in  conflict  with  a 
material  ontology,  became  a  metaphysical  system.  All  knowledge  was 
held  to  be  of  the  immaterial  and  spiritual,  but  only  the  images  of  the 
absolute  were  cognitively  apprehended;  union  with  reality  itself  could 
be  achieved  only  through  an  emotional  state  that  surpassed  all 
knowledge.  Augustine  based  his  philosophy  on  the  absolute  certainty 
of  a  conscious  mind.  In  psychical  activity  in  its  various  forms  he  dis- 
covered the  principles  of  reality.  The  essence  of  personality  was  to 
him  the  undetermined  will  and  for  that  reason  he  located  there  the 
conflict  between  the  universal  and  the  individual  as  well  as  its  solution. 

Thus  in  this  period,  the  individual,  who  is  the  focus  of  interest,  is  at 
first  set  over  against  the  permanent  unchanging  universal  in  the  theory 
of  knowledge,  in  scientific  method,  in  ethics,  in  politics,  and  in  religion. 
As  the  individual  tries  to  readjust  himself  to  this  external  control, 
the  internal  control  develops,  and  in  turn  reinterprets  the  universal, 
until  the  ideal  of  knowledge  finally  becomes  not  a  reproduction  of  ex- 
ternal reality  but  a  harmonious  organization  of  inner  experience  through 
which  the  external  meaning  is  also  interpreted. 

The  development  can  be  traced  briefly  in  the  growth  of  the  term  <f>av- 
racria.  Originally  identified  indefinitely  with  either  sense  or  thought,  it 
was  by  Aristotle  used  for  presentation  in  sense-perception  and  concep- 
tion and,  as  a  technical  term,  for  imagination.  Stoics  and  Epicureans 
at  first  emphasized  the  sensuous  presentation,  then  the  thought-image, 
both  defined  in  material  terms.  At  the  same  time  the  Stoics  labored 
with  the  import  of  judgment  and  meaning.  All  signification  they  held  to 
be  incorporeal  and  acknowledgment  to  be  given  not  to  the  symbol  or  the 
thing  signified,  but  to  the  meaning  expressed  by  the  proposition.  Then 
as  the  importance  of  the  inner  experience  increased,  <f>avTa.<ria  came  to 
mean  not  only  the  image,  but  also  the  value  attached  by  the  mind 
to  things  perceived  or  conceived.  It  was  not  the  unknown  that  called 
for  explanation.  Things  presented  ask  questions  of  the  mind,  said 
Epictetus;  and  then  all  reality  must  consist  in  the  answer  given  by 
reason.  In  the  words  of  M.  Aurelius,  the  view  taken  is  everything. 
For  neo-Platonism  all  cognitive  objects  were  images  of  the  absolute  and 
all  reality  was  mental.  St.  Augustine  discovered  that  in  all  stages  of 
knowledge  the  object  must  be  in  consciousness  and  that  will  is  the 
determining  factor. 

But  as  the  individual  had  reinterpreted  reality  in  the  political, 
social,  religious,  moral,  and  cognitive  realms,  the  new  universals 
again  became  the  fixed  standards  to  which  he  must  accommodate  himself 


96       SUBJECTIVE  VIEWPOINT  IN  POST- ARISTOTELIAN  PERIOD 

as  expressed  for  him  in  the  authority  of  philosophy,  science,  state,  and 
church.  The  practical  problems  could  again  be  solved  with  reference 
to  stable  standards,  and  so  for  Augustine  the  theoretical  which  had  been 
the  fading  ideal  for  actual  life  became  the  good  attained  in  the  future 
life.  "Somehow  the  soul  is  all  existing  things,"  said  Aristotle.  It  was 
the  investigation  of  this  "somehow"  that  formed  the  problem  in  episte- 
mology  and  scientific  method,  in  morals  and  religion;  and  through  this 
analysis  the  point  of  view  shifted  from  the  external  to  the  internal. 
Here  finally  in  the  subjective  attitude  was  found  the  control  which  deter- 
mined all  aspects  of  life. 


UC  SOUTHERN  REGIONAL  LIBRARY 


A     000040120     8 


